While rejecting international allegations of the Arakan Army’s (AA) attacks on Rohingya civilians in northern Rakhine State, the AA’s chief explains in the second part of our interview how the Rohingya issue has been politicized since the 1950s.
Aung Zaw: I’d like to inquire about the recent conflicts and clashes in Buthidaung and Maungdaw in Rakhine State. Reports have surfaced alleging that the Arakan Army (AA) attacked Rohingya civilians on August 5 and 6. The AA has denied these claims. Do you have any evidence that refutes these allegations?
Tun Myat Naing: There have been numerous allegations both before and during the seizure of Buthidaung. When discussing the situation in Rakhine State, it’s challenging to provide a single, straightforward answer.
The context should be taken into consideration. While I won’t delve into an exhaustive list of contexts, it’s worth noting that during World War II, Muslim communities in the Rakhine border region fought alongside the British.
During that time, when the Rakhine and Burmese forces advanced alongside the Japanese, the Muslim communities were armed by the British. These weapons were used in violent conflicts against the Rakhine people, leading to significant loss of life and what can be termed as genocidal acts.
There were killings back and forth. This historical backdrop has fueled a vicious cycle of animosity and mistrust between the communities with each harboring grievances. Building trust in such a context remains a formidable challenge.
Following Prime Minister U Nu in the 1950s, Bamar politicians began exploiting tensions between the Rakhine and Muslim communities for their own gain. The country was then a democracy and Rakhine parties consistently secured landslide victories within Rakhine State and Bamar parties were unable to compete.
To counteract this, U Nu offered to recognize the Rohingya and grant autonomy to the Mayu Frontier District to win their support. The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) later issued about 500,000 white cards, following in U Nu’s footsteps.
Currently, the junta is exacerbating these tensions by arming and training Muslim groups, encouraging them with rhetoric that frames their struggle as a divine mission and a rightful claim to the land.
Bamar political and military leaders have long manipulated ethnic and religious conflicts for their own interests, fueling animosity between communities.
Rohingya activists say they had their own broadcasts under U Nu and the government used the name Rohingya. This reflects the deep-seated dishonesty of the politicians.
The situation has deteriorated significantly under the current regime. The conflict, which has its roots in World War II, and was exacerbated by U Nu’s Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League, saw further complications with the rise of the AA under Thein Sein’s regime.
It was officially established in 2009 and fully operational by 2014.
By around 2015, CEOs in Buthidaung and Maungdaw, such as those from the Naing Group and Father Land, who were also USDP members, played a role in organizing the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) to counterbalance the AA.
Under State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the military created a scheme to exploit these conflicts to undermine and eventually overthrow the elected government.
However, their actions spiraled out of control, leading to severe consequences. After the 2021 coup, their desperation led them to take increasingly reckless action, including arming the Rohingya and forming alliances with terrorist groups like ARSA. They betrayed their duty and ethical responsibilities as an army to the country and its people.
AZ: I appreciate this. Both the international and domestic media have highlighted multiple instances of the junta arming and training the Rohingya, including groups like ARSA and the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO). Captured junta personnel have confirmed these activities. Do you have any additional evidence or updates?
TMN: We have gathered evidence and witness accounts following our seizure of the military headquarters in Buthidaung.
We confiscated computers, official documents detailing orders and apprehended officers responsible for executing those orders.
We obtained data from their phones.
The evidence at our disposal is more than sufficient, though we are withholding some of it during wartime. The data includes information about individuals who commanded the burning of villages, to pin the blame on the AA and exacerbate conflicts.
AZ: When will the media and human rights organizations addressing the Rakhine crisis see this evidence?
TMN: Although we possess substantial evidence, we can only declassify a portion of it. Despite the enemy’s retreat, we have not yet achieved total victory.
In future confrontations, if we have exhausted all our leverage, we may face new challenges. Therefore, we cannot reveal all the sensitive information at this time. We are facing severe allegations and criticism for now and have to keep it classified for now.
We are prepared to declassify some evidence obtained from mobile devices, though technological evidence and certain witness testimonies will remain confidential for now.
AZ: There has been considerable blame directed at the AA. In terms of strategic communication, do you believe the AA’s approach is robust or lacking?
TMN: At times, it feels like we are being overwhelmed by a flood of allegations. However, these challenges only strengthen our resolve and commitment. Instead of weakening our determination, they clarify our understanding of who stands with us and who is opposed. Whereas we previously engaged in dialogue with external stakeholders, it has now become clear that they align with our adversaries, categorizing them as opponents.
We are more inclined toward action than rhetoric. In townships like Minbya, Mrauk-U, Kyauktaw and Rathedaung, which host significant Muslim communities, we are collaborating with Muslims closely on governance and law enforcement.
Although some issues may arise, they are typically related to gang activities or routine confrontations, not ethnic or religious conflicts.
This collaboration reflects our dedication to fostering peaceful coexistence and harmony among different groups.
Extremists have been collaborating with junta forces, while external organizations are vigorously advocating for them.
These organizations, seasoned by past crises, are well-versed in legal matters and well-funded. Their persistent efforts date back to the 2017 crisis, during which they sought to highlight the loss of lives. Despite their attempts to undermine the military, there was some basis to their claims.
Their statements consistently push for international intervention and the creation of safe zones, specifically in Buthidaung and Maungdaw, which have historically been considered our ancestral lands.
Muslims have lived there since the British colonial era and their continued presence should be marked by peaceful and loyal coexistence.
We cannot allow these areas to be separated from us. Despite facing criticism before and during the conflict, we have kept Bangladesh’s security agencies informed of our operations and commitment to minimizing civilian casualties.
We have enforced strict adherence to codes of conduct among our soldiers and have taken severe action against any breaches. This commitment is recognized by residents.
We have established local governments, law enforcement and religious organizations with the support of the Muslim communities.
Managing such a large population would have been impossible without their assistance. Therefore, we view Muslim communities through distinct lenses: those in Rakhine State, those in refugee camps and those internationally.
Each group has different agendas and perspectives. The Rakhine communities seek peaceful living with access to healthcare and education. However, refugee camps are saturated with NGOs pushing various agendas, from governance formation and rights advocacy to incitements to violence and claims of divine missions. The international community, meanwhile, focuses on protection and potential interventions.
Since the AA attacked junta forces, there has been an attempt to exaggerate the impact of the conflict, with claims of numerous casualties even when the actual numbers are low.
Their ambition to control Buthidaung fuels their resentment towards the AA’s presence. This is their issue. In Rakhine State, we aim for peaceful coexistence.
This land, our ancestral heritage, is non-negotiable. We are determined to defend it against any threat, even if faced with unprecedented challenges. Believe me, not even aliens could force us to stop.
In war, destruction is inevitable, but we strive to protect our people to the best of our ability.
Due to operational security, we cannot always provide detailed warnings. Our primary strategy has been to advise evacuation only when battles are imminent.
In areas with large Muslim populations, we took measures to warn residents of impending clashes to avoid accusations of forced evacuations or indiscriminate shootings.
We have captured several cities, always issuing warnings before any military action.
Despite our efforts, there have been requests for safe zones and supplies from those affected. During the conflict, our soldiers had to fight in torn uniforms due to resource constraints.
Our advice to civilians was to seek safer locations where they could survive.
We assisted with every bit of supplies and medicine we could manage, not only in Maungdaw but also elsewhere.
We have faced significant criticism for these efforts. If our intent were truly to harm them, why would we do so in a location visible to international observers, such as near the Naf River to the east of Maungdaw? The Mayu mountains between Buthidaung and Maungdaw present a natural barrier that could easily be blocked by deploying 5,000 soldiers.
Instead, we have evacuated and rescued people from remote villages to ensure their safety. It is illogical to suggest we would carry out attacks in an open area, where the consequences would be severe and counterproductive. The true beneficiaries of such violence would be our enemies, not us.
Their strategy involves sending their operatives to burn down villages and then allowing Muslim organizations sympathetic to their cause to publicly accuse us of the destruction.
Regarding the allegations of drone bombings, it’s important to clarify that drones are widely used throughout the country by all forces.
The junta’s drones are increasingly sophisticated, and capable of operating in any weather, while our drones are limited by conditions like rain, which can cause short circuits.
The junta has advanced drone jamming systems that block our drones.
We can only deploy our drones when the rain stops and the junta turns off their jammers to launch their drones.
Additionally, launching our drones requires elaborate misdirection to conceal our location or our launch sites risk being targeted by junta aircraft.
Therefore, claims that drones launch from our positions are unfounded. We would never recall our drones to our location under such circumstances.
Let’s examine the situation more closely. When drones drop bombs, chaos ensues, people die and some even jump into the river. In such confusion, who can accurately track the trajectory of drones and bombs? According to the reports, there were over 100 armed RSO members among the crowd. Only highly skilled professionals could interpret the trajectory of bombs and mortars amidst such turmoil.
People were crossing the river in both directions. The junta had separate agreements with the RSO and ARSA.
They were both armed by the junta but some of the members attacked junta troops, leading to frequent conflicts.
The RSO received more favorable treatment from the Bangladeshi authorities, allowing them to cross the river with ease while Myanmar’s border guards transported refugees using old auto-rickshaws.
We captured a rickshaw driver at the time and I need to verify if he is still alive.
When we warned civilians to evacuate conflict zones, some sought refuge with us, paying 500,000 kyats at junta or extremist checkpoints.
Although they faced challenges with food and living conditions, we were able to ensure their safety. For those who crossed the river, the RSO primarily arranged their transport.
A man named D Mar Mauk charged 500,000 kyats per person but during the panic, he raised the fee to 800,000 kyats.
The RSO made crossing the river relatively straightforward.
ARSA wanted to seize this opportunity for financial gain as well, leading to frequent skirmishes between ARSA and the RSO near the riverbank, resulting in casualties and deaths.
Furthermore, there have been reports of abductions involving females of various ages, for which I have evidence.
AZ: What did they do to those females?
TMN: They slept with them. We are not making baseless accusations. We have Muslim eyewitnesses. I posted a video on Twitter. They brought the females at night and sent them back in the morning.
They are committing multiple rapes. There are some significant issues I need to address regarding rape allegations.
CNN accused us of raping an elderly woman. Additionally, a female from a family connected with the RSO claimed that we gang-raped a woman and cut her breasts. She said she was at the scene for two hours. It’s hard to understand how she could have escaped if she had been there for that long.
If these allegations are true, we are prepared for medical and forensic examinations, and we will involve international partners to investigate the case thoroughly. If it turns out that our personnel are at fault, they will face the strictest penalties. Conversely, if the accusations are false, the accuser must be held accountable. We are ready to clear our name and invite scrutiny to prove our innocence.
AZ: General, there have been numerous allegations of the rape and killing of civilians. Could you elaborate on the AA’s code of conduct and how personnel are disciplined?
TMN: Since the AA’s founding, we have strictly prohibited the killing and rape of civilians, with breaches resulting in the death penalty. Consequently, such cases are exceedingly rare. When they do occur, we impose the harshest penalties.
The AA operates across much of Myanmar, including Karen, Chin, Sagaing, Magwe and Mandalay. Although problems have arisen in these areas, we have dealt with them decisively, applying the highest levels of discipline. We are particularly vigilant in Rakhine State.
We had to address a rape charge with a Muslim victim in Rakhine State.
While the perpetrator was not sentenced to death by a court-martial — due to the establishment of Rakhine civilian courts — we ensured that justice was served. He was sentenced to 20 years.
Additionally, we carried out 30 severe caning strokes in front of the victim’s family and the entire village. This was not light caning and each strike was extremely painful. After the caning, we compensated the village financially and issued a formal apology.
There have been two such cases and we are committed to taking similar action for any future crimes with the severity of punishment corresponding to the gravity of the offense. We transparently enforce these penalties and work diligently to prevent ethnic and religious conflict.
Our community collaboration aims to neutralize tensions and uphold our political vision.
AZ: The cause of many ethnic and religious conflicts in Myanmar can be traced back to the military. They have employed divide-and-rule tactics to exploit ethnic divisions. Now that the AA is increasingly becoming a de-facto authority, have you engaged in dialogue with Rohingya leaders or have plans to do so?
TMN: The United League of Arakan has not had official discussions with Rohingya leaders, mainly because the leadership is scattered.
Our focus has been on engaging with communities that are firmly established within our state.
We find it more practical to collaborate with community leaders for governance and public affairs. We occasionally listen to grassroots voices from refugee camps, though this has not been a recent focus.
There was a ceremony in the refugee camps marking the seventh anniversary of the 2017 genocide. We observed that many people attended, listening to speakers discussing violence.
While we are working towards repatriation and unity, some within these communities have disparagingly referred to us, during the ceremony, with the offensive term “Morkay”, meaning pirates, and called for our destruction.
We will have to commit to welcoming those who come peacefully. If such large groups were to enter our territory with hostility, it could affect how other groups perceive and accept them.
We address each border issue separately.
Having these challenges does not imply that we are unwilling to engage in dialogue or cooperation. We are open to collaborating with any communities willing to work with us and are prepared to support and accept those who are deserving.
