The first charter drafted by ethnic Chin people – the Chinland Constitution – legitimizes the Chinland Council as the leading political body overseeing the Chinland government’s three branches: the executive, the parliament and the judiciary. The council is expected to fully establish the three branches next month.
It was ratified on Dec 6 by 235 representatives from the Chin National Front (CNF), local administration organizations (both township and area-based), elected members of parliament and special invitees from other Chin stakeholders.
This is the first Chin-written constitution ratified in Chin history. The Chin Hills Regulation Act (1896- 1947) was drafted by the British, while the Chinland permanent constitution, under the Chin Forum initiative (1998-2008), has gone through several drafts without being ratified.
Adopting a Chin-written constitution indicates its drafters are looking beyond their document and the council it enshrines to the future of the jurisdiction they envisage.
The Chinland Council comprises 112 members from the three clusters: 27 from the CNF, 17 MPs, and 68 from administration organizations.
Mixed reaction
The Chin community has had a mixed reaction to the formation of Chinland Council. Many have hailed it as a milestone in Chin history, but others doubt its validity and inclusivity due to the absence of some stakeholders in its formation.
All 17 MPs in the council are among the more than 20 who are active in the Spring revolution and are from the National League for Democracy. Other MPs (most of them from Tedim and Falam townships) declined to join the council reportedly due to ideological differences and divergent interests
Members of 14 of 17 recognized local administrative organizations joined the council, while three township administrative organizations – from Falam, Tedim and Mindat – snubbed it.
All 17 local administrative organizations have their own armed wings – mainly Chinland Defense Forces (CDFs) – in the Chin Joint Defense Committee (CJDC). Non-CJDC member groups are also split over the Chinland Council. One Area Administration Organization from Falam Township has expressed its support while another from Matupi Township has snubbed the Council.
Overall, more than 80 percent of the township and area administrative organizations have collaborated, or support, the Chinland Council.
However, the extent to which the Council can influence Chin state as a whole in terms of support from its people and control of its territory is not yet clear because control of some territory is claimed by both Chinland Council members and those who do not support the council.
The Constitution’s essence
The name “Chinland” replaces “Chin State” in the Chinland Constitution. It authorizes its own national flag and official languages, and endorses the Chin National Army as the only national army while maintaining local resistance groups.
The new Constitution recognizes the people of Chinland as the ultimate owners of the land, natural resources, and sovereignty of Chinland. The Council also adopted a new two-level administrative structure – which is quite different from the one outlined in the 2008 Myanmar Constitution. It has a Chinland government and local governments. The Council agreed on the establishment of 15 ministries under its executive branch, including Defense, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Immigration.
The Constitution did not contain any section about shared-rule with the union government, which has triggered speculation among unionists that the Constitution shows signs of separatism. However, the Constitution’s preamble clearly states that “federal democracy union” is a goal of the Chin armed revolutionary movement.
Sources from the Chinland Council said that the Chinland Constitution is written based on the objective of Chin “state and nation” building through self-determination in “Chinland”, particularly in the liberated area, and that self-determination is rooted in a pre-Panglong concept – an idea that forms a “federal vision” with “coming together.”
The CNF chairman also told this analyst in late 2022 that the priority of the CNF and its local allies is to practice self-determinization while maintaining a relationship with anti-State Administrative Council union-level entities. Thus, making a reality of the self-determination enshrined with a bottom-up approach for the future federal union seems to be what the Chinland Constitution intends. The structure of the Constitution and its key principles might reflect how Chin groups want to build the future Chinland.
On the other hand, critics question how long the Council will last, pointing to past divisions and disputes among Chin stakeholders. These views might be right; if the Chinland Council does not work, the Chinland Constitution would make no sense. What makes the Chinland Council unique is its constitutional mandate. Having a legally binding document might be an advantage for the Council’s future.
Pragmatic implementation of local and Chinland administrations might be validated by the Constitution. Chin joint forces continue to expand their liberated area by capturing SAC bases and towns. Seven towns have been overrun, and almost the entire rural area has now fallen to resistance groups. The Council has great potential to establish a connected administration in its area.
A relevant entity?
The Chinland Council appears to be the most inclusive statewide political body in Chin state, even though more work needs to be done. The involvement of the CNF and local administrative bodies contributes a de-facto legitimacy as they directly influence the territory and people at the grassroots level. The participation of elected MPs also constitutes de-jure legitimacy, and the Chinland Constitution has conferred on them a privilege to retain their mandate beyond 2025.
It is not clear if the NLD MPs have joined the Council with the green light of its Central Working Committee. But the division at the state-level is obvious as some NLD members refused to join. In this circumstance, working along the Chinland Council might be inevitable for the central NLD; otherwise, it could lose its influence on many of its Chin state’s members.
And as of now, none of the union-level entities including the National Unity Government, National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), and Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw have publicly endorsed the Chinland Council. The reason for this delay is not known. But failing to do so might widen the ideological gap between the unionists and the pro self-determination actors, which could consequently alter political vision of the latter.
As the Chinland Council has said, service delivery to its administrative area is its main function. The Chinland Council might be the most relevant entity for local and international actors to engage with. Chin groups have taken over almost all of Chinland’s area bordering India, including the international border trade point. This is a good opportunity for India to reconsider its approach to resistance groups – particularly the Chinland Council – if it truly seeks stability in the border region.
Challenges ahead
Due to the ethnic diversity and the lack of a unified political goal at the community level, there are visible challenges that the Chinland Council must deal with. It has said that it will keep the door open to meeting administrative groups and MPs who have so far snubbed it. Some groups or individuals are likely to reconsider joining the Council because of the flexibility for new member criteria and Constitutional amendment. However, the attempt to bring in some absentees may be a worthless venture as some of their ill feelings are rooted in historical factors or an alternative political vision.
Settling administrative divisions for local governments might be the toughest challenge. The local governments under the Council are divided based on township and area; but these existing local bodies have not had clear demarcations. An area administration means a self-administration run by a “tribal” group that usually lives in at least more than one township, and sometimes different tribal groups live in one village. Thus, the Council may have to facilitate negotiations not only between township and area groups but also between areas, or inter-tribal groups, in order to have an integrated and well-established administration.
The role of Interim Chin National Consultative Council (ICNCC), the first Council formed in April 2021 between virtually the same stakeholders, remains uncertain.
The CNF formally withdrew its membership in March this year while several individuals from political parties, civil society organizations and MPs, also deserted the ICNCC due to internal disagreements. Section 98 of the Chinland Constitution states that ratifying the Constitution means a dissolution of ICNCC by ceding its mandate to the Chinland Council. Most former and “current” ICNCC members agree to this.
However, some active ICNCC members have rebuffed the new Council and rejected dissolution of the ICNCC. Fresh reports have emerged about discussions on potential ICNCC reforms between non- Council members. Even in a reformed scenario, there is no sign that the ICNCC poses a serious threat to the Chinland Council’s legitimacy. There is very little chance it will be a more inclusive body than the new Council. Nevertheless, reconciliation might be a requisite for the Chinland Council in order to build healthy interconnection between the state and union-level entities.
June N.S is an independent researcher writing regular analysis on conflict and political issues in Myanmar, particularly in the country’s northwest.
