Since the military coup on Feb. 1, 2021, the revolution that began with peaceful demonstrations has escalated into a full-blown armed struggle, now about to end its fourth year. The landscape of Myanmar’s conflict has dramatically changed since then. The coup makers’ State Administration Council (SAC) has been losing territory to various ethnic groups and resistance forces.
Myanmar’s civilian National Unity Government (NUG) recently claimed, in a military progress report, that its People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) and allied ethnic revolutionary organizations (EROs) had effective control of more than half of the country by the end of 2024. The NUG said 44 percent of the country’s townships are under those groups’ full control while 24 percent are highly contested and influenced by resistance forces. That means less that one third of the country remains under the control of the SAC.
To be fair, the majority of the territory described by the NUG is in the hands of EROs. Although EROs have gained significant ground, many are still focusing on their ethnic causes—most importantly, gaining a form of autonomy. But the larger question remains: With their increasing influence over newly formed resistance groups and the respect they have earned from large swaths of Myanmar, will they play a role in changing the central government? Will they be able to move beyond a traditionally narrow ethnocentric approach? What decisive role do the ethnic armed players want to play? In short, who dares to be the kingmaker for a future democratic Myanmar?
The Brotherhood Alliance, comprising the Arakan Army (AA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), revitalized Myanmar’s resistance movement with a large-scale offensive—Operation 1027—in late 2023. They seized 16 townships in northern Shan State between October 2023 and January 2024, until China intervened. In June 2024, they resumed fighting and captured key locations including Lashio city and several townships in Mandalay Region. Due to Chinese pressure, the TNLA and MNDAA have paused fighting, but the AA has continued its offensive in Rakhine State, capturing almost all of the state’s townships by the end of 2024. The AA now controls the most territory among Myanmar’s ethnic armed organizations, including parts of southern Chin State. Their military success is widely supported by the Myanmar people.
Up north, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has also been playing a pivotal role by providing training to different PDFs and closely collaborating with the NUG on political leadership. Since September 2024, the KIA has effectively secured all border areas with China under their tight control, and it is currently fighting for the strategic town of Bhamo. In the southern part of Myanmar, despite facing challenges, the Karen National Union (KNU) and Mon EROs have sustained their active fighting, asserting control over a majority of the Thai-Myanmar border.
These developments highlight the dynamic and complex nature of the conflict, with various ethnic groups playing crucial roles in shaping the future of Myanmar. Their continued influence and territorial gains could have profound implications for the country’s political landscape.
Inter-ethnic relations
Along with the military victories and public relations efforts of the EROs, the relationship between Bamar (also referred to as Burmese or Burman—the majority ethnic group in Myanmar) and non-Bamar groups has undergone significant changes in the post-coup context. Moving away from a hegemonic approach, the Burmese have started to acknowledge and understand the grievances of ethnic minorities, leading to a gradual increase in trust between Bamar and non-Bamar, although it is not yet optimal. For instance, “Du Kaba” and “Du Chon”—Jinghpaw Kachin dialect words referring to military ranks—have become household words in Burmese heartland areas such as Sagaing and Magwe regions, as many KIA military personnel are commanding PDFs in the central plain regions.
Despite this progress, many ethnic groups still harbor distrust towards Bamar people, which has led them to prioritize their own ethnic causes over the broader goal. This sentiment is reflected in their stance that Bamar people should build up their own territory and even fight for it themselves. However, it is important to acknowledge that while the Bamar are the majority in terms of population, they currently lack armed power, and partly have a leadership vacuum. This means the Bamar are weak now and need help. The EROs are aiding, but to what extent?
Several possible scenarios exist. One could be keeping the Bamar, including the Myanmar military, weak by allowing them to fight each other in central area of the country. Others include the EROs taking control of central state power by defeating the Myanmar military, or building the Bamar back to a level where they can genuinely share power with their brothers of other ethnicities.
Lessons from history
Myanmar’s history, though often centered around the Bamar, includes significant instances where minority groups shaped events in the Bamar Kingdom. For example, the three Shan brothers of the Pinya Dynasty ruled central Myanmar, demonstrating the influence of minority leaders over the Bamar court. In another circumstance, Arakan King Min Bin allied with the Taungoo king to attack the Hantharwady Kingdom, which was controlled by the son of Emperor Bayintnaung. This was a move that changed the trajectory of the most powerful Burmese empire in the 16th century. These examples illustrate that minority groups have played crucial roles in shaping Myanmar’s history, and there is no shortage of such instances. In post-independence Myanmar, the KNU came close to seizing state power when its troops reached the doorstep of Yangon in the 1950s. Now, EROs control more than half of the country and this is continuously expanding. This is unprecedented in Myanmar’s recent history.
Under such a favorable situation, can any ERO become a kingmaker in today’s Myanmar? Who is willing to wage a war in the most important central zone of Myanmar? Of course, they would do this along with allies and PDFs who are already active there.
There is good reason for EROs to think about these questions seriously. Myanmar’s recent history and unresolved civil war can enlighten us. Although rebel groups have taken control of territory and continue to fight, they can never fully be at peace as long as they lack political guarantees and there is not a genuine power shift. Whoever gains territory or military success, there will be no lasting peace for them as long as state power is concentrated in Naypyitaw. Central power has always been in the hands of the Myanmar military, which only understands hard power and oppression. Increased airstrikes on civilian areas and towns controlled by resistance forces provide recent evidence of this. As long as the SAC or similar institutions are in control of state power, no one is safe. In an interview with Mratt channel, Salai Yaw Mang of the Chin resistance group CDF-Mindat rightly said, “If we see their [SAC] strategy, they could retreat from ethnic land and consolidate in the central plain where their military resources exist. Now they lost Mindat in 2024, but they will come again in 2030 or 2035.” The state needs an overhaul, but that can only be done by controlling the central state power.
There are several barriers to this. The deep-seated mistrust between ethnic groups and the Burmese, rooted in historical grievances, remains a significant obstacle. Additionally, there is a lack of central leadership among the various ethnic groups, which complicates efforts to present a unified front for a larger offensive. Having no comprehensive political pact leaves many political issues unresolved and contributes to ongoing tensions. Pressure from neighboring countries adds another layer of complexity, as regional dynamics and interests influence the situation in Myanmar.
But there is still hope for the Myanmar people, as many leaders of strong EROs have stated that their offensive will continue until the junta is overthrown. But as asked earlier, do any of them really dare to be the kingmaker of Myanmar? We will see the answer to this question before 2025 ends.
Desmond is an analyst of international development focusing on the peace process and transition.
