The first 100 days of the new Thai government have seen Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin repeatedly emphasize plans for “economic diplomacy” with foreign nations, but much still remains unclear about how Thailand will deal with the crisis in Myanmar, its neighbor with the longest shared border. Despite Srettha mentioning his administration’s commitment to taking a leading role on Myanmar, the lack of a clear policy direction will undermine Thailand’s effort to restore its status as a regional kingpin.
On Dec. 9, Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Parnpree Bahiddha-Nukara unveiled plans to form a joint taskforce on humanitarian aid with the Myanmar regime to handle a refugee influx if the conflict escalates. While details of the plan are yet to be determined, there are at least four reasons why Thailand needs to tread carefully when it comes to any such plan.
First, the taskforce would serve as a low-investment but high-return move for the junta, at the expense of Thailand. Since the 2021 coup, the regime’s State Administrative Council (SAC) has been barred from ASEAN summits for failing to adhere to the Five-Point Consensus (5PC) peace plan outlined by the bloc. The planned joint taskforce, on one hand, will allow Thailand to claim credit as an interlocutor who convinces the Myanmar junta to fulfill at least one demand of the 5PC after years of inaction. On the other hand, though, it will offer the SAC a way to claim that it is now gradually fulfilling its obligations and therefore deserves its place back in the ASEAN community. The issues of implementation will give the junta further opportunities to exploit the taskforce and thereby jeopardize its humanitarian efforts.
Though no details have yet to emerge about the taskforce or how its mandates on humanitarian assistance will be undertaken, the government-to-government (G2G) nature of the arrangement means that nothing will be done without the approval of both parties – the Thai and Myanmar governments. This poses at least two difficulties. First, the zones targeted for assistance are ethnic-controlled are afflicted by heavy fighting between the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed groups, making it hard to believe that the junta would have the will to provide any aid there. Thailand, as a partner, will then find it difficult to achieve anything better or beyond the scope of what the existing Temporary Safety Areas (TSAs) under the Royal Thai Army (RTA) can deliver, rendering this a futile effort for Bangkok. Second, even if one were to entertain the thought of the junta being benevolent, the SAC is an ineffective and incapable partner in humanitarian work given the ongoing failure of its ground troops and the loss of military bases in ethnic-controlled areas along the border.
Now that the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) has seized most of Karenni (Kayah) State, adjacent to Thailand’s Mae Hong Son province, it is hard to imagine the SAC being the key partner in humanitarian assistance. A more credible alternative is the Interim Executive Council of Karenni State (IEC), the emerging governing body of the revolutionary movement in Karenni State, which could deliver humanitarian aid to displaced people in its territory. In fact, multiple armed groups are already delivering public services in areas they control along the border; some of them even predate the 2021 coup. In Karen State, for instance, the healthcare and welfare wings of ethnic forces have been interacting with Thailand’s provincial public health entities through an informal cross-border healthcare system to prevent epidemics for decades. In the short term, ethnic administrations can be expected to strengthen along the border, making it necessary for Thailand to consider engaging with multiple actors who control different areas nationwide, not just the SAC.
The G2G nature of the taskforce might also impede Thailand’s autonomy to develop a service delivery plan as it sees fit and overcome obstacles created by the junta’s reluctance to fully engage in the arrangement.
Post-coup migration from Myanmar has become a diverse and complex phenomenon. Therefore, Thailand needs a broad, proactive and up-to-date policy that moves beyond lip service.
Lastly, planning for humanitarian assistance requires that data about the target recipients, in this case the internally displaced people (IDPs), be made available to the taskforce. However, disclosing information such as locations and numbers of IDPs to SAC representatives could put displaced civilians in grave danger. That junta forces might exploit such confidential data for military advantage, by recalibrating artillery attacks, airstrikes, and shelling in ethnic-controlled areas, is hardly unthinkable given they had killed 8,600 civilians as of May this year and committed 22 massacres as of October.
In summary, Thailand should be cautious if it proceeds in this endeavor with Myanmar’s regime. The taskforce on humanitarian assistance must be strategically planned, not only to assist people in need but also to serve Thailand’s interests. Otherwise, it risks becoming another stepping stone to be exploited by the SAC. While Thailand’s desire to re-emerge as a key player in the region is understandable after almost a decade of reputational damage, taking this path to address the Myanmar crisis may cause more harm than good. In the end, the only winner in this arrangement might be the Myanmar junta, a shrinking political actor in the conflict-hit country.
Surachanee Sriyai is a lecturer and digital governance track lead at the School of Public Policy, Chiang Mai University. Her research interests include digital politics, political communication, comparative politics, and democratization.
