The Myanmar proverb “အလျင်လို အနှေးဖြစ်” (If you try to do something hastily and recklessly, it can end up being done slower) is becoming increasingly relevant as the Tatmadaw withers before attacks by armed revolutionary groups. And as Myanmar’s civil wars change conditions on the ground, this is an important thing to remember. The battle to defeat the Tatmadaw may end quickly (or not), but lasting peace will only come when the country’s complicated political and revolutionary conditions permit. In Myanmar, at least six or seven militaries will claim victory if the Tatmadaw collapses.
The Brotherhood Alliance and Kachin, Chin, Karenni, Karen, and Rakhine ERO/EAOs have all won unprecedented victories since October last year. Meanwhile, thousands of Myanmar regime soldiers have defected, signaling declining morale and doubts about junta chief Min Aung Hlaing’s capacity to maintain control. At the same time, the military victories have prompted analysts perched in foreign think tanks and embassies to start describing new governing arrangements. Optimism over the Myanmar military’s impending collapse and the revolution’s unity is common. The optimists in particular jump to speculation about what political systems Myanmar should develop, and begin spinning tales describing long-term visions for a peaceful Myanmar. Dreams are usually of various flavors of federalism imported from Canada, Switzerland, Germany, or wherever. Will there be ethnic federalism, or civic-territorial federalism? Chocolate or vanilla ice cream?
What is missing from the optimistic dreaming is what will actually occur the day after the military either implodes or is defeated. There will still be a Myanmar with various armies under different flags and commands, and each will make claims over territory that they will be hesitant to surrender to a new entity. Inter-group dialogue among allied revolutionary forces will diminish, which is evident even now, and new security dilemmas will emerge as victorious army commands consolidate their victories. In other words, the struggle against the junta and today’s civil war will not be resolved with a big group hug. And if care is not taken, regime collapse could simply lead to more war, with the same belligerents but new alliances. This is indeed what happened after World War II when the Japanese were defeated in Burma, and the British were able to return following General Aung San’s Declaration of Independence. Or after the French returned to Vietnam following the expulsion of the Japanese there by the forces of Ho Chi Minh. Both countries entered decades of more war.
Shrinking space for inter-group dialogue
Struggles against military dictatorship are the important first step, but they are not the entire solution to resolving Myanmar’s civil wars, which have roots in many ethnic separatist movements. In addition, the Burmese majority has suffered decades of oppression by military governments which at times was endorsed through their own fears, silences, acquiescence, and even active support of military rule. Right now, there are inter-group dialogue platforms rooted in shared enmity for the Tatmadaw, and this is a start. But each group represented prioritizes the suffering of their people under the military regime and looks to a preferred ethnic military or PDF for protection. Ghosts are always peering over the shoulders of peace negotiators in Myanmar! But how to prevent future armed conflicts when there is no more shared enemy?
Solidarity and cooperation based on a common enemy is not enough to change deep-rooted fear, insecurity, grievances, and conflict. Inter-group dialogue platforms for both new and long-established must be part of the larger plan. This has perhaps started with the emergence of bottom-up sub-national platforms like the Sagaing Forum, and Chinland Council, even as the highly politicized and under-strategized National Unity Consultative Council wanes. Still, all should be looked at closely and built to formulate effective dialogues among the victorious forces and beyond. The challenge will be to retain the spirit of consultation and consensus developed in the decades-long fight against the Tatmadaw, when the Tatmadaw itself is diminished.
Security dilemmas
Overthrow of the military is the shared common objective among the revolutionary forces fighting today. But against this backdrop are territories independently governed by the Kachin, Wa, Arakan Army, NUG, Brotherhood Alliance, Karen, Karenni, and numerous PDFs. More sophisticated weapons and ammunition seized from the military have increased the capability of many of these groups, too. This situation increases the likelihood of tensions arising between long-established ethnic armed forces with competing claims. Myanmar is no stranger to inter-ethnic armed conflicts for territorial, political, ethnic, and military advantages.
The places most at risk in a post-military era will be ethnic communities who are stranded in the territories of EROs with different ethnicities, for example the Shan communities in Brotherhood Alliance territories; Mon in Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) territories; and Shan-ni in Kachin Independence Army (KIA) territories. The dissolution of central authority would channel resources unevenly and widen the gap between political and military power among the different actors and communities. Where will the Shan communities in Brotherhood areas, Mon in KNU areas, or Shan-ni in KIA areas seek protection when their ethnic rights are violated?
Recall that when the Japanese surrendered in Burma in 1945, a period of terrible anarchy emerged in the resulting power vacuum. In Myanmar, insecurity among fellow EAOs and ethnic communities following a collapse of the Tatmadaw is possible, even likely. Perceptions of insecurity would increase the likelihood of another cycle of conflict.
Challenges to negotiating attractive outcomes
Connected to Myanmar’s coming security dilemma is a need to address the problem of recognizing ethnic identities, ethnic self-determination, and the lived experiences under decades-long civil war and military dictatorships. After Ne Win’s coup in 1962, the future was imagined only in the context of a centralized military dictatorship that cultivated fear and distrust. A pluralistic and inclusive Myanmar is not achievable without addressing the mutual fears and distrust that is the legacy of British colonial rule, decades of military dictatorship from 1962. Political aspirations differ among different ethnic groups, which have armed and governed themselves for decades. A western cosmopolitan view of civic-territorial federalism that ignores the independence of the ethnic armed organizations and their institutions is not enough. Such approaches lead to hasty assertions about a one-size-fits-all federalism imported from Switzerland, Germany, or Canada which exclude on-the-ground conditions of Myanmar. The consequences of lived experience of violence, oppression, cultural exclusion, and inequality, are central facts that any post-conflict approaches must address.
The problem of a one-size-fits-all approach
Discussions of post-conflict Myanmar are frequently blighted by one-size-fits-all approaches that ignore the asymmetric nature of actors’ political aspirations. The NUG (and its donors) hasten to insist on federalism as a panacea for multifaceted Myanmar conflicts. The junta military’s insistence in pushing the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), even after battlefield losses, is another good example of why a one-size-fits-all approach does not work.
The one-size-fits-all approach was also evident in peacebuilding training sessions led by international non-governmental organizations from 2012 to 2021. Many such programs were imported from abroad and boiled down debates to what type of federalism was best for Myanmar: ethnic federalism or civic federalism? Such duality hindered thinking on federalism, leaving out other ideas rather than promoting critical thinking about specific conditions in Myanmar, where a dozen or so heavily armed groups control territory under charters that implicitly or explicitly assert, as the KNU does, that “We shall retain our arms.” Similarly, Arakan Army Commander-in-Chief Twan Mrat Naing once floated an idea of confederation for Rakhine State within Myanmar, a proposal that reflects the AA’s capacity to hold territory and retain arms.
This is why recognizing the uniqueness and asymmetries among various ethnicities and communities is crucial to building foundations that prevent future wars in peaceful and democratic ways.
It is not a matter of choosing war or no war, or chocolate or vanilla ice cream.
Haste is the enemy
Passed on to us by our grandparents, the Myanmar proverb “အလျင်လို အနှေးဖြစ်” (If you try to do something hastily and recklessly, it can end up being done slower) is key, as Myanmar looks beyond military governance. Hasty action among peoples traumatized by decades (or centuries) of war and hatred may seem necessary for a country like Myanmar. But haste is a mistake, too, even in an urgent situation.
It is also important to note that no one factor, including those described here, is a linear “roadmap.” Nor should there be rigid roadmaps in a rapidly changing Myanmar, where the first question will be how to disengage well-armed actors from future wars, not whether an abstract linear plan with benchmarked objectives is met. Still essential is assistance from Myanmar’s neighboring countries, regional actors such as ASEAN, and the international community. The US and China must also engage meaningfully with the revolutionary forces. However, any peace and governance process must prioritize accountability to Myanmar’s people rather than outside donors.
The challenge is achieving governance in Myanmar without resorting to more war, by talking to each other and understanding each other’s insecurities, fears, distrust, and political aspirations. This requires unlearning old habits that insist one solution is the best solution, and instead beginning a mutually supportive process to build collective commitments to peace and against conflict. Haste and recklessness are the enemies of such a process.
The warnings of Myanmar’s grandparents needs to be heeded.
R.J. Aung (a pseudonym) is a former peace and development worker in Yangon and Thailand, and a native of Yangon. Tony Waters is a Visiting Professor at Leuphana University, Germany, and formerly at Payap University Chiang Mai.
