I read in The Irrawaddy a few days ago that the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) has dismissed reports by media controlled by the Myanmar junta that it will help the regime conduct a pre-election census in October next year, insisting the claims are false.
This is perfectly OK. It would be very problematic if it were otherwise. However, there have been consistent indications (or rumors, if one prefers) that the UNFPA and its Myanmar head Ramanathan Balakrishnan are talking with the junta about the census and that they are preparing and doing “something”. For that reason, one has reasonable suspicions that cannot be fully dispelled by just a statement saying, “No we will not do it”. When smoke appears so many times, one has a right to assume that there might be some fire over there.
One could, for example, be creative with one’s choice of names. One could say that he is not conducting a “census”, rather one is “testing for household registration” or something similar. In so doing, one is providing the junta with equipment and technology that is now used for “something else”, but might later also be used to conduct a census.
So, if the UNFPA wants to dispel all suspicions, it should not just deny that they are assisting with the preparations for a census, but it should also be transparent about what it is actually doing.
This is the first point.
Real performance accountability test
The second accountability test is the following: Since the UN agencies and a majority of humanitarian and development INGOs (international nongovernmental organizations) have chosen to stay in Yangon after the coup, putting themselves in the situation of hostages, they need to show to the people of Myanmar the numbers described below.
The bottom line is, they are not spending their own money. They are spending the money of taxpayers from developed democracies, which has been allocated to assist the people of Myanmar. So in addition to accountability toward donors, it is a legitimate expectation that they need to be accountable toward the people of Myanmar as well. In their promo materials, all UN agencies and INGOs write about how much they listen to local voices and how much they are guided by local ownership. How can one have any voice or any ownership in a situation of such information disproportionality?
UN agencies are constantly complaining that their budgets are not sufficient to cover their huge needs. If that is the case, then it requires even more strict scrutiny of exactly how the available funds are used.
The UNFPA need to make transparent their annual budget (the money they actually receive) and account for how much they have spent and how much they have not spent (although the needs in the country are dramatic and emergent). They could do this on The Irrawaddy’s websites.
Next, once they account for how much they have spent, they need to break down those costs in the following columns:
- How much money allocated by donors for the people in Myanmar has remained in the UNFPA headquarters and how much has been spent for salaries of expat staff, for their travel, accommodation, risk bonuses, family allowances and similar items? Here they should also include the cost of their office(s) in Yangon and backup office in Bangkok, if they have one; the carpark that the UNFPA has, and other operational costs connected with the senior foreign staff.
- The second column should calculate the costs of operations inside Myanmar and costs of salaries of the local staff. I would put here also all costs of Zoom and offline trainings. Training is not really of significant benefit to vulnerable people in Myanmar. But it is an easy way to simulate outreach to beneficiary groups.
- The third column should indicate how much money has been used for beneficiaries that are in junta-controlled territory. Maybe even pull out how much of that has been used for beneficiaries in Yangon and its surrounds. The reason for this is the following: There have been numerous indications that 70 percent of funds are spent on beneficiaries in Yangon and its surrounds. So, it would be good to dispel such rumors with an accurate breakdown of the numbers.
- The fourth column should indicate how much money has been used for beneficiaries who are in the territories that are not under junta control and which are the target of the junta’s intentional war of destruction and terror.
If the amount in Column 4 is significantly lower than the other three, then we have identified the root of the problem that critics of the UN agencies’ work in post-coup Myanmar are talking about.
If the costs in columns 1 and 2 are 60 percent or more than those in columns 3 and 4, then we have the same problem. Money is being spent on the institutional costs of the organizations, not really for the people in need.
If the costs in Column 3 are significantly higher (60 percent or more) than those in Column 4, then again, we are hitting the problem. My own estimation is that the imbalance is even higher.
This is the second performance test to which UN agencies in Myanmar should submit in order to make themselves accountable to the public that they claim to serve.
Last but not least…
There is one more question for the UNFPA.
If the UNFPA regional director will meet junta “officials” to “address constraints on existing programs and operations, and will also push for visas to be issued for staff waiting for them”, then it would be good if the UNFPA regional director or spokesperson could clarify the following two points:
Why will the director meet junta “officials” and not the representatives of the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) and the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs)? They have far more legitimacy than the junta “officials”. They also have significant and increasing control over territory. They are actually taking care of civilian populations by providing them with public services—to the extent they can—while junta “officials” are weaponizing aid.
So why will the UNFPA regional director not meet the NUG and EAOs as well?
If the UNFPA is “committed to the sexual and reproductive health and rights of women and young people in Myanmar”, then there are huge numbers of women and young people in the territories liberated by the People’s Defense Force and the EAOs whose current need for help is much greater. In many places women and young people are in dramatic need of assistance. So if there is emergency need somewhere, why are the UN agencies continuing to spend aid money on “existing projects” designed before the 2021 coup and why have they have not in the meantime channeled them where the needs are most urgent and dramatic?
If the UNFPA regional director and the UNFPA staff will talk with the NUG and EAOs, they will quickly solve the “constraints on existing programs and operations”. It will be very easy to discuss how to overcome operational obstacles to access to territories where internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other highly vulnerable groups are.
So why not talk with them?
Last but not least, if the UNFPA regional director will discuss with the junta “officials” the “constraints on existing programs and operations, and will also push for visas to be issued for staff waiting for them”, then it will be good to explain what Martin Griffiths, the UN’s under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs and emergency relief coordinator, has achieved. He has visited Myanmar and met top level junta “officials” for exactly the same purpose, to open access for aid and to get pledges regarding visas for international staff of the UN agencies.
Griffiths is the UN’s aid heavyweight. The top guy. So if he has not achieved a lot and the UNFPA regional director needs to travel again to plead for the same thing, why does he think he will be more successful?
Would it not be much more reasonable, after three years, to pull the aid money out of Yangon, to reduce (temporarily!) operations there, to give local staff paid (temporary!) leave and to agree with the NUG and EAOs to channel as much as possible of the available aid money—and as quickly as possible—through local charitable, religious and civil society structures?
If the UNFPA and other UN agencies do that, they will suddenly gain access, very deep inside Myanmar, to significant numbers of beneficiaries. They just need to be a bit creative and bold and they need to reduce their own costs in order to channel more money through local organizations.
But for that to happen, they will need to step out of their self-imposed hostage situation.
Igor Blazevic is a senior adviser at the Prague Civil Society Centre. Between 2011 and 2016 he worked in Myanmar as the head lecturer of the Educational Initiatives Program.
