It was to be expected.
Min Aung Hlaing and his regime have in the last few weeks suffered a series of major defeats in Arakan and Kachin states and most recently in Karen State at Myawaddy, an important border trade town. These defeats are significant for two reasons.
First is the humiliation factor: They have inevitably eroded morale among troops while seriously undermining trust in Min Aung Hlaing within the military and its loyalists.
Second is the strategic factor: The defeats have cut major supply and trade lines, giving control over important border crossings to anti-junta liberation forces, increasing the resistance’s access to resources, and significantly altering the regional and international view on the junta’s ability to control the country.
For those reasons, Min Aung Hlaing and his regime are left with little choice but to attempt action that:
- Instantly grabs media and public attention.
- Is destructive and painful enough to divert attention away from recent defeats in Kachin State and Myawaddy.
The junta cannot undertake a major offensive in Kachin for logistical and geographic reasons. Neither can it send ground troops into Arakan State, because this would inevitably lead to massive losses and more humiliating surrenders.
Myawaddy is the only place where the junta can realistically mount a counteroffensive. Its goal would not be to seize back the border town (the military and its overarching power structure are no longer capable of retaking and consolidating control over territories and towns they have lost).
What they can do is to wreak destruction. And that is what they will try to do.
The junta’s resources and capacity are shrinking by the week. So, it will concentrate its fading power and what can be hastily assembled into one punitive destructive operation.
It is a make-or-break situation for the junta.
If the counteroffensive fails and the military trucks and reinforcements now rushing toward Myawaddy from Hp-an and Mawlamyine are picked off along the way, we may witness a game-changing event. The outside world would observe a broken Myanmar military. Photos and video of destroyed trucks and dead soldiers on the roads to Myawaddy would send powerful shockwaves through the military itself.
Images of destroyed military convoys similar to the ones we have already seen in Chin and Arakan states would signal the end of Min Aung Hlaing.
One problem is that the terrain between Mawlamyine, Hpa-an and Myawaddy differs from that in Chin and Arakan states. The military can rapidly assemble strong forces with heavy firepower to battle resistance fighters on the way to Myawaddy.
Yet there are still many ways an attempted counteroffensive could fail.
Several chokepoints exist on the roads to Myawaddy. The Karen National Union (KNU) and its allies hold Kawkareik, 25 miles to the west. This stronghold and others to the south offer means to slow junta convoys with mines, ambushes and other obstacles.
But more would be needed to conquer any counteroffensive.
A lot will depend on what the Karen National Army (KNA), recently rebranded from the Border Guard Force, decides to do. Will they remain neutral or will they surreptitiously help the KNU its efforts to prevent military convoys reaching Myawaddy. The KNA wields the kind of military power that could be a tipping point.
One more potential game-changer could contribute to the failure of the junta counteroffensive. The regime is throwing its depleted resources and full focus into the fight to regain control of Myawaddy. The regime’s deputy head has been placed in charge of the Karen front, demonstrating how desperate the junta is. This is an opportunity to hit regime troops from “behind”, attacking them in as many places around the country as possible.
Resistance forces nationwide now have a unique opportunity to show they are unified. If they were to conduct simultaneous attacks on junta troops and targets across the whole country, the junta’s Myawaddy counteroffensive would falter. Attacked from the rear, they would lose steam going forward in Karen State.
Last but not least, Thailand has become a critical factor. If the junta’s counteroffensive reaches Myawaddy, it would mean fierce fighting on the Thai border, destruction of the important trade town, and an exodus of civilians across the border. If diplomatic pressure for a ceasefire fails, Thailand will end up with another 50,000-plus war refugees on its territory.
The KNU and other revolutionary troops will delay the counteroffensive’s progress with attacks and other disruptions. That will give the Thai government, diplomats and military generals time to get a fuller picture of what is going on and apply heavy pressure on the junta to cease its operation.
Bangkok has both the leverage and the capacity to do so. The junta’s main source of revenue comes from oil and gas sold to Thailand. The Thai military has more than enough discrete communication channels with its Myanmar counterpart to send them strong warnings that they themselves must stop Min Aung Hlaing from seriously damaging Thai interests.
China, with its bullying diplomacy, had sufficient leverage to pressure the junta and the ethnic armed Brotherhood Alliance to sign a ceasefire in January. It remains to be seen whether Thailand’s civilian government and its ASEAN “constructive engagement” policy can be similarly effective.
We can only hope so.
The counteroffensive against Myawaddy must be halted before it destroys yet another town in Myanmar causing another humanitarian catastrophe. That means Min Aung Hlaing must be stopped.
Thailand and its ASEAN allies have the opportunity to intervene in a brewing catastrophe that would spill over into their territory.
