At issue in the ongoing border standoff between the Thai and Cambodian armed forces is timing and circumstance. In less than two weeks, a seemingly minor border skirmish intensified into a full-scale military confrontation. What is being overlooked in the thick of mutual antagonism and ultranationalism on both sides is when and how the current round of confrontation transpired. Getting its origins right is crucial to finding ways and means for conflict resolution.
In the early hours of May 28, small border units of Thai and Cambodian forces clashed over a forested enclave called Chong Bok in Thailand’s northeastern province of Ubon Ratchathani, resulting in the death of one Cambodian soldier. The origins of the shootout go back to simmering tensions since February, when Cambodian troops and their family members reportedly entered the Ta Muen Thom temple in disputed territory and sang the Cambodian national anthem, leading to a brief argument with Thai forces.
It sparked what has degenerated into a full-scale, nationalism-fueled military and whole-of-society confrontation. Troops, tanks and artillery pieces have been reinforced on opposing positions in a tense and combustible face-off, buttressed by partisan media and public sentiment on both sides. In just over two weeks, Thailand and Cambodia are again at each other’s throats over border issues.
Previous flare-ups took place in 2003, 2008 and 2011-13 over the Preah Vihear temple dispute, dating back to 1962 when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) awarded the ancient Hindu shrine to Cambodia. Thailand abided by the ruling but never recognized its full effect, while both countries commercialized the temple area for mutual benefit, punctuated by periodic spats. Cambodia, whose Khmer civilization dominated mainland Southeast Asia a thousand years ago, holds an inferiority complex with both the Vietnamese and the Thais (formerly Siamese), whereas the Thai people feel resentful toward the French who colonized Cambodia in the 1860s. The French later manipulated map-making, and the Siamese did not know any better than to go along. Thailand and Cambodia thus use different maps for their border demarcation, unable to build fences to make good neighbours.
In the latest military skirmish—the shootout in 2011 claimed 20 lives on both sides—former Cambodian prime minister and current Senate President Hun Sen stirred up nationalistic fervor partly in response to the Cambodian soldier’s death on May 28. Exiled Cambodian opposition leader Sam Rainsy also pressured the government of Prime Minister Hun Manet, Hun Sen’s son, to stand tall, while Cambodia has faced international criticism for harboring scam centers and illicit businesses. Lashing out to distract and galvanize the home front is appealing at this time. Yet given that Hun Sen is seen as close to Thaksin Shinawatra, Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s father, the Cambodian strongman’s latest power play seems counterintuitive, although he is seen as wily and seasoned after four decades in power. It is likely that Hun Sen needs to overcompensate even more zealously for fear of being seen as a Thaksin loyalist at home.
On its shortcomings, the Thai side did not adequately address the Cambodian soldier’s death with an appropriate investigation and potential recompense. Thailand’s fragile coalition government and weak political system over the past two decades made it vulnerable to Hun Sen’s offensive. Now that Thailand has restricted border crossings and commercial flows at Cambodia’s expense, a measure of de-escalation is in play amid continuing brinkmanship and mutual threats. Thailand also has other cards to leverage, such as a stoppage of power supplies on the Cambodian side of the border and a partial deportation of reportedly close to a million Cambodian laborers, thereby turning up the political heat for the Hun family government. As in the past, Cambodia will try to internationalize the issue and bring the disputed border areas to the ICJ, while Thailand will keep it bilateral.
For Cambodia, it is likely that the current huff-and-puff will persist until sufficient steam is let off at home and the Cambodian side realizes that its internationalisation efforts will go nowhere while its border trade, workers and local economy suffer. In the January 2003 incident, when a Thai actress claimed that Angkor Wat was “stolen” from Thailand, it took the Cambodians just 12 days of nationalist frenzy before burning down the Thai embassy in Phnom Penh. Bilateral relations and border crossings were virtually severed until two months later, when a semblance of normality resumed. This kind of incident seems to coincide with Cambodia’s election years in 2003, 2008 and 2013.
The Thai government will have to overcome ultra-right-wing fanaticism at home and come up with conciliatory gestures to defuse the situation, such as an investigation into what happened on May 28 and giving appropriate restitution for the dead Cambodian soldier. Overall, the border situation could get worse, but a semblance of the status quo will likely reappear in the weeks ahead. The tone and tenor of the Joint Boundary Commission’s meeting on June 14 could lay the groundwork for a resolution if the Thai government is willing to address what happened on May 28 and the Hun family-led authorities can see that they have made their point.
The fallout from Cambodian border tensions has enabled the Thai military to take charge, thereby undermining civilian control in coup-prone Thailand. Prime Minister Paetongtarn looks more out of her league as a result. Thaksin, who is hobbled by domestic legal trouble surrounding his return from self-exile while being seen as chummy with Hun Sen, is poorly perceived for not being able to put a stop to what Thais see as a Cambodian charade of the highest order. On the Cambodian front, Hun Sen proves again that he’s still got it—the crafty ability to rile the Thais and gain points at home when he needs to. While Hun Manet cannot be seen as weak so early in his tenure, his Western-educated profile and background offer hope that his political inclinations moving forward may still differ noticeably from those of his father.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, rotationally chaired this year by Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, is seen as completely impotent as two of its members openly plan for military conflict. For development prospects, the Overlapping Claims Area between Thailand and Cambodia remains off-limits indefinitely, despite both countries’ need for the energy resources it contains. None of the external major powers, from the United States and the United Nations to China, especially, are likely to wade in on the Thai-Cambodian tussle and would prefer the status quo to return bilaterally.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak is senior fellow of the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University.
This article first appeared in the Bangkok Post.
