On Jan. 28-29, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) foreign ministers will meet in historic Luang Prabang, until 1975 the capital of Laos, their host country. It will be their first meeting since Laos took over ASEAN’s rotating chairmanship from Indonesia at the beginning of the year.
Laos’ theme for the year of its chairmanship is “ASEAN: Enhancing Connectivity and Resilience”. But as is often the case when ASEAN leaders gather, other issues will loom large over the meeting, particularly the situation in the South China Sea and the crisis in Myanmar.
In Myanmar, conflict between the military regime and a broad coalition of resistance organizations has been escalating. Since the launch of large-scale coordinated attacks in late October 2023, the military regime has suffered major losses. Named Operation 1027, the attacks have seen hundreds of military posts captured, more than 40 towns taken, important trade routes with China, India and Bangladesh affected, and massive supplies of weapons and ammunition brought under the control of the resistance. Myanmar’s military, often labeled as “invincible”, has shown serious weaknesses.
The initial attacks inspired a heightened sense of unity of purpose among the resistance groups in the country. But as of yet, such unity of purpose is difficult to find in the international community. Three months after the start of Operation 1027, diplomats, high officials and analysts continue to read the tea leaves. A clear path out of Myanmar’s crisis is not in sight.
Laos has appointed Alounkeo Kittikhoun as its special envoy for Myanmar. He is a vice minister of foreign affairs and former ambassador to the UN in New York. Together with special envoys from Indonesia and the Philippines, he forms the ASEAN troika, a mechanism ASEAN’s leaders set up in 2023. Alounkeo visited Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Myanmar’s military leader, on Jan. 10, but little is known about their discussions.
As ASEAN members prepare themselves for the Luang Prabang meeting, one of the organization’s inherent weaknesses is now even more visible than before. Only two of ASEAN’s 10 members share a border with Myanmar (Thailand and Laos). Myanmar’s other important neighbors will not be in Luang Prabang: China, India and Bangladesh. Saddled with the growing burden of proximity, they have contended with refugee flows, violence on their borders, humanitarian needs, cross-border crime, stalled development and lost economic opportunities.
In the past, one might have looked towards the UN or other international groups to provide a more inclusive stakeholder platform, but the UN has already kept the position of its Special Envoy for Myanmar vacant for more than six months. More generally, since Myanmar’s military coup of February 2021, the international community has seemed rather relieved that ASEAN had assumed the burden of finding solutions for Myanmar’s crisis. “ASEAN is in the lead”, was an oft-heard excuse of those shying away from sharing responsibility.
Until recently, Myanmar’s direct neighbors did not appear overly concerned with what was happening in Myanmar. The exception was China, which has decades-old bonds with ethnic armed groups along its border. When its pleas to Myanmar’s military leader to act against cross-border crime fell on deaf ears, China is said to have greenlighted Operation 1027. This led to the dismantling of multiple online scam centers on Myanmar soil, just across the border with China. From these centers, employees working under slave-like conditions defrauded countless innocent victims around the world but particularly in China.
The operation was successful for the Chinese border areas, but it may have contributed to a waterbed effect: the growing concentration of scam centers along Myanmar’s borders with Thailand and Laos. India, which has largely been supportive of Myanmar’s military regime, has announced that it will construct a 1,643-km-long fence along its border with Myanmar. And at the recent summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, Bangladesh and Myanmar continued to discuss the repatriation of Rohingya refugees, even though the military regime was rapidly losing ground in northern Rakhine State, the birthplace of many Rohingya. The variety of actions shows that Myanmar’s neighbors have not yet brought their positions into line.
Thai Foreign Minister Parnpree Bahiddha-Nukara has underlined the importance of greater alignment. Earlier this month, in an opinion piece published by the Bangkok Post, he called for engagement of other regional players in addition to ASEAN. He also announced the establishment of a bilateral humanitarian initiative with Myanmar “to meet the pressing needs of the people along the border and further inland”. And he urged ASEAN to become engaged and said that he hopes it will help to implement ASEAN’s five-point consensus on Myanmar, agreed in Jakarta in April 2021.
We do not doubt the sincerity underpinning some of the ongoing efforts, but it is important to note that they miss a key point: Myanmar’s ongoing crisis cannot be resolved without the full engagement of its population.
Myanmar’s landscape has changed considerably since the now three-year-old military coup. International support for the military regime has dwindled, and on the domestic front, it now faces a much more formidable opponent, one that is better armed, highly motivated and, above all, more united.
While contacts between the international community and the resistance are increasing, they remain lip service unless representatives are actually in the room as stakeholders when Myanmar is discussed at international conferences. Indonesia, Laos’ predecessor as chairman of ASEAN, has said that in 2023, it had more than 60 contacts with various groups and organizations. These same groups should not be held at arm’s length during this crucial time for Myanmar.
Thailand’s collaboration with Myanmar’s military regime in border areas is a case in point. The regime is no longer in control of many of these areas. The initiative can only succeed if it is embedded in local structures with proven effectiveness. There are many of them, and for decades, they have shown their effectiveness in delivering assistance to those who need it most.
Moreover, Myanmar’s regime is not a benevolent organization. It has a long history of blocking humanitarian assistance from those in dire need, as was the case, for example, for areas heavily affected by cyclone Mocha (2023), the deadliest storm to hit the Rakhine coast in 100 years.
Current reactions by members of the international community to Myanmar’s crisis reflect their uncertainty. Many have been caught by surprise. They never believed that Myanmar’s invincible military forces might be beatable.
Their uncertainty shows up rash measures such as building border walls or in continuing to work with a regime that has lost territorial control over much of the country, that can no longer maintain law and order or deliver basic services to its people.
No one can predict what will happen in Myanmar in the coming months and years, and that makes it more important than ever to listen to the voices of those who have been laying the groundwork for a new and inclusive federal democracy.
Given the huge challenges ahead, ASEAN and the broader international community should support them, while also looking for opportunities that a changing Myanmar might bring to the entire region.
Laetitia van den Assum is a former Dutch ambassador to Thailand and Myanmar. Kobsak Chutikul is a retired ambassador of Thailand and a former elected member of parliament.
This article first appeared in The Bangkok Post.
