The success of the ongoing anti-regime resistance offensives against the Myanmar junta’s military has made headlines, but according to Daw Zin Mar Aung, foreign minister of the civilian National Unity Government (NUG), this has yet to translate into an increase in international engagement with the anti-regime movement, particularly among Myanmar’s neighbors. In the following interview with The Irrawaddy’s English edition editors Kyaw Zwa Moe and Hpone Myat, she discusses the NUG’s cooperation with ethnic armed organizations, her government’s diplomatic efforts to isolate the junta and starve it of funds, the need to fill political vacuums in areas where the junta has been uprooted, and how an increase in foreign support could end the suffering of Myanmar’s people more quickly.
Myanmar’s armed revolt has become increasingly sophisticated nearly three years after the coup. It is fair to say Operation 1027 has turned the tide of the war. The offensive has exposed the weaknesses of the Myanmar military. To what extent is the NUG collaborating with the Brotherhood Alliance, which is conducting Operation 1027, as well as other ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in the ongoing offensive?
Last year, we introduced our “one-year plan” at our press conferences. It is a package of measures showing how we will step up the fight against the regime militarily and politically, as well as by pushing for economic sanctions, organizing mass movements, and funding the resistance. When we started designing that one-year plan, we consulted with our partner EAOs, and explored potential for cooperation. Revolutionary groups have their respective plans and visions. We can say those visions have converged.
Operation 1027 has pushed the wave of military operations this year to its peak. It coincided with the final phase of our one-year plan. As everyone knows, fighting normally escalates in the dry season. So, the timing just fit. As we have explained our objectives to our partner EAOs, I can say we have a certain degree of cooperation. But I can’t say how much we are cooperating on military operations. It is sensitive information.
What impression has the resistance offensive left on ministers and diplomats of foreign governments with which the NUG has been engaging?
They are surprised that the Brotherhood Alliance has joined the revolt, and they wondered if the NUG knew about their offensive in advance. Yes, we did. We just didn’t talk about it. It is not our business. Leaders of the concerned EAOs will do their job. And, it is not a good idea to announce an operation in advance.
The international community was shocked. They didn’t expect it. Because there was previously little harmony between EAOs and [pro-democracy] forces fighting the regime, the international community took it for granted that it would be impossible to destroy the military.
We have explained to the international community that armed revolt alone is not responsible for the junta’s defeats. Besides the armed resistance, we are also making diplomatic efforts, organizing mass campaigns, and trying to cut off sources of revenue for the regime, and all these factors have led to the junta’s defeats. After the Brotherhood Alliance actively and decisively participated in the revolt… and the Arakan Army (AA) also opened a new front in Rakhine State, hundreds of junta outposts fell in a month. This has exposed the weakness of the regime. The international community was also shocked, and they are interested to see what will come next.
Few countries have given practical support for the revolt in Myanmar. As foreign minister, to what extent have you been able to convince them to accept the NUG as the legitimate government of Myanmar and collaborate with it?
We can say our revolt is very organic. It is a genuine movement of the public. We haven’t received heartfelt support from any country. They oppose [our revolt] in principle. We have faced challenging questions regarding the situation on the ground, our activities, and [the extent of our] cooperation with other stakeholders. Diplomats also complained when the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) were formed. They didn’t welcome the formation of the PDFs. They even criticized when the PDFs announced a defensive war. When I asked them if they had any other ideas about how we should stop the military’s violence, they had no answer. We established our diplomatic representation amid such criticisms and questions.
But soon we entered a new phase. After we announced a federal democratic charter… when we were able to tell the world that we have a vision and a roadmap about what political path we would take for the future… and after we outlined a military code of conduct, how we would establish the chain of command, how we would handle war crimes… after we proved that we could do those tasks with commitment, they changed their tone. Though they are not very satisfied with [our actions], they said they could arrange to provide help in certain areas according to international norms. There is engagement. Diplomats also ask about the degree of trust we have built with the Brotherhood Alliance and other ethnic allies.
They also ask challenging questions reflecting their assumption that we will again fight with each other when the Myanmar military ceases to exist, and that the country will shatter. They have this impression because they still view Myanmar’s problems based on their experience of the past situation in Myanmar. Everything is new in this Spring Revolution. The ideas are new, approaches are new, and the way the funds are raised is new. Plus, there is serious and frank debate about federal democracy. This is a different landscape from previous revolutions. Despite those challenges, there have been political and military developments. Trust has also been built among the forces in spite of arguments. This has changed the international community’s impression of the revolt. In our view, we thought it would be very difficult for the Brotherhood Alliance to throw itself into the fighting. They did so because they have a certain degree of trust in us and the potential of the Spring Revolution, as well as in their capability and stance. This trust has triggered changes [in the fighting against the regime]. Following those changes, diplomats and the media have changed the tone of their descriptions of the situation in Myanmar. You might be aware that the Myanmar crisis received little attention from international media before Operation 1027. But since the launch of Operation 1027, it seems that diplomats from foreign countries including Japan have woken up to the situation in Myanmar. They have responded to the fact that Operation 1027 has accelerated the wave of the revolution.
What is the Biden administration doing for the democracy struggle in Myanmar? To what extent is it collaborating with the NUG? Is it just paying lip service?
It adopted the National Defense Authorization Act [which includes the “Burma Act”]. The amount of money it has spent annually from its national budget to assist Myanmar has not changed at all. It has allocated the same amount of funds before and after the coup. Secondly, not just the US, but many countries have been slow to review their foreign policies and approaches towards Myanmar. The context in Myanmar after the Feb. 1, 2021 coup is different from what it was before the coup. But they continue to exercise the same policies, and continue with the same budget and projects. For example, they are still spending money on projects like leadership and capacity building training and the like.
We have been fighting the regime on our own. And we have to deal with questions about the possibility of power vacuums in the areas under our control. Just fighting is not enough; we have to run the administration. For example, in Karenni [Kayah] State, the Karenni State Interim Executive Council is installing interim local governance. Such is also the case in Chin State. This is different from the past. So, when [the US] allocates funds for us… we are not asking for military assistance… I am sure they wouldn’t give it to us even if we asked for it… but, they can assist us under the heading of “democracy and local governance”. There is a need for them to correctly understand the latest developments on the ground. We have to persuade them to assist in those areas.
The US has imposed economic sanctions targeting the cash flow to the regime. Those sanctions are effective, and we appreciate that. The fact that the regime can’t use US dollars to purchase weapons largely restricts their ability to fight. We don’t expect military assistance from the US. We are advocating for effective use of the budget that they grant for Myanmar.
Do you mean the support from the US—and the way it provides that support—is not effective for revolutionary forces including the NUG?
We could say it like that. It has been three years, and I say they are too slow in making decisions [to help] and providing effective help.
Will the revolution take longer if there is no effective assistance from them?
I am sure we could finish it more quickly if we received practical assistance. If we have friends that provide us with necessary assistance, that will speed up our work. It will be quicker if they can provide assistance to us in practical areas, and put political pressure [on the regime]. In that case, we would be able to stop the suffering of the people and the violence of the regime more quickly. Though people are showing resilience in the face of violence, it is hell for them. People will be able to escape that hell more quickly if assistance is provided early and in large quantities. Delaying the assistance will lengthen these conflicts, and cause greater suffering for the people.
But regional countries including China and India have not even shown verbal support for the NUG. And India has grown increasingly close to the regime. Many ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] countries are also close to the regime. How much have their positions changed over the past three years?
There is not much difference. They maintain the status quo. They denounced it when the military staged the coup [in 2021]. Today, they still say they do not accept the coup [but they have never taken any action]. They dare not publicly engage with groups that represent the Myanmar people. It seems that those countries will only engage with us as equals after we successfully complete the revolution. Only the US and EU have publicly expressed their support for us—regional countries dare not publicly engage with us. There has been no progress.
