The security landscape in Myanmar is evolving rapidly, and it appears that the coercive power of the military junta or Myanmar armed forces controlled by State Administration Council (SAC) chairman Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has significantly diminished. This new security dynamic has made it increasingly challenging for the senior general to incentivize certain key ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) including Shan and Mon groups, while he is also struggling to suppress other EROs such as Karen, Kachin, Karenni (Kayah) and Chin, along with the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) loyal to the National Unity Government (NUG). Concurrently, the NUG is making efforts to establish full control over PDFs and mobilize local defense forces (LDFs) that emerged following the attempted military coup in February 2021.
At a press conference on Aug. 22, 2023, military spokesperson Major General Zaw Min Tun publicly acknowledged “Bamar people killing each other,” a highly unusual admission. This narrative of Bamar-to- Bamar killing received little media attention in the past, although analysts and some commentaries have informally discussed the matter. Does this confession suggest that an equilibrium has been reached between the younger Bamar-led PDFs along with ethnic forces, and the older Bamar-led SAC troops in military efforts to control Naypyitaw? This development has raised question about the Myanmar military’s current ability to rightfully influence ethnic armed groups and political actors.
Has the military’s coercive capability truly diminished? While the capacity of PDFs and EROs may likely meet an equivalence with the Myanmar military in terms of man power and assault rifles, the progress of political coalitions and shared goals among anti-regime forces will shape the trajectory of the resistance movement in the years ahead.
Political alliances
The Myanmar military has gained more political foes than friends. The SAC’s commemoration of the eighth anniversary of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) on Oct. 15, 2023 in Naypyitaw was attended by only a few remaining EROs who were part of the accord. The NCA process, characterized by theatrics, has been marred by conflict, human rights violations against ethnic populations, and a military blockade hindering humanitarian assistance to war-torn communities.
In parallel, the Union Election Commission (UEC) of Myanmar’s junta has permitted 37 small political parties to register and engage in operational discussions. The military-affiliated Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) is expected to dominate any election held in 2025, giving rise to concerns about potential election-related violence. The military-authored 2008 Constitution guarantees 25 percent of seats for military officers, rendering any junta-led election universally discredited as neither free nor fair. The ongoing loss of territories by the Myanmar military has engendered uncertainty surrounding the 2025 elections.
On the opposing side, the establishment of the Federal Democracy Charter (FDC), ratified by some political stakeholders as a response to the attempted coup, aims to abolish all forms of dictatorship and is coupled with the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC). The NUCC, formed in late 2021, unites forces opposed to the regime that seized power in February of that year. Together, they represent a substantial threat to the junta, with the goal of overthrowing the military dictatorship and establishing a federal democratic union through collective leadership, political dialogue, and coordination. Although opposition forces led by the NUG have yet to fully capitalize on these initiatives, they signify a stride toward political inclusivity in Myanmar’s future.
The SAC’s endeavors in 2023 to reinforce the NCA with certain ethnic armies ended unsuccessfully. Concurrently, an increasing number of ethnic armies have provided military training and supplies to anti-junta forces. The exceptional level of cooperation among EROs has facilitated the expansion of the PDFs and LDFs in Myanmar’s heartlands.
Military manpower and capabilities
Operation 1027 (a reference to the day it began—Friday, Oct. 27, 2023), was launched by the Brotherhood Alliance comprising the Arakan Army (AA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), with simultaneous attacks on regime targets and bases in several towns in northern Shan State. This operation not only undermined the junta’s capacity but also had a negative impact on the morale of its soldiers. According to the United States Institute of Peace, the junta had around 150,000 personnel, with approximately 70,000 being combat soldiers, as of May 2023. However, the SAC’s defection rate has been steadily increasing, and despite airpower and heavy artillery support, the regime has started losing significant strategic locations on the peripheries. In late September, the Karen Peace Support Network reported that the SAC lost 62 military camps in southeast Myanmar due to offensives by the Karen National Liberation Army and its allies. Operation 1027 further resulted in the loss of more than 50 SAC bases in northern Shan state.
Meanwhile, the joint forces comprising Karen ethnic forces and the NUG’s PDFs have intensified attacks in eastern Bago Region, disrupting the junta’s logistics routes to Karen State. Although these attacks pose a threat to some strategic junta bases near Naypyitaw, analysts have cautioned that such efforts by the NUG and its allies could strain its limited resources, willpower and stamina. As the conflict continues, some experts have suggested a resurgence of the ceasefire capitalism observed in the 1990s, where military-ethnic partnerships and economic concessions, often involving private companies controlled by ethnic leaders, played a crucial role in borderland regions.
The SAC is currently grappling with a currency crisis, economic fallout from the coup, and widespread displacement, particularly due to the burning of villages. High inflation has eroded the purchasing power of the population, disproportionately affecting rural communities with limited resources to cope with rising prices. Many are now questioning whether the regime still possesses sufficient financial resources and has limited access to resourceful lands to recreate the peace and stability seen in the 1990s.
Financial difficulties and economic pressure
In early 2023, junta chief Min Aung Hlaing approved a military budget of over 5.6 trillion kyats (equivalent to around US$2.7 billion) for the 2023-24 fiscal year. Despite this substantial budget, the SAC is grappling with financial difficulties, attributing Myanmar’s currency crisis to unnamed banks and accusing some domestic banks of disloyalty. Additionally, the regime’s efforts to establish a proxy entity for accessing previously sanctioned funds from foreign partners have proven unsuccessful.
In recent months, the National Unity Government (NUG) has taken steps to address its financial needs. Notably, the establishment of the Spring Development Bank represents a significant investment of approximately $160 million to support the NUG’s resistance against the Myanmar junta. Furthermore, Myanmar Now reported that the NUG raised approximately $150 million through various fundraising initiatives during the early summer.
The financial situations of the opposition forces and the SAC differ significantly, largely due to the military’s control over Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise, which generates an annual income of nearly $1 billion from gas sales to Thailand. However, this financial advantage is tempered by the mounting pressure resulting from Western sanctions, imposed due to the military’s alleged atrocities. As the SAC braces for financial hardship, the ever-evolving dynamics on the battlefield remain pivotal factors in determining its future.
Dominance under threat
In conclusion, the military’s historical dominance in terms of manpower and equipment is being challenged due to shifting security dynamics and the progress being made by the resistance movement. Despite the Myanmar military’s use of harsh tactics like the “four-cuts” strategy, scorched-earth policies, extrajudicial killings, and arbitrary arrests in Bamar-majority areas, it has been unable to conquer the heartlands of the country.
The coercive capability of the Myanmar military has undeniably weakened, as demonstrated by their struggles to persuade EROs to renew the peace agreement, maintain control over bases in ethnic regions, and address economic pressures. In this evolving security landscape, especially in Bamar-majority regions, and with the expansion of territorial control by EROs, the balance of power is shifting away from the Myanmar military.
Nonetheless, other factors will also play a crucial role in determining the outcome. Building meaningful political coalitions among anti-junta forces led by the NUG and EROs, as well as the progress of groups like the FDC and the NUCC, will influence the path to a decisive victory. While large-scale battles or invasions of Naypyitaw were unlikely in the past, the diminishing military capacity of the SAC may increase the likelihood of face-to-face battles. Myanmar military generals find themselves increasingly isolated, both politically and militarily, and are desperate for legitimacy through uncertain elections and financial resources to sustain their survival.
Contrary to previous perceptions held by the West, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and neighboring countries like China and India, it’s worth noting that the Myanmar military may no longer be a “too-big-to-fail” institution capable of “holding” the country together. The tides are shifting, and the military’s grip on power is no longer as secure as it once appeared.
Zaw Tuseng, a former pro-democracy activist, is the founder and president of the Myanmar Policy Initiative (MPI).
