Over three years since the February 2021 coup, the enormous momentum gained by the popular armed resistance is reinforcing the narrative that Myanmar’s military, once recognized as one of Southeast Asia’s strongest armies, can be defeated. The international community, spanning Myanmar’s neighbors to Western powers, now realizes that the fall of the military is no longer impossible, though far from inevitable.
Many observers and analysts remain skeptical that the resistance, with its scattered operations, can deal a final blow to the mighty military, citing the lack of historical precedent. But Myanmar analysts have moved on from their initial assessment – that an uncoordinated resistance armed with makeshift weaponry would be short-lived and only worsen the toll on civilian lives. The emerging consensus is that Myanmar is fragmenting as civil war tears the country apart.
The current discourse consists of a wide variety of views and perspectives, ranging from Myanmar’s political history to economic realities; the current crisis to centuries-old Burmese societal values; and military tactics on both sides to the politics of resistance forces (ethnic armies and People’s Defense Forces) and the Myanmar military.
However, little attention has been paid to the personal aspirations and struggles of the man at the top, the commander-in-chief and coup leader, Min Aung Hlaing.
The man most responsible for current crisis
Studies of Myanmar’s precarious civil-military relations, and military vs democratic doctrines, are worth analyzing to better understand the current crisis. Based on Myanmar’s political nature, no one would argue that one person is more important than the institution he or she represents. Min Aung Hlaing was therefore rowing against the tide when he staged a coup widely understood as a solo decision driven by his personal aspirations and paranoia. Thus, Min Aung Hlaing and his motivations cannot be ignored in whatever scenarios we envision for the country’s future.
For this reason, the question that needs to be raised is not whether foreign governments will have to deal with future statelets in Myanmar, or whether Myanmar people would accept such fragmentation, or even if a negotiated settlement can be reached between ethnic revolutionary organizations (EROs), the junta, and the civilian National Unity Government plus the ousted National League for Democracy.
The pressing question is what actions Min Aung Hlaing would take if any of these scenarios were to materialize. How would the junta chief react to these scenarios, and what would be the best choices for him? And most importantly, how would Myanmar’s people, political leaders, EROs and the wider international community hold him accountable for his heinous crimes to pave the way to a better future for Myanmar?
Coup was the only exit for Min Aung Hlaing
From the coup leader’s perspective, it would have been difficult to imagine that any alternative except a coup could guarantee his position, legacy, wealth, family, and even his life. As dark clouds loomed over Naypyitaw in late 2020, the future looked bleak for the military chief. The people’s leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, had won another landslide election victory and was not swayed by Min Aung Hlaing’s relentless petitions to betray her campaign promise and make him president of the country.
The military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) was considering radical reforms after humiliating defeats in the 2015 and 2020 elections – reforms which would effectively limit free access for military top brass. Also, the International Court of Justice was likely to convict Min Aung Hlaing for genocide in Rakhine in 2017.
The coup-leader could not trust that his stone-faced generals, loyal to their old chief Than Shwe, would defend him against the ICJ charges, fearing instead that they might push for his downfall.
Yet while all these facts were apparent, most Myanmar observers failed to see the choices facing Min Aung Hlaing and therefore underestimated the possibility of a coup. The consensus prior to the putsch was that Min Aung Hlaing was doomed, the military had been defeated again, and democracy had prevailed. The possibility of a coup was widely dismissed as too politically and economically costly.
However, just as a drowning man will clutch at a straw, Min Aung Hlaing found the devasting consequences of a coup preferable to being charged at the international court, betrayed by his generals, and living in shame minus a legacy or wealth. The protracted armed conflict that followed was evidently the least of his concerns.
Masking personal interests with military narratives
Despite being unpopular both within and outside the military, Min Aung Hlaing is a seasoned general who understands his institution well. Amid the bitter realization of his own shortcomings, his strategic choice was to flex his power through his institutional mandate, which he earned through obedience to his seniors rather than any military acumen.
Than Shwe, the old chief, appeared to believe that his young and obedient generals, particularly Min Aung Hlaing, would play along with his plans to retire in 2016 and allow a new elected government to take over, with deputy commander-in-chief Soe Win following suit at the 2020 election. These arrangements would have cemented the military’s role in politics, backed by a constitutionally secured 25% seats in Parliament plus control of military-affiliated ministries and economic holdings.
But in that case, why did the other top generals not consider Min Aung Hlaing’s coup as personally motivated? Likely because the generals also prioritized their personal interests over their old boss’s plan. The top generals’ betrayal of institutional interests may appear naïve, but this was a game of personal survival – it was now or never for them.
Consequently, with their limited worldviews and lack of imagination for better alternatives, Min Aung Hlaing and the top generals resorted to their last option: reopening the old playbook of military dictatorship and using violence and terror to enforce submission to their rule.
Although Min Aung Hlaing and his generals have tried to disguise their personal interests behind a mask of military narratives, institutional fears, and objectives, the institution itself seems to be fighting back. Continuing military defeats and resistance gains appear to have sparked shock and awe among soldiers and military supporters. Many have blamed long-term corruption and weak leadership. Few however seem to realize that Min Aung Hlaing and his generals’ pursuit of personal interests at the cost of their institution is the main reason for the failures of junta ground troops.
Weak link in longstanding military dictatorships
Min Aung Hlaing’s unpopularity has spilled over into China, the target of multibillion-dollar online border scams protected by the junta. As Beijing’s frustration with the scams peaked, China cracked down with little concern about embarrassing Min Aung Hlaing’s regime. Worried for his own survival, the junta boss promptly purged his generals to please his powerful neighbor. The move apparently exacerbated mistrust for the coup-maker among his generals. While it may be too early to say that the interest-based alliance among the generals is disintegrating, arrests of old regime loyalists and frequent purges of the junta cabinet betray widening cracks that are further undermining the military institution.
At this point, loyal members of the military face a dark future looming over their institution. Neither of the two scenarios – a resistance victory or Min Aung Hlaing and his self-serving generals maintaining power – offer hope.
The end of Min Aung Hlaing
Since he sparked the crisis, it is reasonable to assume that Min Aung Hlaing will be instrumental in ending it. More than three years after his coup, with tens of thousands of civilians killed or arrested, the junta boss remains mired in a rising tide of bloody crimes.
Any scenario – a negotiated settlement brokered by the international community, or a decisive resistance victory to establish federal democracy – would be intolerable for Min Aung Hlaing.
And anyone considering a possible power-sharing arrangement with the military, as seen from 2010-2021, must address the role of Min Aung Hlaing. Given the long list of atrocities and other crimes he has ordered and the numerous enemies that surround him, he would not be afforded the kind of impunity that his predecessor Than Shwe enjoyed. The people would be reluctant to accept any pardon, even if Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and political elites offered one. A formal pardon and return to ordinary life would be accompanied by widespread fury and threats against his and his family’s life. And for a military general who dragged the country into chaos just to save himself, the threats would be real, not a case of paranoia.
To settle the disputes, it may be practical for all stakeholders to place the blame on Min Aung Hlaing as the sole enemy of Myanmar’s people. Burmese history has a precedent for this: When several independence leaders including Aung San were assassinated in 1947 amid intense political rivalries and ideological debate, U Saw was singled out for blame and duly executed; the country moved on.
In the ongoing crisis, as well as betraying the military’s institutional interests, Min Aung Hlaing has created more enemies than all his predecessors combined managed in their lifetimes. He failed to secure any ceasefires with ethnic armed organizations, as his predecessors had done. He has alienated traditional military loyalists such as USDP supporters and religious fanatics. He has overseen plunging morale among soldiers, thereby losing battles on the ground. He also stands on the verge of being charged with genocide and facilitating the online scam industry. He has wrecked the economy, shrinking the share of the pie for military cronies both old and new. It is difficult to imagine any reasonable person defending him when his time comes.
The fall of Min Aung Hlaing is only a matter of time. However, all stakeholders, including the Myanmar military itself, must ensure that his ousting does not go to waste. All well-meaning peace efforts – for the delivery of humanitarian aid, release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and political prisoners, cessation of violence, five-point consensus, and engagements with statelets as an entry point to ending the conflict – have proved to be less effective than focusing on the one man solely responsible.
Many would argue that a country like Myanmar needs a strong military. However, do the country and the military need Min Aung Hlaing? Even in a negotiated settlement, would Min Aung Hlaing put his institution’s interests above his own survival?
Could condemning this one man, who has caused insufferable pain to millions of Myanmar people and brought the worst crisis in the country’s history, be a good starting point to unite all stakeholders and people to end the current conflict in Myanmar?
Kyaw Htin is a political and security analyst.
