What is the future of Myanmar’s Rakhine State? In a year of unprecedented military gains, the Arakan Army/United League of Arakan (AA/ULA) has achieved what four years ago would have been inconceivable: the liberation of an entire state by force of arms. As the AA has driven out almost all State Administration Council (SAC) forces from north to south, laid siege to the state capital Sittwe and the Kyaukphyu naval base, and is penetrating into Magwe, western Bago and the Irrawaddy Delta, threatening the military defense factory complex, 2025 may be the year Rakhine State becomes independent. This will likely be the first irredentist success of a non-state armed group since the Wa and Kokang established their autonomous zones in 1989, followed soon after by the Mong La enclave.
It’s never been completely clear what the political aspirations of the AA/ULA are, apart from the complete takeover of Rakhine State through military means. Its leadership has talked up “confederation” but hasn’t elucidated what that means or how it will work. But if overturning the central Myanmar state apparatus and expelling all the security forces of the SAC from Rakhine is their aim, then remaining in any future Union of Myanmar will likely be symbolic. The AA is striving for effective independence. Even if it can reach some form of negotiated agreement with the central state on creating a separate political unit in the country, it will likely be conditional on never being under central administration, widely seen as subjugation, ever again. But the AA must contend with four major challenges: military consolidation; humanitarian and development challenges; intercommunal relations; and the international arena.
Military consolidation
The AA has achieved an unprecedented military victory—certainly in the history of civil war in Myanmar—from overrunning Paletwa, in Chin State, in late 2023, to sweeping clear central Rakhine soon after, and eventually all of the Bangladesh and Indian borderlands, in spite of daily air strikes, no control of maritime routes along the coastline, and during an economic blockade of over two years. What next as the army fights on several fronts simultaneously? The AA is besieging two towns still strongly held by the regime: Sittwe and Kyaukphyu. With its array of allies, such as the Student Armed Force (SAF) and Chin Brotherhood, it is also pursuing a three-pronged offensive into Central Myanmar.
The AA/ULA relations with the exiled National Unity Government (NUG) are a minor factor in national revolutionary dynamics. A recent study by the Center for Arakan Studies argued that cooperation was perfunctory, and that the two movements had almost irreconcilable philosophical outlooks: the AA/ULA is a realist nationalist organization, while the NUG is, at least publicly, driven by liberal democracy. The NUG will likely have little to contribute to the military and political future of an AA/ULA confederation, or in its radius of military power into other parts of Myanmar.
For the AA to succeed in consolidating territorial control and expanding administration by establishing their confederation, they have two broad options: make a deal with the SAC and stop fighting, or continue to cooperate with other revolutionary forces to ensure the military regime falls. It is already helping allies in Chin State, Magwe and the Irrawaddy Delta, as well as in other parts of the country through its participation in the Brotherhood Alliance. But in the murky, treacherous world of Myanmar peace-making, multiple modalities can exist at the same time—a peace agreement and support for nationwide armed operations. The AA was a signatory to the Haigeng Agreement brokered by China even as it stepped up its offensive in central Rakhine State: the agreement only applied to northern Shan State. China has clearly given the AA/ULA more rope to advance its cause.
There is also the urgent need for mine action, humanitarian demining and UXO disposal. Rakhine has been extensively contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW), which will dangerously impact the next generation. There are rising cases of civilians being killed and injured from tampering with ERW on the ground, in areas that have only experienced armed conflict in the last year.
Humanitarian and development challenge
The AA/ULA is likely already planning ahead to develop new economic and humanitarian access
routes to alleviate the suffering of millions in the state. The SAC blockade by land and sea has deeply impacted all communities in Rakhine State, and disrupted agriculture and trade. There have been workaround solutions, different supply routes, but these are tenuous and have driven up prices. Two solutions the AA/ULA might consider: First, now that the group has complete control of the border with Bangladesh, conceivably that could open trade and humanitarian supply routes, and further north from India too, down the Kaladan River. Yet the Bangladeshi security forces are not so far conducive to opening up the border, and seem to be siding with Rohingya militants.
A second consideration is opening new routes into Magwe and the Irrawaddy Delta. The AA has largely taken control of the Arakan Yoma range, and with the gradual takeover of Gwa Township, their forces are less than 100 km from the Delta capital of Pathein in Ayeyarwady Region, and continuing to push along the coast. These could potentially open up new supply routes—but not when there is a full-blown war going on. But two issues make that difficult, and that is the ongoing threat from airstrikes and the ability of the Myanmar military to control the coastline and dominate the sea. Much of the riverways in Rakhine, extremely important for the movement of people and goods, are under the firm control of the AA: most crucially the Kaladan River, which is pivotal for riverine trade with India.
Punitive airstrikes, as well as artillery barrages from land and seaborne platforms, will continue to endanger civilians and harass economic recovery. As Cyclone Mocha devastatingly demonstrated in 2023, Rakhine State is an area badly affected by climate change and extreme weather events. Yet, the positive lesson from Mocha was the capacity of the AA/ULA to assist affected communities and divert scarce resources to respond to disasters. These lessons will have to be refined moving forward.
The AA will also not be hesitant to engage in a form of “nationalization” of seized assets, including all the hotels they overran in the tourist zone of Thandwe. The seizure of property owned by Rakhine tycoon Kyauk Taung in Taungup in recent days is one example of revolutionary “redistributive justice” that may partly finance reconstruction efforts. The AA/ULA has also long been engaged in revolutionary taxation, from formal business all the way down to poor civilians, as well as engagement with a litany of illicit enterprises. The AA will invariably come in for criticism for some of the economic choices it makes, but this is the dirty end of the field of “rebel governance” and “bottom-up federalism” lauded by Western cheerleaders of revolution in Myanmar.
Intercommunal dilemmas
Where the Rohingya fit into the AA/ULA’s plan’s is a significant question, and is surrounded by a great deal of uncertainty. If the AA does achieve a form of independence, then what form of citizenship and basic rights will be granted to all communities—not just Rohingya but Mro, Daignet, Chin, Kaman, other Muslim communities and the “unofficial minorities” of other groups? What would any complete victory mean for the return of 1 million Rohingya from Bangladesh?
Priority has to be given to the remaining Rohingya inside Rakhine, in terms of humanitarian assistance and basic freedoms of movement and protection. But there needs to be a responsible public debate on granting all ethnic and religious communities in Rakhine equal citizenship status, including those Rohingya forced into Bangladesh since 1978. There are so many unknowns with Rakhine’s future that people should consider innovative ways to establish communal relations and not replicate the abusive and discriminatory Myanmar military state.
In a statement on Dec. 29, 2024, the AA promised it would be “working towards achieving freedom for the people of Arakan.” The Rohingya community, as well as all other communities, should be actively engaging with the AA on how they perceive freedom and what, in their view, a liberated Arakan would look like. There needs to be an organic reconnective process, or wholly new societal relationships in the wake of the decade-long conflict. It also has to be remembered that the Rohingya have already been included in some small ways in the AA/ULA administration, the judicial system and other offices.
If the Myanmar military state is completely driven from Rakhine State, then the most destructive and divisive actor in the complex communal relationships will have been vanquished. That really does necessitate a completely different approach to social, political and economic interactions. Being wary of the AA attitudes and treatment towards Rohingya is crucial, and there have clearly been grave abuses against the community. But to equate the AA with the SAC and more than 40 years of crushing administrative apartheid and denial of basic freedoms is ludicrous. Claims of AA “genocide” are also dangerously inflammatory.
The planning for receiving over 1 million Rohingya from Bangladesh, as well as some 60-80,000 who have fled fighting in 2024, has to be seriously considered, especially in light of recent United States Agency for International Development (USAID) food aid cuts. Who will pay for an expensive repatriation? Recent visits to the Rohingya refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar by United Nations Special Envoy Julie Bishop and Secretary-General António Guterres may provide a symbolic boost, but won’t materially improve the plight of the Rohingya. The World Food Program (WFP) has announced cuts of food aid from US$12.50 a month to just $6 a month in the camps. WFP also announced cuts to its support for 1 million people around Myanmar, including 100,000 internally displaced persons in central Rakhine. Bangladeshi “Chief Advisor” Muhammad Yunus has a cross-border humanitarian combustible catastrophe on his hands, in the middle of a full-blown war.
Repatriation planning will be challenging as long as the Rohingya armed groups continue to fight the AA. There is a narrative that the AA is the greatest threat to the Rohingya, which obscures the reality that the Rohingya Solidarity Organization, Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army and Arakan Rohingya Army are siding with the Myanmar military. The Rohingya strongman Dil Mohammed is a particularly troublesome factor in fueling violence, both inside Bangladesh and in Rakhine State’s Maungdaw. The Rohingya militants as equally threatening to the Rohingya community and are putting them at grave danger of not just AA reprisals, but getting caught in the crossfire of AA attempts to clear them from Rakhine territory. Under these circumstances it’s almost impossible to see how serious planning for repatriation can be considered.
The international dimension
There is a little-discussed international dimension to the AA/ULA’s position that is quite unique among armed groups in the current conflict, as it will have to contend with China, India and Bangladesh for its future viability as a state. The Chinese will not permit any destruction of their investments, but what effective multi-control modalities can be worked out? The Myanmar Institute of Strategy and Policy (ISP) estimates the AA completely controls two of the 11 Chinese projects in Rakhine and partially controls another eight. This gives the AA significant leverage, which it could exert on Beijing to pressure the SAC to suspend air strikes. The AA statement on Dec. 29 also said the Arakan People’s Revolutionary Government will take “special care to ensure the security and safety of those involved in investment activities, projects and business.” China needs the AA/ULA as much as they need China. India’s role is less well understood, but the AA/ULA is certainly in discussions with a range of Indian authorities.
Bangladesh should provide more leadership on the conflict. But it needs to be genuinely inclusive of key actors, including the AA and related groups such as the Chin Brotherhood. The West should also be more proactively engaging with Bangladesh to establish much needed humanitarian supply routes into Rakhine to assist all communities. The world needs to acknowledge the reality that the illegitimate Myanmar military state no longer has sovereignty, and must establish productive working modalities with the de facto authorities of the AA/ULA.
Bangladesh Home Advisor retired Lieutenant General Jahangir Alam Chowdury told reporters recently that “the 271-km land and river border with Myanmar is now controlled by the Arakan Army completely. However, the country is officially run by the Myanmar government. Now, [given the situation] we have to maintain contact with both parties… In order to protect our interests, the communication between the Myanmar government and the Arakan Army is being maintained from the beginning.”
International actors also need to fundamentally rethink their approach to “social cohesion” and take a more realistic perspective on inter-communal relations: millions in funding have been squandered on ill-advised conflict sensitivity activities over the past decade that have accomplished nothing. Funding is also being squandered on ill-advised “peace mediation” efforts that try to incorporate the AA/ULA but forget that the group purposefully stayed away from the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) process and tried to avoid the scrum of peace INGOs. There is very little role for the West to perform any more in Rakhine State, especially as it slashes life-saving humanitarian aid.
The AA/ULA has also likely been cushioned from the effects of recent USAID cuts, which will mostly impact Thailand-based initiatives. The group’s leadership, always deft at avoiding historical mistakes, has always calibrated its contacts with foreign aid, and avoided any dependence on Western assistance, knowing it would raise China’s ire and contain onerous provisions and conditions.
There are so many possible scenarios in a situation of great uncertainty. But it should be remembered that few outside observers on Myanmar thought the AA was much of anything until early 2019 with its Independence Day attacks in Buthidaung. Six years later, the group has taken over major territory, waged guerrilla war, urban warfare and siege warfare to overrun scores of heavily fortified military installations and kill and capture thousands of Sit Tat (Myanmar military troops). That took multiple-scenario planning and vision to achieve. The AA/ULA must already have advanced planning for consolidating its future. The group has pursued a ruthlessly competent project until now, and likely will continue into the troubled future.
David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, humanitarian and human rights issues on Myanmar.
