Myanmar and China share a 2,227-km border, and their relationship is officially characterized as a “pauk-phaw” or fraternal relationship. But in reality there is plenty of anti-Chinese sentiment in Myanmar due to the country’s support for the military junta and exploitation of Myanmar’s resources.
An online survey conducted by independent researcher Hnin Phyu found that “unfavorable attitudes toward the country continue to be widespread, with many people believing that Beijing supports the junta and seeks to maintain a fragmented Myanmar with only as much stability as is required to further its own interests.”
That arose from a range of actions by China.
Taking advantage of Myanmar
According to survey, Myanmar’s general public widely believe that the Chinese government is taking advantage of their lack of space for freedom of expression to advance its own economic and geopolitical interests. China supports the military junta while pushing to resume projects that stalled due to resistance from Myanmar citizens.
The overwhelming majority of respondents (93.4 percent) said that China is instrumental in undermining press freedom, human rights and democracy in Myanmar.
China is also widely seen as greedy and exploitative in its business activities, and has been reviled for its to strong support for the previous military regime that oppressed Myanmar’s population after the 1988 pro-democracy movement, according to The Irrawaddy’s Editor Kyaw Zwa Moe. Columnist Bo Bo shares this observation and adds that China’s insistence on reviving the suspended Myitsone Dam project, the sometimes grating manners of Chinese expatriates toward their host communities in Myanmar, and the works of some Burmese novelists and intellectuals have contributed to the emergence of anti-Chinese sentiment.
Earlier this year Chen Hai, the Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar, met the junta’s Foreign Minister Than Swe in Naypyitaw to insist on “mutually beneficial” cooperation between the two countries such as eradicating online scam centers—insofar as they target Chinese citizens—and the maintenance of “peace and stability” along the shared border.
In reality, then, it is fair to say that the China-Myanmar relationship is not really one of “phauk-paw” amity but rather an uneasy or uncomfortable coexistence. It is hard to say how China’s cooperation has been “mutually” beneficial: on the whole it has tended to benefit one side only.
Supporting the military junta for its own benefits
China continues its supports for the military junta in two explicit ways. First, there is military aid. It is widely believed that the junta would have been defeated long ago if it lacked the air power China has provided or if resistance groups had effective means of combating its airstrikes. Knowing this, China has recently provided six more fighter jets. They arrived just in time for the regime to escalate its air attacks on civilian populations in Shan, Rakhine, Kachin and Kayah (Karenni) states and Sagaing Region.
Second, China is putting pressures on ethnic resistance forces to stop fighting against the junta. It leaned on the Brotherhood Alliance to halt Operation 1027 at the height of its momentum. In March 2024, Tar Bhone Kyaw, the general secretary of the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) which is a member of the alliance, said the ceasefire was against their will but they were unable to resist pressure from China. China has also forced ethnic resistance groups not to ally themselves (politically and militarily) with the National Unity Government (NUG).
Chinese pressure extends beyond the Brotherhood Alliance. Beijing has also urged the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) to stop fighting the junta, and shut its border checkpoints to economically pressure the resistance group into compliance.
In short, China’s involvement in Myanmar’s current affairs is widely seen as an attempt to protect the military junta against the people of Myanmar solely in order to safeguard Beijing’s own interests, rather than as a way of being a good neighbor or responsible regional power.
Opportunity to cultivate positive sentiment
But neighboring countries including China now have a window of opportunity to foster goodwill by supporting the Myanmar revolution. If direct support is not an option, China should at least refrain from interfering in Myanmar’s domestic affairs.
Non-interference, in this context, means simply standing aside and observing. It involves not supporting either side or exerting pressure on any group. A mere idle stance would be greatly appreciated by the people of Myanmar.
In other words: if China does not want to help, at least it should not disturb.
