China showcased its new policies on Myanmar to ASEAN leaders during the 8th Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Economic Cooperation Summit in Kunming, Yunnan province on Nov. 7.
China’s new direction
China had earlier signaled the policy shift by dispatching Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Naypyitaw on Aug. 14 – 10 days after the fall of Northeastern Command in northern Shan State sparked speculation of the Myanmar military’s imminent collapse.
Wang used his visit to voice support for the junta’s five-step roadmap and proposed poll, unequivocally backing the regime. He outlined three bottom lines for Myanmar: It should be free from civil strife, remain part of the ASEAN family, and remain free of external interference.
Two days later, Wang attended the 9th Mekong-Lancang Cooperation (MLC) Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Chiang Mai, Thailand, where he reiterated Beijing’s stance on Myanmar to foreign ministers from Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar, introducing China’s new policy to ASEAN, which adopted the five-point consensus for peace in Myanmar following the 2021 coup.
Bringing junta chief in from the cold
Beijing confirmed its split from the ASEAN consensus by inviting junta boss Min Aung Hlaing to the Nov. 7 Kunming summit, his first visit to China since the coup.
ASEAN has barred the junta leader from attending its summits over the past three years as punishment for failing to implement the five-point consensus, especially the demand to end violence.
Yet, in Kunming, China allowed him to rub shoulders with leaders from Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and even the ASEAN Secretary-General.
Despite Beijing’s claim that Min Aung Hlaing was not invited as a state guest, its actions brought the shunned junta leader into the fold, facilitating meetings with ASEAN leaders to garner support for his regime’s proposed election. This move differs from ASEAN’s “inclusive dialogue” policy, pushing instead for elections as a path to resolve the conflict.
ASEAN policy vs China policy
There are clear differences between ASEAN’s policy on Myanmar and China’s approach. ASEAN’s policy emphasizes engaging with relevant stakeholders, including civil society organizations, to foster dialogue, halt violence, and open opportunities for political resolution. ASEAN’s aim is to support Myanmar’s internal dynamics, with a focus on Myanmar’s populace.
China’s policy instead prioritizes the country’s stability, sidestepping internal conflicts. By steering clear of violence and conflicts, China aims to protect its thriving economic ties and business interests in Myanmar.
China may have given lip service to ASEAN’s political resolution, but it has effectively backed the junta’s violent rule, prioritizing direct engagement with the regime over ASEAN’s inclusive policies.
Mekong Summit and ASEAN’s policy
While not outright opposing ASEAN’s five-point consensus, which has thus far proved fruitless, China’s new approach to Myanmar leans heavily on the junta’s election plan as the key to peace. This was evident at the Mekong Summit, where China sought to whip up support for the planned poll among leaders of the four ASEAN countries.
The summit saw Premier Li Qiang reaffirm Beijing’s backing for the junta’s five-step roadmap and proposed election. However, the official statements from China were carefully worded.
China’s state-owned Xinhua news agency highlighted Li’s support for “reconciliation and transition” efforts in Myanmar.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning also emphasized the need for inclusive dialogue among all parties to achieve political reconciliation, restart Myanmar’s political transition process, and maintain territorial integrity.
Xinhua and the Foreign Ministry’s emphasis on Myanmar’s political reconciliation and transition efforts was an attempt to align with ASEAN’s five-point consensus.
However, in practice, China’s support for the junta’s five-step roadmap and elections diverges from ASEAN’s policy of dialogue among all parties in the conflict.
A lifeline for Min Aung Hlaing
With the junta facing continuous defeats on the battlefield and political dead ends, China’s policy change has thrown a lifeline to Min Aung Hlaing. The junta now has little choice but to toe the line set by China.
During his trip to Kunming, Min Aung Hlaing painted the ethnic Brotherhood Alliance as armed terrorists responsible for the ongoing conflict. He said his regime was willing to engage in talks but only if the alliance demonstrated a genuine intention for peace.
Neither a truce nor lasting peace are prominent on Min Aung Hlaing’s agenda, but his regime is incapable of recapturing lost territory and needs outside help more than ever. At the Mekong summit, he stressed that eradication of ethnic armed organizations along the border as a prerequisite to resuming border trade and implementing the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor.
If China lends a helping hand, the junta seems ready to bend over backwards to meet Beijing’s demands regarding border trade and the economic corridor. The junta is already sweet-talking Beijing, vowing construction of the China-Myanmar railway wherever feasible.
The regime has lost large swaths of northern Shan State, Mandalay and Magwe regions and Rakhine State, through which the railway would pass. But in exchange for support, the junta has vowed to fulfill China’s wishes without hesitation.
In doing so, the regime has signaled that China can expect a free hand to do whatever it wants in Myanmar should it offer help.
China’s strategy and Myanmar’s reality
China and the junta seem to think that pressuring border-based EAOs into a ceasefire will subdue People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) across country, allowing the military to finally regain control and resume the economic corridor and border trade. However, there are three significant hurdles to this goal.
The first problem is that the Myanmar military, which China is trying to resuscitate, is a shadow of its former self. During dictator Ne Win’s era, the national economy crumbled but the military retained its discipline and strong combat capability.
However, since Than Shwe took the reins in the 1990s, the military has morphed into a self-serving, corrupt institution, losing both its fighting spirit and competence. Following years of corruption coupled with ongoing war crimes, the military is unable to suppress the insurgency now raging. Salvaging such a degraded force will be no walk in the park for China.
In reality, the military controls only two towns on the thousand-mile-long Chinese border, Muse and Kanpiketi. Both remain standing thanks to Chinese protection. Meanwhile, regaining control over its lost territory in Kachin and Shan states, or any other region of the country, is virtually impossible in the short term.
The second problem is that ethnic armed conflict in Myanmar is not confined to border areas claimed by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). These conflicts are nationwide and involve various ethnic groups throughout Myanmar.
Past decades have shown that ceasefires alone can’t resolve these deep-seated disputes. The junta-drafted 2008 Constitution is also ill-equipped to address ethnic conflicts.
China is pushing for a ceasefire akin to pacts made between the previous regime and EAOs in the late 1980s and 1990s. However, having suffered from the divide-and-rule tactics of the military in 2009, northern Myanmar’s EAOs have little trust in it now.
They see the Spring Revolution as a golden opportunity to oust the military, while fearing future retribution if they align with it now. So, the EAOs on China’s border cannot afford to buy into Beijing’s new stance.
Thirdly, China’s backing for the junta’s election plan is also contentious. Over 20,000 junta opponents, including key opposition leaders, have been thrown into prison since the coup. Major parties reject the poll plan, while the junta’s election body has barred numerous parties from registering.
Voting cannot be organized in over half the country under resistance occupation, while freedom of speech is curtailed in regions controlled by the regime. Any election held under these conditions would be neither fair nor legitimate.
By endorsing the poll plan, China has turned a blind eye to the junta’s mass killing of civilians and burning of over 100,000 homes, enabling the junta to continue its war crimes with impunity.
Thus, China’s new policy on Myanmar resembles a placebo – appearing to offer a solution but failing to address the real issues.
Will Beijing’s medicine work?
For the embattled regime, China’s new approach may seem like a magic pill. Amid turmoil on all fronts, being handed a seat at a high-profile summit with China and other neighboring countries feels like a diplomatic win for the junta.
The junta boss’s return to the international arena was celebrated with much fanfare, including dragon dances. However, evidence suggests the junta will not be saved by China’s “magic pill.”
While Beijing’s support might offer the regime a temporary lift, it will be limited. China’s interest lies in border trade, Myanmar’s natural resources, and its strategic location.
So, while Beijing might provide economic and military support for the junta, it will be watching for any further destabilization in Myanmar that could harm its interests. Hence, the regime can’t expect unwavering support from China. Meanwhile, the influence of other major powers like the United States and India means Myanmar’s geopolitical landscape may shift over time.
Overcoming the complex challenges of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and border trade will require years of careful planning and execution. Success hinges on long-term stability in Myanmar. Addressing the deep-rooted conflicts with temporary solutions will not suffice. Quick fixes don’t align with China’s long-term interests either.
Banyar Aung is a political and ethnic affairs analyst.
