Myanmar enacted the Private Security Service Law on Feb. 18, effectively opening Myanmar’s borders to Chinese military personnel disguised as private security firms. This legislation represents a calculated move by Beijing to protect its strategic investments while further deepening its influence in a vulnerable neighbor—a modus operandi China has deployed across multiple countries along its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
China’s ambitious economic corridor through Myanmar has boomeranged into a security nightmare for Beijing. As resistance forces and ethnic armed groups gained control of territories containing critical Chinese infrastructure, Beijing’s strategy shifted from economic partnership to military entrenchment. The law follows a visit by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in August 2024, after which proposals for a “joint venture security company” mysteriously materialized in Myanmar’s policy discussions.
By November, reports emerged of a deal between a Special Economic Zone management sub-committee and China’s CITIC Group to establish a Chinese private military corporation in Kyaukphyu, a strategic coastal area in Rakhine state. This timeline reveals China’s hand in orchestrating the legislation to serve its interests.
China’s approach to Myanmar mirrors its tactics in Pakistan and other BRI partner countries like Sri Lanka and several African nations, where economic dependencies created through unsustainable infrastructure loans eventually compromise national independence.
The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, featuring oil and gas pipelines stretching 800 km from the Indian Ocean coast to Yunnan province, has become increasingly vulnerable as Myanmar’s civil conflict intensifies. Rather than respecting Myanmar’s internal political dynamics, Beijing has pressured the junta to create legal pathways for Chinese security forces to operate within Myanmar’s borders.
The legislation’s fine print reveals Beijing’s intentions. While requiring that 75 percent of security personnel are Myanmar nationals and prohibiting “members of foreign armed forces,” the provisions contain deliberate loopholes. Former soldiers from China’s People’s Liberation Army can simply resign their commissions before assuming these security roles, creating a de facto Chinese military presence in Myanmar without the diplomatic complications of an official deployment.
China’s approach to Myanmar exposes the exploitative nature of its international development model. BRI projects, often financed through loans that recipient countries struggle to repay, create economic dependencies that evolve into security dependencies. In Myanmar, resistance to Chinese infrastructure projects has been widespread, with communities objecting to environmental damage, land seizures, and the minimal economic benefits for local residents.
Rather than addressing these legitimate concerns, Beijing has opted to militarize its economic presence. This pattern has created resentment in many BRI countries, with Pakistan’s experience serving as a cautionary tale. There, Chinese workers and investments have required increasing security measures as local opposition to exploitative projects has grown.
The Myanmar junta, desperate for international support amid widespread domestic opposition, has effectively surrendered key aspects of its sovereignty to Beijing. The 2008 constitution explicitly prohibits foreign forces from operating within Myanmar. But the security companies are not “foreign forces” but staffed by “former” military personnel, a distinction without meaningful difference.
Most concerning is the provision permitting these security firms to collaborate with Myanmar’s security agencies, creating a mechanism for China to gather intelligence and influence operations within Myanmar’s own security apparatus. This is an unprecedented level of foreign penetration into a sovereign nation’s security infrastructure, with the junta serving as willing accomplices in exchange for Chinese backing of their illegitimate rule.
China’s security presence creates dangerous new dynamics in Myanmar’s already complex civil conflict. When EAOs or resistance forces encounter Chinese security personnel, they risk triggering international incidents that Beijing could exploit to further justify its presence. This internationalizes Myanmar’s internal conflicts, adding layers of complexity to resolving the country’s political crisis.
For Myanmar’s people, already suffering under brutal military rule, the law adds the indignity of seeing their country’s independence bartered away to Chinese interests. Having lost their democratic rights in the February 2021 coup, they now face the prospect of Chinese security forces operating in their communities, answerable not to Myanmar’s laws or interests but to Beijing’s strategic imperatives.
This Private Security Service Law marks a dangerous escalation in China’s exploitation of Myanmar. While presented as a routine regulatory framework, it represents Beijing’s opportunistic capitalization on Myanmar’s political crisis to advance its strategic objectives at the expense of Myanmar’s long-term sovereignty and security.
Ankit K is an assistant professor at the National Defence University, India.
