When nationwide nonviolent protests were brutally attacked by Myanmar military and police, demands for international intervention under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle went ignored.
Pleas for help have also fallen on deaf ears after the junta launched a full-fledged war of terror against the civilian population, committing atrocities across the country.
Myanmar’s people have been abandoned to their fate – though they are not alone in this. The reality of today’s world is that hardly anyone is willing to help nations that become victims of state terror and brutal dictatorships. And when democracies and international intergovernmental organizations like the UN and ASEAN are unable or unwilling to provide meaningful assistance to a brutalized population, other authoritarians are emboldened to help out dictators facing protests and uprisings by their own people. Russia, China, Iran and others are increasingly willing to jump in and provide assistance and diplomatic cover to shaken dictators. Meanwhile, democracies and intergovernmental organizations express concern and regret.
Western democracies like the US and EU at least provide some funding for limited humanitarian aid while supporting favored civil society organizations and independent media. For populations under attack and in desperate need, this is welcome and useful, but it is far from sufficient.
However, no international player provides substantial, meaningful assistance for people to defend themselves against regimes ready to kill and torture.
The “victim narrative” and “democracy and human rights narrative” are no longer effective in mobilizing international support against murderous regimes. Proof of atrocities, humanitarian disasters and mass human rights violations will not spark action from global players, and neither will pleas to protect democratic values.
However, if the balance of power starts to shift in Myanmar and the junta looks vulnerable to the expanding resistance offensive, countries around the world will start reconsidering their policies on the state and its military rulers.
Recent gains by resistance forces across the country, coupled with the coordinated and synchronized character of their attacks on military posts and bases, have suddenly increased the policymaking focus and media attention on Myanmar.
Surprise military successes of the Brotherhood Alliance in northern Shan and simultaneous attacks by ethnic allies and PDFs in other parts of the country are changing perceptions about the junta’s terror war and the people’s resistance.
So far, the general perception has been that whatever happens in Myanmar, the military is too strong to be defeated and will, through a combination of brutality and trickery, reconsolidate control over most or all of the country. As such, the only option is to deal with the junta, even if they are murderous and reviled by much of the population.
However, this perception is changing fast. A realization has dawned that the junta is on a downward trajectory and could be ousted.
That altered perception may lead to changes in attitudes and policies in the international community, including Myanmar’s neighbors.
However, a change of perception does not automatically lead to a change of policy.
If the current momentum is to tip the balance, the junta must be prevented from regaining control of the narrative.
In the seven weeks since the launch of Operation 1027, the narrative has been one of spectacular losses for the junta.
The regime will now do whatever it can to bring stalemate on the battlefield, while escalating destruction and human suffering wherever it has the power to do so. Finally, the junta will push a narrative about the possibility of ceasefires and peace negotiations.
The regime can no longer rely on securing significant military victories; troop numbers and morale are simply too low. However, it still has airpower and artillery capable of causing widespread destruction, suffering and humanitarian emergencies. It is in the junta’s interest to replace narratives of resistance successes and coordination with a narrative of suffering and destruction. So it will try to bomb, destroy, burn and blockade wherever it can.
The regime will also attempt to persuade neighbors, and any willing listeners, to replace the narrative about its losses with a narrative of potential negotiations, peaceful solutions, elections, whatever.
What can allied resistance forces do to keep up the momentum and pressure?
It is unrealistic and dangerous to assume that resistance forces can sustain the current intensity of their offensive. In this still highly disproportionate warfare, the resistance’s advantage lies in a combination of strategic patience, tactical surprise and a stretching of the military across multiple fronts. Resistance groups must continue to bleed their enemy with frequent attacks on its weak spots, chopping military supply lines one by one while simultaneously avoiding frontal attacks on its strongholds. Even small victories should be multiplied by offering individual soldiers and whole units the opportunity to defect.
Breakthrough successes by resistance forces will, for some time yet, be followed by inevitable lulls in the offensive. But the battlefield is not the only front on which the junta can and should be pressured. Spectacular military successes by allied resistance forces in October and November must now be followed by progress in forging political agreements between resistance stakeholders.
This diplomatic “offensive” must be launched quickly. The renewed media attention and change in perspective have prepared the ground. Now is the time to issue confident messages and persuasive and credible assurances for policymakers, media and foreign affairs think tanks in world capitals.
The National Unity Government and allied ethnic revolutionary organizations (EROs) should rapidly form a joint foreign affairs team for visits to Washington, Brussels, London, New Delhi, Tokyo, Canberra, Jakarta, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, etc. The team should be ready to go to Beijing if invited.
The international community has so far used ASEAN as a shield for its own inaction and unwillingness to intervene. The NUG and allies should continue participating in ASEAN-led dialogues, but not expect anything to come of negotiations.
The ASEAN peace process was undermined from the start by wrong assumptions. The objectives of its Five Point Consensus are now misplaced and outdated while its framework – “all-inclusive dialogue” – effectively calls for all sides to bow to military dominance and its 2008 constitution in exchange for the junta promising to “de-escalate violence” and allowing humanitarian aid to reach IDPs.
The ASEAN process has one more fatal weakness. Its dialogue process mixes representatives of genuine stakeholders – those wielding legitimacy and power – with irrelevant actors who wield neither.
Instead of waiting to be invited to join the process by outside actors like Jakarta, Oslo or Vientiane, or shunned by “1.5 Track” meetings in Bangkok or New Delhi, the NUG and allied EROs should leverage Operation 1027 successes and confidently initiate their own diplomatic track, controlling the framework of talks and who gets to attend them.
Resistance operations 1027 and 1111 must now be followed by diplomatic Operation 0124 (January 2024).
Drafting a new constitution for a federal democratic Myanmar must wait. Stakeholders in the anti-junta alliance already have a solid basis for mutual political agreement in the success of their joint struggle, in the Federal Democratic Charter, in the spirit of the Spring Revolution and in the mandate and empowerment they receive every day through the support, endurance and resilience of the people. However, a much more complex political agreement will be needed – one that will require multiple compromises on many sides. This is not easy to achieve amid an unfinished war, not least because representatives from different sides are unable to meet safely and talk.
What is possible and necessary now is to revisit and redefine the transition roadmap. Myanmar’s Spring Revolution against a hated military junta has been impressive and heroic in many different ways. Everybody involved should be recognized and praised for that. Much has already been achieved. However, the reality is that neither resistance stakeholders, Myanmar’s neighbors or the international community is prepared to deal with the vacuum that will emerge with the possible collapse of the junta.
There is a solid level of military cooperation and some basic elements of political agreement. But it remains unclear who would take authority, who would manage the transition (and how they would do this) if the junta were to suddenly collapse.
Such a collapse should catch no one by surprise given the dramatic resistance gains in just a few weeks.
The NUG and allied EROs must draft a joint roadmap. Key stakeholders should formulate and endorse it publicly, with minor actors included through consultation and quiet agreements. The roadmap should lay out plans for the 12 months following the junta’s collapse, including who will be in charge and under what principles and procedures.
The NUG and allied EROs must draft a joint roadmap. Key stakeholders like NUG, K3C (Kachin Independence Organization, Karen National Union, Karenni National Progressive Party, and Chin National Front) and existing state consultative councils should formulate and endorse it publicly. Other actors with reasons to keep a lower profile should be included through consultation and quiet agreements. The roadmap should lay out plans for the 12 months following the junta’s collapse, including who will be in charge and under what principles and procedures.
There will also be stakeholders who will choose to remain apart from the process. The train should not wait on them, but press ahead loud and confident, leaving doors open for others to join at a later stage.
To push forward Myanmar’s domestic political dialogue, a diplomatic offensive on the international front should be waged. Suggested headlines of op-eds published in major international media include: “Myanmar’s junta is losing. The US should prepare for its collapse”, “Myanmar’s junta may be on the verge of collapse”, “We must stop Myanmar’s descent into a failed state”, “India should think long-term and recalibrate”, and “Time to start planning post-war future of Myanmar’s military”.
Perspectives on events in Myanmar and their probable outcome are changing fast.
The window of opportunity for diplomatic Operation 0124 should not be missed.
