After launching its anti-regime Operation 1027 offensive in northern Shan and Rakhine states late last year, the Brotherhood Alliance quickly came under pressure from China to stop fighting.
Despite the pressure, the offensive by combined forces of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Arakan Army (AA) continued and the regime lost large swaths of territory.
Beijing arranged the first talks between the two sides in December as it pushed for the three ethnic armies to halt the fighting.
The talks were attended by China’s special envoy for Myanmar, Deng Xijun, a junta delegation led by chief negotiator Min Naing, secretaries from the MNDAA and TNLA and the AA’s deputy commander-in-chief.
Ceasefire in northern Shan State
The third round of talks in Kunming saw the two sides agree to a ceasefire in mid-January, though the truce was confined to northern Shan State bordering China. By the time the ceasefire deal was struck, the MNDAA had already gained territory beyond its heartland of Shan State Special Region 1, known today as Kokang Self-Administered Zone. The TNLA had also secured the territory that it intends to establish as Palaung State.
The two armed groups needed a lull in the fighting so that they could install administrative control, undisturbed, in their newly won territory. This is one reason why both approved the truce, which required the regime to halt airstrikes and shelling in the area.
Moreover, the alliance also needed to respond appropriately to pressure from China. So, it signed the truce.
No truce in Rakhine
The ceasefire is limited to northern Shan and does not cover the AA’s ongoing conflict with the junta in Rakhine State, western Myanmar. When the ceasefire was signed on January 11, the AA controlled only parts of Paletwa, a gateway to Rakhine in neighboring Chin State. So, the two sides reportedly did not even bother to discuss a truce in Rakhine.
Two months later, the AA now controls all of Paletwa along with the Rakhine townships of Kyauktaw, Mrauk-U, Minbya, Pauktaw, Myebon and Ponnagyun.
The fourth round of talks between the alliance and the regime took place from Feb. 29 to March 1. The AA dismissed the idea of a ceasefire in Rakhine, reaffirming that it aimed to take control of the whole state.
While the main force of the AA is deployed in Rakhine, it has also dispatched troops to several other fronts. It is fighting alongside the MNDAA and TNLA in northern Shan, the People’s Defense Force and Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in parts of Kachin and Shan states, and Sagaing and Magwe regions, and the Karen National Union’s armed wing in Karen State. AA forces outside of northern Shan are not covered by the ceasefire.
Fourth round of talks in Kunming
The latest talks were aimed at reinforcing the ceasefire in northern Shan State and restoring China-Myanmar border trade, which was halted by the fighting.
The two sides agreed to use the Lashio-Hseni-Kunlong-Chin Shwe Haw route for border trade but did not reach any agreement on troop deployment. The regime reportedly demanded the withdrawal of Brotherhood Alliance troops from the border trade route. Understandably, the ethnic alliance has no plan to return territories that they have occupied.
It has now been more than 130 days since the border trade, which is worth between US$ 10 million and $15 million per day, was halted. China wants to restore it as early as possible. The two sides agreed to further negotiations in May.
Also on the agenda of the latest talks were troop deployments and demarcation of territory in northern Shan State, but no agreement was reached except that the existing ceasefire would be maintained, and Chinese investments in Myanmar would be protected.
Latest military operations
The AA confirmed it would continue to pursue its military objectives in Rakhine. It has also publicly declared it will support revolutionary groups including the People’s Defense Force (PDF), the armed wing of the parallel civilian National Unity Government. The AA seized Infantry Battalion 550 and Ponnagyun town while attending the talks in Kunming.
The MNDAA and TNLA, meanwhile, will continue to build up strength and keep supplying revolutionary groups while consolidating control of territories seized from the regime. Experience has taught the two ethnic armies that Myanmar’s military will use its old tactic of securing a ceasefire with one enemy to focus on fighting the other, and will come for them once it can contain armed resistance in central Myanmar. The two have no trust in a military whose attacks have previously forced them to rebuild and relaunch their revolution from square one.
The two armed groups will therefore continue supplying resistance forces to keep the Myanmar military busy.
China’s stance
China’s approach to Myanmar is dictated by its own interests. Among these is its oil and gas pipeline running across the country from Rakhine to northern Shan State. Any disruption of this supply could seriously impact businesses in China. Second, Beijing wants to resume border trade worth over $5 billion annually. Third, it wants to implement the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone in Rakhine as part of its global Belt and Road Initiative.
China believes the junta and revolutionary forces cannot defeat each other, meaning the conflict must be resolved through compromise. Though the military regime appears increasingly vulnerable, Beijing calculates that it will not collapse in the short term.
This view is shared by the US, its Western allies, and Myanmar’s neighbors. Neighboring countries do not want to see border instability, a decline in border trade, and a refugee influx due to escalating conflict and the introduction of mandatory military service in Myanmar.
Regional countries silently support the China-brokered talks. Junta generals have consistently warned the international community not to interfere in Myanmar’s internal affairs, but they dare not complain when their powerful neighbor, China, intervenes. They are on record as saying they fear Beijing’s influence.
China assumes that Myanmar will fall into chaos if the military regime disintegrates, making it difficult to protect its interests in the country. Beijing pushed for the truce as the Brotherhood Alliance was preparing to attack Lashio, where the junta’s Northeastern Command is based. This afforded breathing space for a military suffering a crisis of morale after losing large swaths of territory in just a few weeks.
Sources close to Beijing say China is now pushing for the regime to negotiate with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other detained leaders of the ousted civilian government. But it believes there is a need to replace Min Aung Hlaing with more moderate generals as it doubts the hardline junta boss will agree to negotiate. However, the idea of replacing the current junta leadership sounds unrealistic. Also, the extent to which junta leaders are involved in scam operations at the border – a thorn in the side for Beijing – remains a mystery.
China has maintained engagement with seven ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) based on its border but had more limited contact with the parallel National Unity Government (NUG) and PDFs. However, sources say it recently took steps to increase engagement with the NUG as part of plans to push for peace talks between the junta and anti-regime forces.
Beijing invited the NUG to open an office in China early this year, according to credible sources at the border.
Revolutionary forces must act wisely to prevail in talks
China is known for its pragmatism. Meanwhile, EAOs have experience in fighting and negotiating with the Myanmar military.
The revolutionary forces involved in the Spring Revolution should be mindful of China’s approach to the crisis in Myanmar, as well as the experiences and positions of the various EAOs. They must work towards building their strength and take the initiative to shape the situation in their favor. They need to make good use of the changing circumstances.
China has become increasingly involved in Myanmar’s internal affairs since re-engaging with the junta in late 2022. The talks in Kunming are having an impact on Myanmar politics that is inevitable given China’s interests in the country.
Revolutionary forces need to find the right way to handle China, rather than confronting or opposing it. They must learn to deal with the current situation wisely to ensure that it works in their favor. Myanmar’s crisis is increasingly not just a military issue, but also a political and diplomatic one.
Thet Htar Maung is a political analyst.
