Tipped to become Myanmar’s next military chief, Lieutenant General Kyaw Swar Lin was elevated to Chief of General Staff for the Army, Navy, and Air Force in late 2024 — placing him third in the country’s military hierarchy.
At just 49, Kyaw Swar Lin, who is now 54, became the youngest lieutenant general in Myanmar’s modern military history — despite never having engaged in any frontline fighting. His combat-free career and rapid promotion have earned him mocking nicknames from his peers, including “Nay Toe” and “Pyi Ti Oo,” after two of Myanmar’s most famous film actors.
A graduate of the Defense Services Academy’s 35th intake, he spent much of his career as personal staff officer to General Maung Aye, the former deputy commander-in-chief in Than Shwe’s military regime. Far from the front lines, his postings have mostly been in Naypyitaw.
Kyaw Swar Lin led a life of ease when he was a battalion commander, leading Light Infantry Battalion 411 based in Naypyitaw, responsible for security in the administrative capital.
This dearth of battlefield experience stands in stark contrast to the traditional path to senior command, which involves leading combat battalions in active zones. Kyaw Swar Lin’s bypassing of this rite of passage casts a long shadow over his capacity to lead in times of war.
Since his promotion, junta chief Min Aung Hlaing and his deputy, Soe Win, have become increasingly removed from direct military command, shifting their focus to administrative and political matters, according to sources within the Myanmar military.
Min Aung Hlaing’s indifference to battlefield setbacks over the past few years suggests he is comfortable letting Kyaw Swar Lin take the helm — despite his lack of combat credentials. In May, Min Aung Hlaing even brought Kyaw Swar Lin to Moscow to foster ties with Russian military counterparts, a clear attempt to position him as his successor.
Meanwhile, Soe Win has been relegated to handling civil affairs, including post-earthquake relief efforts, following the 7.7-magnitude quake in March. This rebalancing of responsibilities leaves Kyaw Swar Lin in operational command — a move military insiders see as part of a broader power transition strategy as the regime needs to form an interim government to organize the poll planned for December.
The current situation resembles the circumstances under which Than Shwe promoted Min Aung Hlaing to Chief of the General Staff in late 2010 as he prepared to transfer power to Thein Sein’s quasi-civilian government. Min Aung Hlaing is doing the same.
Kyaw Swar Lin has already begun presiding over key military meetings with regional commanders. In May, he reportedly chaired a high-level meeting with regional commanders at the War Office headquarters in Naypyitaw, and also held separate meetings with each commander.
According to multiple sources, he now oversees both offensive and defensive operations across the country. Yet his inexperience is beginning to show.
The military’s current strategy is defensive and reactive, focusing on attempts to reclaim command bases overrun by resistance forces, and to reinforce crumbling, besieged outposts.
A major focus has been Karen State, particularly in Karen National Union (KNU) Brigade 6’s territory, where resistance forces have made significant gains.
After losing its base at Baleldo, the junta attempted to secure the strategically important Thay Baw Boe camp by dispatching reinforcements from its 13th Military Operations Command. These reinforcements needed to go through Sone See Myaing, the headquarters of the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), which is a signatory to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement.
The regime sought the help of the DKBA to allow its reinforcements go through the area to reach Thay Baw Boe.
However, junta reinforcements were ambushed by the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) near Sone See Myaing. Many junta reinforcements were killed. The regime responded with an air raid on Sone See Myaing, in an apparent move to punish the DKBA for their lack of cooperation, and potentially sowing discord among Karen factions.
Military observers noted that the decision to send a 70-man unit through enemy-controlled territory without clear support from the DKBA demonstrates the limited field experience of Kyaw Swar Lin, and indicates that he was issuing orders on the fly. Thay Baw Boe has since fallen.
In areas claimed by KNU Brigade 7 in southern Karen State, the regime has lost key bases. While resistance forces have seized several junta positions along the Thai border in areas claimed by KNU Brigade 6, the regime has failed to mount any counteroffensive.
The picture is equally grim elsewhere.
The Arakan Army (AA) is advancing on multiple fronts. In Kyaukphyu Township in Rakhine, AA troops have advanced to within 6 miles (9.6 km) of the town. In Magwe Region in central Myanmar, AA troops are closing in on the Nat Yay Kan base on the Ann-Padan Road, which links those two towns.
On the Bago front, the AA and allies have been attacking the junta’s Nyaunggyo base in Padaung Township, posing threats to the junta’s ordnance factories.
In Ayeyarwady Region, the AA and its allies are closing in on Artillery Battalion 334’s headquarters in Ngathaingchaung.
In northern Shan State, a major junta counteroffensive is underway to retake Nawnghkio, and the regime is apparently gaining the upper hand. However, much of northern Shan remains under the control of ethnic armed organizations.
Chin State remains largely out of the junta’s control, with only three townships still in the regime’s hands and reinforcements sent to Tedim suffering deadly ambushes.
In central Myanmar’s Mandalay Region, resistance forces have launched Operation 9/Anyar in Myingyan District, targeting junta positions in Natogyi, Myingyan, Taungtha and Nganzun townships. This has forced the regime to reinforce its positions by boat. Previously, the regime relied on allied local militia groups to control those areas.
However, successful resistance ambushes on junta convoys protected by armored vehicles in Nyaung-U have forced the regime to bolster its presence across Mandalay townships.
The regime is also struggling to contain armed conflicts in Magwe’s Salin and northern Sagaing bordering Kachin State.
The operational crisis peaked in Bhamo, Kachin State, where the military lost two helicopters during a Kachin Independence Army assault. Ground forces failed to secure the landing zone, and the helicopters were dispatched without jet escorts—an error that exposed both the inexperience and recklessness at the top. One aircraft crash-landed and another was shot down by a KIA drone. These mistakes reflect a systemic breakdown in military planning under Kyaw Swar Lin.
At what may be the Myanmar military’s lowest point in decades, it is increasingly clear that Kyaw Swar Lin functions more as a symbolic figurehead than an effective commander.
For the resistance, however, his appointment presents an opportunity. A leader who rose by serving his superiors, not by leading troops, is unlikely to earn the trust of those fighting on the front lines. The military’s endurance thus far can largely be credited to two remaining assets: forced conscription and air superiority.
One pressing question remains: Do junta leaders deliberately promote weaker successors to protect their own legacies?
Than Shwe handed power to the pliant Min Aung Hlaing, who lacked vision but was obedient. Now, Min Aung Hlaing appears to be repeating that formula — preparing to pass the torch to someone even more removed from the military’s core mission: winning battles.
Kyaw Swar Lin may wear the uniform of a general, but in today’s Myanmar, the daunting task of commanding a crumbling army is not one that should be entrusted to a military officer without combat experience.
Swe Taw is a Myanmar military defector.
