So far, ASEAN has done very little to bring peace to Myanmar. As a result, not only has the suffering of the people increased, but so have the problems in neighboring countries from refugees, scam centers, and drugs.
After the February 2021 coup, ASEAN initially agreed on a Five-Point Consensus. Indonesia, during its term in the rotating chairmanship of the body, held a lot of meetings and did its best but achieved very little. Laos achieved as much as anyone expected. When Malaysia took on the chairmanship in 2025, expectations were higher, but there are now only a few more months left to make an impact before it hands over to the Philippines next year.
Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim gave Myanmar junta chief Min Aung Hlang some legitimacy by inviting him to Bangkok for a meeting, but he also held a public online meeting with Mahn Win Khaing Thann, the prime minister of the civilian National Unity Government (NUG). However, Anwar seems stuck in the “inclusive dialogue” mindset as a means of bringing peace. This will be as successful as ceasefires with the junta.
As the Chin Human Rights Organization recently said: “Stop calling for a ‘ceasefire’ that never existed, and stop pretending both sides are equally to blame.” Min Aung Hlaing dropped bombs on civilians just after agreeing to the ceasefire and has since carried out at least 172 attacks, many in areas heavily affected by the earthquake. This in fact represents an increase from the six months leading up to the “ceasefire.” As UN Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews has said: “While calls to extend a non-existent ceasefire are well-meaning, they will not stop the Myanmar military junta’s relentless attacks on civilians. Cutting off their supply of weapons and weapons materials will.”
The only negotiations with the junta should be for its surrender. The military will never voluntarily hand over power to a civilian government and will use the engagement ASEAN has afforded it as a lifeline.
Anwar wants to achieve some success before Malaysia’s term as head of ASEAN expires. This involves dealing with the humanitarian crisis exacerbated by the March 28 earthquake as well as making inroads into ending the conflict. Anwar must remember that in 2008, when parts of the country were ravaged by powerful Cyclone Nargis, the military regime pushed ahead with a constitutional referendum that paved the way for a semi-civilian government but cemented the military’s influence on the country’s politics. Then, with a new military-drafted constitution in place, the regime calling itself the State Peace and Development Council, held elections in 2010 that were widely regarded as a sham.
Therefore, it is clear that earthquake aid should go through the NUG, ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), and civil society groups rather than through the regime, which has already weaponized aid as it did after previous disasters. Humanitarian corridors from both sides of the country are needed, from Bangladesh through Rakhine to Sagaing and across the border from Thailand. Since both border areas are largely controlled by the resistance, this should not in theory be too difficult—as long as Anwar stops considering the junta as part of the solution rather than the problem.
Discussions concerning a humanitarian corridor are ongoing between Bangladesh and the Arakan Army (AA) but need to be sped up before the monsoon begins in earnest. Anwar also needs to convince Thailand’s Thaksin Shinawatra, who acts as his “informal advisor,” that cross-border aid from Thailand to Myanmar should go through Karen and Karenni States. These two humanitarian corridors are achievable and would have a huge impact. The aid should focus on early recovery and saving lives rather than rebuilding since disease is already the major concern.
Anwar needs to demand that Min Aung Hlang ensures access to all earthquake-hit areas by relief teams, and that the junta stops bombing healthcare facilities. Min Aung Hlaing will not agree, but the public demand needs to be made. ASEAN should also make a public statement condemning the air and artillery strikes that killed at least 309 people between March 28 and the end of April.
Apparently only a non-political appointee from Myanmar will be invited to the ASEAN Summit on May 26-27 in Langkawi. But prior to the summit, Anwar is scheduled to meet with the NUG and EAOs in Kuala Lumpur. This must be a substantive meeting and include the ASEAN special envoy, Othman Hashim, who has already had discussions with them. The meeting needs to discuss earthquake relief and aid generally, and the resistance’s vision or road map for the future of Myanmar. The NUG and EAOs also need to decide on a coordination mechanism and a focal point for international actors—many do not even know how to contact a representative of the resistance.
China is always the elephant in the room, so it is important that Anwar talks to China about its now overt presence in Myanmar, and its hopes and plans for the country. Perhaps golden parachutes could be offered for the generals to go to China.
Various well-meaning people continue to look for ways of facilitating “inclusive dialogue” with the junta rather than pushing to cut funding, weapons, and aviation fuel. In the Bangkok Post, former Thai foreign minister Kasit Piromya, a member of ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR), made a number of good points last week. But he proposed an ASEAN military delegation led by a senior Malaysian general, with respected officers from Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. “Soldier-to-soldier engagement speaks in a language Myanmar’s top brass understands,” he claimed. The mission would “assess battlefield realities and engage all armed actors, including the junta and ethnic resistance groups” to “lay the groundwork for trust and transparency.” This idea is born to fail. Many ASEAN military leaders are likely to have a relationship with the junta and will not be impartial.
Even if they were, they would be unlikely to achieve anything positive without serious political pressure behind them. The strategy, in other words, is likely to prolong the conflict. “Inclusive dialogue” is continually touted by those who do not seem to understand that the military must not be involved in politics and will only represent itself. No dialogue is possible until the current junta is gone.
The resistance controls about two-thirds of Myanmar and will eventually win, but this can be accelerated or delayed by ASEAN. Min Aung Hlaing relies on arms supplies from mainly China and Russia, foreign currency in the form of gas payments, and the importation of aviation fuel. Whilst it may be difficult to stop the flow of arms, ASEAN should at least raise this concern. Thailand should withhold gas payments to the junta, and there must be an embargo on aviation fuel. This is doable if ASEAN has the resolve and really wants to end the war permanently, rather than trying to patch things up temporarily. Only air power and funds to buy weapons are preventing the defeat of the junta.
Paul Greening is an ex-UN senior staff member with over 20 years’ experience in six Asian countries working for six UN agencies and four INGOs. He worked in Sittwe, Rakhine State for the International Organization for Migration from 2017 to 2020 and since then has worked as an independent political analyst and consultant on Myanmar.
