There were big changes in Myanmar in recent weeks with the extension of the state of emergency and a cabinet reshuffle and, most dramatically, the masthead of the venerable Global New Light of Myanmar newspaper received a stylish makeover. Yet closer observers of the Myanmar military regime’s mercurial propaganda machine would have noticed a recent pruning of the political, economic and social objectives of the State Administration Council (SAC) in official media, from 12 down to nine. Following the extension of the state of emergency, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing briefed senior officials on the revamped priorities. What was clipped, and what was made over?
From political objectives this line was removed: “To continue implementing the principle of peaceful co-existence among countries through an independent, active, and non-aligned foreign policy.” From economic objectives, this was cut; “To develop a stable market economy and promote international investment in order to enhance the economic development of the entire National people.” Disregard the social objectives changes: the regime is fundamentally anti-social.
The reworked economic objectives also contain this worrying new claim which evokes the disastrous period of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC): “To spur the cultivation of oil crops to meet targeted production levels, thereby achieving self-sufficiency in local oil supply and striving towards both local adequacy and overseas export of surplus oil crops.”
It’s unsettling to conclude that these changes herald a withdrawal from world affairs and a retreat into self-sufficiency. After all, xenophobia is a deeply rooted military characteristic. The Revolutionary Council (RC) of former dictator Ne Win went from intensified non-alignment to autocratic isolationism from 1962 to 1988. And the SPDC’s strongman Than Shwe sowed chaos in the agricultural sector when his madcap domestic bio-fuel project of the mid-2000’s, called jet-suu, produced little more than nationwide misery. The existing major oilseed crop production zones are Sagaing, Magwe and Mandalay, where the military has mercilessly attacked rural communities since the coup, displacing over a million people and burning over 60,000 homes: the conflict appears in contretemps to the economic objective.
Why alter these objectives, and how real are they? The bigger question is what drives Myanmar military statecraft? Are the changes to the major objectives a new direction in domestic and international approaches or simply a sick SAC version of Wordle?
There have been a number of attempts at understanding what drives Myanmar military decision-making. Andrew Selth’s fine study on “Myanmar’s military mindset” is from 2018, but contains penetrating observations of a skewed worldview. Mary Callahan’s prescient article in the New Left Review in 2009, “Myanmar’s Perpetual Junta”, should be reread in light of the coup, and so too the clear warnings of military perfidy from journalist Bertil Lintner, informed by history and past deceptive practices. The ramblings of Larry Jagan, long held to be an oracle but in retrospect a fantasist and fabricator, have been mercifully muted during the current round of military rule. There is much to be harvested from the history of past military rule, but we must also understand that the SAC is a new permutation of military mania in a very different Myanmar, so comparisons with previous regimes should be measured.
I suggest a rough guide to living with incredulity, anticipating confusion, and constructing a chaos theory for the seemingly nonsensical. Think of this approach as embodying three key features of SAC behavior since the 2021 coup: unpredictability, obstinacy, and insincerity. Taken together, they lack sophistication, but they have so far proved successful: if the measure of success is staying in power
Unpredictability
Any attempt to predict what the SAC will do is an act of folly. There are simply too few reference points to base scenarios on. The constitutional provisions as guide? They can be manipulated, easily. Legal procedure? The military has always ruled by law, and amends or creates the justification for arbitrary authoritarianism with multiple laws.
Tying probable political prisoner releases or amnesty to specific dates or holidays is old predictive thinking. The patterns are simply not there anymore, or predications of concessions far less than anticipated. This creates feverish anticipation ahead of holidays such as Buddhist Lent. Imprisoned economics professor Sean Turnell and former British ambassador Vicky Bowman were released on National Victory Day in November 2022, not a usual auspicious date for releasing hostages. There is a great deal of wasted breath and word counts from ‘experts’ predicting military behavior, but precious little review of what went wrong, nevertheless admitting predictions were woefully askew.
Consider the ‘Crazy Ivan’ tactic, of a Soviet-era submarine suddenly breaking into a 180-degree turn without prior indication of choosing port or starboard. The tactic was (according to novelist Tom Clancy) coined to overcome blind spots in a vessels baffles, it’s exposed rear-end where sonar cannot work effectively. A sharp turn ideally detects any American or NATO submersible silently following. But that provides simply 50-50 odds of prediction. Left or right?
Erratic Myanmar military decision-making often involves a multitude of possibilities, many of which are unforeseen let alone unpredictable. Let’s call this the ‘Crazy Aung’ theorem. General bafflement in the wake of military decision-making usually ensues.
This could also be termed ‘sit-tat longyi statecraft’: up or down, inside out, back to front, knotted or folded, codpiece or plumage, the khaki pasoe can be adapted for any situation. Formulations of making sense of SAC bafflement energize foreign policy thinkers who project their own predilections onto inchoate decisions. But this is just simply guesswork.
Diplomats and august commentators will gravely observe Myanmar is at a ‘crossroads.’ But there is no electricity to power traffic lights in Myanmar. Trying to predict any future direction in politics or the conflict is supposition. Decision-making in the dark.
Obstinacy
The next pattern is dependable stonewalling, just saying mashi: in multiple ways. The Myanmar military is a major case study in the effects of prolonged impunity whose primary means of survival has been cognitive dissonance. This doesn’t implicate all of the diplomats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), but as many ministries and institutions have been colonized by former military men there is extremely limited space for artful diplomacy. There are undoubtedly many fine people in the Myanmar bureaucratic machine, but with no latitude to pursue a professional and progressive foreign policy. Just saying no is a default position imposed from the top.
The treatment of ASEAN is the most obvious case study of SAC obstinacy. From the Five Point Consensus reached in April 2021, the more than two years of studied SAC rejection of ASEAN’s efforts have been remarkable. To brush off the attempts of Brunei, an authoritarian micro-state, to the frontrunner for Southeast Asian scumbag of the past 20 years, Cambodian strongman Hun Sen, is a shocking example of rejecting diplomacy in all its forms. The best intentions of Indonesia as ASEAN chair in 2023, an opportunity to open up some regional process of insincere change, was also rejected. On the one hand it would be a fascinating subject of granular international relations study on how the junta bamboozled ASEAN, but also what’s the point? Nothing worked. Looking at the treatment of two UN Special Envoys since the coup provides ample evidence of this, and no further discussion on their performance since the February 2021 coup is worthwhile.
The SAC bristles at public statements of concern from Western embassies, the UN, INGOs, and sundry others, so the messages are indeed registering. But the response is one not of opportunity in that admonishment, but umbrage over the temerity to even suggest shortcomings. This can be discerned in the distillation of state media propaganda into exhaustively detailed ‘Information Sheets’, in Myanmar, English, Russian and Chinese, indicating considerable effort defending the SAC’s virtue.
Denial after denial and the construction of an alternative reality is the persistent pattern, and a great deal of effort goes into this construction. Consider the MOFA Briefing Paper to the United Nations Credentials Committee from October 2021 which rebuts all the claims of post-coup wrongdoing in clumsy but still serviceable fashion: its defense of effective territorial control was particularly revealing of an institutionalized oxymoronic outlook. Shudder the thought that MOFA is granted latitude to make these products more convincing, but that would entail actually admitting to some wrongdoing in order to obscure greater crimes. Institutionalized obstinacy won’t permit this flexibility.
Close readings of SAC rebuttals indicate a return to total denial, whereas during the ‘transition’ there was occasional grudging admission of crimes, although woefully inadequate justice measures. Their July response to the recent UN Secretary General report on conflict related sexual violence was one indication of this: a sense of umbrage at being singled out for criticism, with no acknowledgment of the gravity of the disgusting crimes they are being charged with.
The official denials and responses to international criticism is not just a culture of denial, but there are elements of a perceived unfairness: the manifold failings and crimes of the anti-SAC forces apparently get a free pass on the world stage. There is no comparing the atrocities of the SAC with the multi-sided resistance at all, but it does underscore that the resistance complex writ large should make greater efforts at observing the laws of armed conflict and human rights and punish any and all perpetrators.
Insincerity
When obstinacy gets boring, pretending to be amenable is a fine substitute. This often produces results of foreigners projecting reformist, or at least accommodating, tendencies to the SAC to cooperate. All it takes is a few soothing words, some levity, flattery of course, and a patient and logical comportment. Many visitors have tried this ingratiating approach, from ambassadors to UN agency heads, the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Chinese and Indian diplomats, and a never ending parade of Russians. Has anyone noted any change in SAC behavior? Nope, only more empty promises on humanitarian access for conflict zones and natural disaster areas. The visit in recent days by Martin Griffiths, Under Secretary General of the United Nations and Emergency Relief Coordinator, to Min Aung Hlaing and other senior SAC officials in Naypyitaw may excite hope for an opening for post-Cyclone Mocha relief access. But an audience with Min Aung Hlaing is where hope goes to die.
The SAC have inherited a culture of empty protocol, where visitors to their gauchely spacious meeting rooms get a smirking reception, a cheap gift, a manipulative photo op and absolutely no meaningful progress. Former Australian ambassador Andrea Faulkner was but one official who must have felt this following her April 2022 visit to Naypyitaw, which included an audience with Min Aung Hlaing but failed to secure the release of Professor Turnell.
Insincerity is in the Myanmar military DNA. How else do we explain hundreds of ambassadors, journalists, ‘Western experts’, and dignitaries who actually fell for the dubious enthusiasm of U Soe Thane, Ko Ko Hlaing, Khin Yi and scores of others, many of whom have joined the SAC. Some diplomats had the impression that Vice Senior General Soe Win was the ‘reasonable one’: Switzerland seemed committed to adopting him as a favored son.
Soe Win was supposedly distinct from Min Aung Hlaing, who former US Ambassador Scot Marciel recently observed was “superficially smooth and reasonably polished…[but with]…pretty strong racist views.” If the commander in chief could have spent a decade beguiling and befuddling ambassadors and world leaders, he can do so still. Min Aung Hlaing also gave away atrocity photo albums to visiting dignitaries showing mutilated Myanmar security personnel, victims of Rohingya militants, as justification for mass atrocity, and while it appalled people, they still took future meetings. That’s what he is possibly counting on now: a version of the ‘scarcity principle’, or the ‘treat ‘em mean, keep ‘em keen’ approach to statecraft. It’s a diplomatic equivalent of the SAC’s battlefield strategy against the post-coup resistance: you have the watches; we have the time. Ride out the bad times.
Another tendency of SAC-gazing is to look for ‘adults’ or moderates in the machinery. The former minister Aung Kyi was often promoted as a ‘Mr. Fixit’, moving around troubled ministries or initiatives when needed to actually get work done during the late SPDC era and during the 10 years of the ‘transition.’ He was a rare individual, but any discernable impact was modest.
Yet there doesn’t appear to be anyone in the SAC with the qualities to take on such a ‘good cop’ role. The current foreign minister, U Than Swe, is perceived as a calmer individual than his volatile predecessor, the monstrously corpulent Wunna Maung Lwin. Lt-Gen Yar Pyae was often seen as amenable, or at least approachable, in his role as senior peace process official, but he assumed the position of National Security Advisor soon after the coup and from the August reshuffle is now Minister of Home Affairs: a position guaranteed to render him a more egregious war criminal as he switches from fake peace to crushing resistance.
A recent report called “How (not) to engage with authoritarian states” makes several ‘pitfalls of engagement’ points, all precisely salient for engaging with Myanmar. One in particular that new diplomats being dispatched to the country should be forced to write out a thousand times to commit to memory: “Premature celebration of reform can legitimize repressive regimes that do not intend to change substantially…there has been a tendency for development agencies to rush to celebrate supposedly reformist regimes even though they have made few meaningful changes, conferring unwarranted legitimacy on governments that remain inefficient and repressive.”
Many denizens of international foreign policy thought have a meager understanding of Myanmar: culture, terrain, cuisine and interrelationships. Their opining is a projection of their elite predilections and previous postings. Activists are simply offering an assemblage of a basic tool kit: loud condemnation, call for international accountability, sanctions, strongly worded statements, the kind of checklist the generals have survived before and now register as a distant, irritable tremor.
The process of possible ingratiation is lamentably unoriginal, and SAC have the ability to play along if they choose. It may seem unlikely now, but the SAC is likely anticipating a future of international engagement in eventual ‘transformation’, including whenever and however elections are staged. This may seem outrageous, but let’s be honest: it’s already starting and the regime senses it. First, decry the rising violence and start a quiet process of moral equivalence, asserting that something must be done to seek a peaceful resolution.
Second, slowly ratchet up the discrediting of the opposition, their unfortunately shrill messaging, the extremity of their positions, their unreasonable demands for weapons, formal recognition, monopolization of aid and zero intercourse with the SAC, all gurgled out by their unhinged coterie of foreign advisors.
Third, encourage the SAC to open up channels of communication with shifty interlocutors who have been used in the past, in blithe denial of their ineffectiveness, or a new round of scoundrels.
Fourth, start having a series of retreats in twee English country mansions or Singaporean conference rooms inviting key ‘stakeholders’ to brainstorm scenarios and develop incentives for appeasement (this is far advanced already). Increase funding to an assortment of morally dubious international think-tanks or ‘peace’ institutes, German stiftungs, and switch-hitter international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), who for the right price will legitimize any atrocity machine (they’re way ahead of the SAC already, panting in anticipation of any potential entry point).
The most commonplace yet crippling flaw in international diplomacy is to believe your adversary thinks like you. For decades the Myanmar military establishment, regardless of the mixed caliber of their diplomatic representatives, have resoundingly rebuked such approaches. Reaching out in premature mediation at this point is tantamount to giving the SAC a clumsy tracheotomy.
International optimists or opportunists both ascribe positive intent for military decision-making, often with only fumes of evidence: as Nietzsche wrote, “they muddy the water, to make it seem deep.” Expecting some deeper reservoir of cunning, plotting and planning is often simply the military muddling through with a combination of extreme violence and expectant opportunity to remain in power. There is no ‘method in the madness.’ Just madness.
David Scott Mathieson is an independent consultant working on conflict, human rights and humanitarian issues on Myanmar
