Many consumers, when they buy a large product to be delivered to their homes, on opening find in the package a note: “Some assembly required.” The factory or outlet has taken the product apart to reduce shipping costs, and it is up to the consumer, with perhaps a screwdriver or small tool, to reassemble the item. There are usually instructions of assembly included, but often the recipient does not bother to read them and tries to assemble the item based on common sense. Often the sequence of assembly steps, however, is critical to success. Ignoring it leads to consumer frustration.
Now, Myanmar is disassembled. Putting it back together requires deft handling and nuanced thinking. The instructions for assembly—the constitutions of 1947, 1974, 2008—are no longer adequate, if once they may have been so considered by some groups. Blame is easily assigned: the British for their governing patterns, the military, the civilian leadership, and the ethnic minorities, some of whom at various times sought to prevent assembly. But blame is neither a guide to reassembly nor a policy alternative. And reassembling the puzzle cannot be accomplished with a hammer, as the military has viciously tried to do for over half a century. Myanmar is moving in a chaotic self-induced and destructive path. There are no instructions for reassembly. This is uncharted territory.
Well-educated and well-meaning foreigners have in the past sought to help the process. Their elaborate, full-blown plans may have been sound and had international relevance, but they lacked local understanding, and what one group may have wanted, another group rejected. Perhaps starting with modest, general principles might have been more efficacious. And suspicion of foreigners is an established, and often justified, Burmese trait.
The established national and international premise has been that an assembled Myanmar is the best possibility for the prosperity and wellbeing of all the various populations. Such a situation would prevent the manipulation and exploitation of a divided country by its neighbors and those national and private entities further afield. It would end the killings and dislocation of hundreds of thousands.
But how to begin? The present leadership of all conflicting parties has proven to be inept at best, and incompetent in negotiating the compromises necessary for reassembly. A new generation of leaders of all groups willing to think constructively is urgently needed, but power is a corrosive force that often undercuts reality and is rarely voluntarily discarded. The calls for any group to surrender is a strong impediment to progress, for these groups have nowhere to go and will continue fighting unless they are offered a face-saving and dignified position, attaining some of their objectives but eschewing others for the common good. The past cannot be forgotten, and sometime in the future a type of reconciliation commission might be formed to air past sins, and if not absolve them, to provide solace to those who lost family, friends, and properties in the continuous upheaval that has plagued the state.
It might be better to consider first some abstract principles on which agreement might be reached, rather than specifics of territorial power, always disruptive. For example, what kind of local government might be acceptable to all groups, and how would those governments be financed? Then, how would a guide for reassembly—a new constitution—be written? This approach could well be considered dreaming, but it might be an improvement over the present nightmares that permeate the state.
The drawing of local government boundaries becomes exceedingly difficult. The former state demarcations are unacceptable. The former Shan State is impossible, with the Wa, Pa-O, Ta’ang and other groups holding overlapping territorial claims. The Rakhine (Arakan) and Karenni (Kayah) entities have historical accuracy, having been based on independent kingdoms absorbed into the Burman empire. Other than those two groups perhaps only the Mon, Chin and central Myanmar Bamar (Burmans) inhabit areas of a predominate ethnic group. But to start with territory is to invite stasis.
The present chaos is unacceptable to all parties, and yet no group has sought viable alternatives. There is a need for dialogue, discussion, and compromise. A reformed military is needed. Inclusive local governments are necessary. Ethnic authority is required. Religious freedom and equality are essential. The constructive voices of the diverse peoples are important.
And yet, there are no signs of any of the present leaders rising above the turmoil. Some foreign nations are beginning to place bets on what they perceive as probable winners in this struggle. But there will be no end, and no winners. The losers will be the unfortunate peoples of Myanmar, whose fates are in the hands of incapable leadership. And so the tragedy continues.
David I. Steinberg is the distinguished professor of Asian studies emeritus, Georgetown University.
