In the second part of her interview with The Irrawaddy’s English edition editors Kyaw Zwa Moe and Hpone Myat, National Unity Government (NUG) Foreign Minister Daw Zin Mar Aung discusses anti-regime groups’ efforts to build new local political structures, the issue of trust between ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and Bamar-led organizations, the future of the Myanmar military, the importance of encouraging military defections, the ongoing need for funding of anti-regime forces, the role of the international community in Myanmar’s crisis and other issues. Read Part 1 of the interview here.
International observers—whether sincerely or due to some agenda—still maintain the widely held view that Myanmar is in danger of breaking up without the military. It seems foreign governments and leaders have concerns that when the military collapses, Myanmar will split into many smaller units in a process of balkanization, or end up in a different form, like Syria. Such concerns have been continuously expressed on the international stage and in the media. We have to admit that there is not much unity between Bamar and other ethnic groups, as well as among organizations. Is there a positive scenario to be seen here?
There can be a positive scenario, but we should be cautiously optimistic. There are causes for concern. But again, we have ways and means to overcome them. Actors that can overcome them have already emerged. We have seen new faces among the ethnic leaders in the Spring Revolution. For example, the younger generation has taken up the leadership in Karenni [Kayah] State. Their farsightedness encourages us to think positively. As you said, the international community has concerns because of criticisms made by scholars or activists. Critical voices are always louder. But they are not always bad. I like it. But, when we are overwhelmed by those critical voices, and are out of touch with the reality on the ground, there will only be pessimistic expectations.
There has been certain progress on the ground. We don’t want the international community to lose sight of that. We face challenges, but there are also lessons from the past about what we can do to overcome them, and where the pitfalls lie. We can’t assume that because something happened in the past, the same thing will happen now or in the future. There was no unity in the past and we can’t let the same problem affect us now. We are overcoming this, and I am optimistic about it. My view is there are opportunities for us amid the challenges.
What scenario do you imagine is most likely? Will we be able to rebuild the country?
We have answered the question of how we would deal with the [political] power vacuum in areas under our control. Some, citing the example of the pro-democracy uprising in 1988, say anarchy will follow when Myanmar military troops abandon [towns] and their administration collapses. This is wrong. We have learned lessons from [the past]. We have made preparations in advance. As the fighting was about to take place, we formed the Interim Local Administration Central Committee to run administration and enforce law and order in situations where power vacuums arise. We also thought about how to make sure such local administration does not conflict with federalist principles and the self-determination of ethnic groups. You might have heard that there were disagreements when we announced our interim local administration plan. That was some 18 months ago. But we have been able to negotiate an agreement [with EAOs] since. Now, [local revolutionary groups] are able to run administrations on their own in Karenni State. They are also cooperating with the NUG. Ethnic leaders of those regions have publicly said they are cooperating with us. We are running schools, providing humanitarian assistance, and healthcare services. I don’t mean everything has returned to normal there. The country is at war and fighting is still taking place there. But the significant point is that a local [civilian] administration was installed despite the fighting. Karenni State is an example of this. But it is also happening in other places.
There is a need for collaboration among all the actors. There is a trust issue. There may be disagreement between the ethnic groups and Bamar-majority organizations such as the NUG and the National League for Democracy (NLD). To what extent has the NUG built trust with them to enable collaboration? The NLD won the 2020 general election. There has been little cooperation with the National Unity Consultative Council. The NUG has also attracted a lot of criticism. What can you say about the trust issue?
It is reasonable dispute in my opinion, especially as a believer in democracy. My view is that we must accept diversity and overcome disagreement with tolerance. There will be disagreements on the details. Sometimes, we can’t get an answer if we are overly focused on details. No matter what happens, it is important that we don’t lose sight of our vision for what we will do after toppling the military regime. The country is establishing a new system. The challenge is new, and the experience is new. So, such disputes are natural. There will still be disputes in the future. I think we will continue to quarrel even after stability is restored. But I believe we will be able to learn from those disputes and mature. If we don’t engage with each other because of mistrust and disagreements, we will continue to live under military rule. We have to overcome this. This is a must, and we have to overcome this bravely. Only our determination to establish a federal democracy in our country will determine our future. This is my belief.
Suppose the resistance forces gain the upper hand and changes occur. What role will the current military leaders or defectors play? Will they be allowed to participate, and what roles will they be assigned in the reconstruction of the country?
We have a policy in place. But regarding its implementation, we still need to make preparations for technical matters. Some [junta soldiers] have surrendered and some have defected to us. We have to check how many of them have committed war crimes. They will be treated differently depending on the severity of the crimes they have committed. In principle, regarding security sector reform, the Myanmar military has to reform itself. The military is impaired, and it needs to mend. They must understand that they must mend now. If they mend quickly, they may be able to restore ties with the people and salvage their reputation. But if they don’t, they will be forcibly mended. Military leaders and personnel who say they love the Tatmadaw [Myanmar’s military] have to make a choice.
The resistance offensive is expanding, and people feel encouraged. But the Myanmar military still has large numbers of troops. What measures do political leaders like you plan to take to expedite the collapse of the regime?
Primarily, soldiers protecting the regime should defect quickly. Some ethnic allies describe it as a loyalty shift. We have to use non-military means to persuade the soldiers to switch their loyalty to the people. So, we have put greater efforts into the People’s Embrace program and defector programs [that aim to persuade junta soldiers to defect] over the past month. If our allies can do the same, we will be able to reduce bloodshed, and the revolution can succeed more quickly. Now is the critical moment. The regime’s infantry troops have substantially weakened. Their morale has hit rock bottom.
Meanwhile, PDFs [People’s Defense Force groups] and revolutionary organizations mainly comprise young people. They may not be able to match the military in terms of weaponry, but they are full of energy and are superior in terms of confidence and morale. Perhaps this is the main factor that has enabled us to reach this far. So, it is important that soldiers defect from the Myanmar military quickly. We are focusing our efforts on it.
Another thing is to impose economic and financial sanctions to prevent the regime from purchasing weapons. If we can do these two things well, we will be able to end the suffering of the people in the shortest possible time.
The resistance will grow weary if the fighting drags on for too long. There is also a need to provide sufficient weapons and ammunition. The NUG has been raising funds for this. How much has it been able to provide, and how much more is needed?
The requirement is huge. We need hundreds of millions of US dollars.
How much has been raised?
I will need to take a look at the data from the [NUG’s] Finance Ministry. Recently, we sold shares in the Spring Development Bank. We targeted raising US$10 million in 10 days. We have exceeded the target. There are other sources of funds flowing into the revolution. Those funds come from the people, and are being used for the people. Our allied ethnic groups have their own fund-raising programs. It is fair to say we have been able to arrange sufficient funds for each phase. And I would like to stress that public support matters. We can’t fight a war without public support. In some areas, once PDFs arrive in villages, villagers do not want them to leave. There is a risk of being attacked [by junta troops] when PDFs are in their village. Villagers can also be attacked after PDFs leave their village. Villagers feel safe with PDFs in their villages. They have trust in them. When we talk about funds, it is not just about the money. The support from the people on the ground gives us strength and resources in the fighting.
How much progress has the NUG made in its engagement with China over the past three years? Has China sounded the NUG out about Operation 1027?
No, China has not approached us or sounded us out about it. We don’t have official engagement with China, but we do have unofficial contacts.
The NUG says it has been engaging and building trust with ethnic organizations, but in media interviews, ethnic leaders speak as if they don’t have much trust in the NUG. They sound like they can’t count on the NUG because it is dominated by NLD members.
We have also heard about that. You can’t build trust overnight. It takes time. Time will prove everything. Our actions will prove it. We can’t force them to trust us. Their past experiences discourage them from trusting us. So, we will need to build trust with patience.
It has been almost three years since the coup, and the NUG is also turning three soon. It has been two years since the fighting started. Things have started to change, especially since the launch of Operation 1027. What assurances can you give people—people who are supporting the NUG, political prisoners suffering behind bars, and the people displaced by the fighting?
All the people, both in urban areas and rural areas, are facing their own troubles. They have demonstrated resilience and are contributing to the revolution in their own way. I don’t want to give false hope. The people have seen with their own eyes what stage this revolution has reached over the past few months. What we can guarantee is… we must build greater political trust and unity among revolutionary forces to ensure those gains do not end up in vain. We must honor our vision and our commitment to building the nation. I can guarantee that we will stand firmly on this foundation, and try our best to make sure the sacrifices of the people are not in vain. If this revolution fails, our descendants will always remain under military rule, for sure. I believe no one will let this happen. This is the determination that prevails not only among those who assume political duties, but in each and every citizen. This will determine our future.
The regime will try to find a way out as its political and military crises deepen. But it seems unlikely they will ever consent to the federal democracy that is demanded by the people. They won’t surrender. In our opinion, they will take similar measures to those they took in 2008 and 2010, in order to survive. For example, they will pretend to yield to the demands of the international community or ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus, and do certain things including releasing political prisoners to ease pressure. What are the views of opposition forces and resistance forces about this?
We have already thought about that. It is a likely scenario, which concerns us. Myanmar people will not be deceived by it though. But the international community might be. Myanmar people have learnt from their past experiences, which cost them life and limb. We are not going back to the 2008 Constitution. We have adopted fundamental values such as… there is a need for security sector reform, and transitional justice. Those values are adopted not just by us; they are the basis of discussion among the political forces [opposing the regime]. Unless they [the regime] guarantee those things, it is hard for us to leave the path we are taking. When we hold public meetings, I always stress that it is important not to lose momentum as there are no guarantees for our political objectives… It is important that we do not go along with such a scenario. We have to stay vigilant at this moment.
What do you want to tell the international community? Recently Finland and Switzerland invited junta representatives to discuss peace. What should the NUG tell them to make sure they are not deceived by the regime?
In my opinion, mediation—or whatever it is—will not succeed if their approach [towards Myanmar] does not reflect the vision that the majority of stakeholders and the majority of the people have for this country. There are countries that handle conflict resolution [as mediators for other countries]. It is important that those countries correctly understand that developments in Myanmar are different from the previous examples and lessons that they have learnt from previous cases. We always have to argue with them about that.
Which countries are you least satisfied with among the global countries that you have engaged with about Myanmar’s crisis? Do you want to name a few?
In fact, there are only a handful of countries that we are engaging with. I want to say thanks to them. There are many countries that I am least satisfied with. It would be a long list. Thank you.
