Myanmar’s junta has launched an offensive against the powerful Kachin Independence Army (KIA), whose headquarters are located in the Kachin State town of Laiza.
In late June, junta forces attacked the KIA in its eastern territory along the road between Sadon and Kanpaiti in Kachin’s Waingmaw Township. By early this month, junta troops had reportedly advanced to Nam San Yang, a village previously controlled by the KIA about 9 kilometers from its Laiza headquarters.
Tensions are escalating by the day, with reports that junta troops are being ambushed by KIA forces as they advance with reinforcements. The junta has also deployed artillery and is shelling the KIA stronghold of Laiza.
To find out how the KIA and its Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) political body view the junta’s offensive and the possible consequences of rising tensions, The Irrawaddy spoke to the KIA’s information officer and an independent political analyst.
Colonel Naw Bu, Kachin Independence Army (KIA) information officer:
Q: Why do you think the junta has launched an offensive in Kachin State, especially in KIA-controlled areas including Laiza town?
What the strategy of the opponent is we cannot precisely say, we can only guess. After the coup, most of the junta military units along the Myitkyina-Bhamo Road retreated, including their troops in Nam San Yang.
Therefore, my appraisal of their current moves is that the junta wants to take back control of the Myitkyina-Bhamo Road. It seems they want to retake hilltop outposts. I think they are supporting this mission by deploying forces from different directions.
Q: Does the junta want to control this road for economic reasons, for strategic military advantage, or both?
On the Myitkyina-Bhamo Road, Nam San Yang is their prime objective because this is the junction that connects with Laiza. The road is also important to the junta from an economic perspective. This is why they still want to control it.
Q: Do you think the junta’s offensive is a response to the KIA/KIO’s support for the People’s Defense Force (PDF) and cooperation with the civilian National Unity Government (NUG)?
Yes, this aggressive approach and operation could also be a way of imposing pressure on us to reduce our support [for the resistance]. But I want to emphasize that the support we have provided to the PDF and NUG is negligible. Indeed, they are now standing on their own feet, with more firepower and weapons as well as experts and technicians. Therefore, they are independent bodies that stand by themselves. If the junta believes that imposing pressure on us will weaken the PDF and NUG, I have to say that this is neither practical nor possible.
Q: Are you worried about junta airstrikes, and can you make effective preparations for aerial attacks?
It’s true that junta forces are continuously shelling and launching airstrikes against even non-military targets, including community wards and villages. That’s their custom. Hence, we have concerns about possible airstrikes and artillery attacks. Innocent people throughout the country have suffered a lot from such attacks. We have often witnessed them burn down villages.
We cannot reveal our military preparations or strategies here. But what I can say is that [if they launch attacks] we just have to resist and fight back as much as we can. Peace cannot be built by imposing military pressure alone. A country can never achieve peace in that way; the fighting would never end. Therefore, the State Administration Council [junta] must change its ways, and this is the time for it to change completely.
Sai Tun Aung Lwin (political and peace analyst):
Q: Why do you think the junta is on the offensive in Kachin State, especially in KIA-controlled areas including Laiza?
Beyond its advance on Laiza, I think the junta is attempting to take control of three major points in Kachin State. One point is Nam San Yang village and the surrounding areas on the Bhamo-Myitkyina Road. This is where the road branches off to Laiza, which is only about 7 miles away.
Last year, we witnessed both KIA and junta checkpoints deployed on the road near Nam Sam Yang. That is the situation at Nam San Yang. Meanwhile, another clash broke out recently near Sadon and Kanpaiti towns on the road to the border with China. And the third point the junta is trying to control is the area around Tanai and Shaduzup towns on the Ledo Road. Clashes have also broken out in this area.
Junta reinforcements are reportedly still being sent to these areas. The junta has many military outposts in Bhamo Township and its Northern Regional Military Command in Myitkyina. Therefore, it is now attempting to take control of the route between those two strategic areas. Whether or not the junta attempts to seize Laiza, the bigger objective is likely to be the Bhamo-Myitkyina Road.
What these moves actually reveal is that the regime is attempting to take control of major routes in Kachin that are connected to China. That is the situation on the eastern side of the state. On the western side, the junta is attempting to block the KIA from accessing the India border and Sagaing Region. In recent fighting, it was interesting to see junta making more use of [its allied] militia groups.
Q: Do you think this could also be an attempt by the junta to stop the KIA from supporting the PDF and cooperating with the NUG?
This is also possible. It appears that the junta is attempting to kill three birds with one stone. Every offensive has a purpose, whether economic, for security, for another competitive edge over its enemy – or for a geographical-strategic advantage. Military pressure is always imposed for certain reasons. In this case, what I see is that the junta has launched an offensive but rainy-season conditions have ruled out intense fighting. But I expect to see clashes escalate at the end of the rainy season later this year.
The junta’s moves are also dependent on China’s attitudes. Relations between Beijing and the junta, and between Beijing and the NUG, and other facts – all these aspects affect the decisions of Myanmar’s military. This is what we have seen during a decade of researching military affairs in northern Shan State. A similar scenario is seen in the case of Kachin as well.
Q: How will tensions between junta forces and the KIA develop in the coming months?
Right now, the junta is sending in more reinforcements [to Kachin]. If we examine this, it appears the junta believes it already has resources in place to control other conflict areas, like Sagaing Region and lower parts of the country. That’s why it is confident enough to prepare for a fight against the KIA. Also, that’s why I expect the junta may launch major operations at the end of this rainy season.
However, it will not be easy to seize Laiza with the power the junta has on the ground at this moment. But, in the first phase, it is trying to take control of the major routes. Again, I don’t know the details, but this is very likely related to China’s desire to resume its projects in these areas, improve trade along these byways, and so on.
On the other hand, the junta is also constructing a base near Tanai where it will deploy not only troops but also armored vehicles and artillery units. This is a very systematic military approach.
If we take all these situations together, my conclusion is that heavy fighting could be seen in Kachin at the end of this rainy season this year.
