In the aftermath of Myanmar’s February 2021 military coup, the junta has weaponized internet shutdowns in-country, targeting resistance-controlled areas. By severing the opposition’s communication channels, the regime aims to stifle dissent, isolate these forces, and weaken the coordination of pro-democracy elements. The deliberate blackouts have profound implications not only for Myanmar citizens’ freedom of expression but also for the safety, livelihoods, and survival of affected communities.
The tactic of governments using internet shutdowns is neither new nor limited to Myanmar: Freedom House has uncovered its ubiquitous usage in countries across the democratic spectrum.
The junta has aggressively deployed such tactics in Myanmar’s civil war, simultaneously with armed attacks. The Myanmar Internet Project has recorded 329 shutdowns since February 2021. Resistance-controlled areas, particularly Sagaing and Magwe regions and Kachin State, bear the brunt, as they are where some of the most intense fighting with the Myanmar army occurs. ATHAN reports that all 330 townships in Myanmar have experienced some form of communications blackout (meaning telephone and/or internet outages) since the coup.
For the junta, taking these areas off-grid is a two-pronged strategy: to disrupt the flow of information among resistance groups and to isolate these areas from global attention. Without access to Wi-Fi, local activists and communities struggle to document and share real-time information about military atrocities. This in turn limits the international community’s ability to hold the junta accountable.
Myanmar’s junta understands the power of the internet in modern resistance movements. Online platforms are vital tools for organizing protests, sharing news, and rallying support. Consequently, the junta has introduced different versions of a draconian cybersecurity law. The most recent (effective Jan. 1, 2025) bans the use of virtual private networks (VPNs) and imposes strict surveillance measures. For instance, violators can face up to six months in prison and a fine for an unauthorized VPN installation or service. This rule is apparently applicable to overseas Myanmar nationals too.
Criminalizing the use of VPNs, a lifeline for civilians and anti-regime groups to bypass censorship, further isolates Myanmar’s people from the outside world. It makes it even harder for them to access critical information, communicate securely, and share evidence of the junta’s abuses. For citizens, the VPN ban restricts their access to social media platforms, financial services, and international news, deepening their disconnection and ironically, making them more vulnerable to cybercrimes in their effort to stay connected.
The shutdowns and legal restrictions can have dire humanitarian consequences. In resistance-controlled areas, civilians have relied on the internet for critical updates on military movements or warnings about airstrikes. An internet blackout and VPN ban effectively blind these communities, making them sitting targets. For displaced groups already lacking resources, the loss of communication exacerbates their isolation and insecurity.
Faced with this situation, Myanmar’s resistance forces and affected communities have sought alternative solutions to connect with the world. Some resistance groups, media, and civil society organizations (CSOs) have been using Starlink, a satellite-based internet service, while anti-junta forces have set up satellite-based internet access in more than 60 areas under their control in Sagaing and Magwe, and Karenni and Kachin states, allowing some communities to restore communication. However, procuring Starlink equipment in Myanmar remains fraught with challenges. The most serious is the logistical complexity of acquiring and deploying the technology. The importation of Starlink into Thailand is illegal, although Thailand is the most viable transit point into Myanmar. Any attempt to bring Starlink to Myanmar risks the importer getting raided by Thai police, as resistance affiliates’ actions can be conflated with those of online scamming operations.
Furthermore, in a country where large swaths of the population live below the poverty line, satellite internet is prohibitively expensive. Resistance groups, already stretched thin, struggle to allocate resources for the technology. The Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) has reported that The Starlink Cafe in Karenni stays open for only a few hours a day due to electricity outages; customers must pay 1,000 kyats (29 US cents) per visit to help cover the café’s monthly subscription for Starlink.
Despite these challenges, communities in resistance-controlled areas have shown remarkable resilience and ingenuity. People in Myanmar are trying to stay connected to the world and their loved ones through satellite internet, Wi-Fi hotspots, and radio signals in places ranging from internet cafes with spotty connections to even a bomb shelter.
More seriously, Myanmar’s internet shutdowns and restrictive laws underscore a troubling global trend: authoritarian governments continue to suppress dissent, stifle protests, and silence marginalized communities through digital repression.
For Myanmar, the people’s battle for connectivity is inseparable from their broader fight for democracy. Restoring communication in resistance-controlled areas is not just about facilitating the flow of information but also empowering communities to resist oppression, document abuses, and rebuild their lives. Technology’s role in shaping Myanmar’s future cannot be overstated. Connectivity is a lifeline for communities in crisis and a cornerstone of resistance against tyranny worldwide.
As the opposition’s fight continues in Myanmar, the international community would ideally hold the junta accountable for weaponizing internet shutdowns and other restrictions against resistance forces and civilians. Foreign partners can use targeted sanctions, capacity-building initiatives, and funding to local communities for broad humanitarian needs. These are essential components of a holistic strategy to counter the junta’s repressive tactics online and in real life.
Surachanee Sriyai is a Visiting Fellow with the Media, Technology and Society Program at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. She is the interim director of the Center for Sustainable Humanitarian Action with Displaced Ethnic Communities (SHADE) under the Regional Center for Social Science and Sustainable Development, Chiang Mai University.
This article first appeared in Fulcrum.
