On April 2, Myanmar’s military opened fire on a Chinese Red Cross convoy of vehicles headed to Mandalay, one of the areas hardest hit by the recent 7.7 magnitude earthquake, to deliver relief supplies. Armed rebel group the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) alleged that the military used heavy machine guns to fire on the convoy as it passed through Nawnghkio Township in northern Shan State. But the military claim the convoy failed to inform them of its route and failed to stop when ordered, leading to the firing of warning shots.
While some sources suggest this may have been an unintended incident, the exact cause remains unclear. What remains undeniable is that Chinese interests continue to face attacks within Myanmar. China’s active involvement in Myanmar’s internal conflict—including its support for both the military and armed resistance groups—further intensifies tensions.
Just days before on March 21, 2025 a silent protest took place in Lashio, the capital of northern Shan State. Residents displaced by the conflict between the military junta and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) expressed their opposition to China’s involvement in brokering peace talks between the two parties. Protesters distributed posters urging China to respect Myanmar’s sovereignty and cease its support for the military regime.
Public frustration
This protest is part of a broader trend of increasing anti-China sentiment in Myanmar. Over the past few years, public frustration has grown due to China’s perceived support for the military junta, its economic exploitation through controversial projects, and its interference in Myanmar’s internal affairs.
On Oct. 18, 2024, China’s consulate in Mandalay was targeted in an explosion. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian confirmed the attack on three days later, expressing Beijing’s “deep shock” and issuing a strong condemnation of the incident. Although China is an arms supplier to Myanmar’s junta, it maintains connections with ethnic groups opposing the military, creating a complex dynamic in the region. China’s ties in Myanmar form the background for the broader context surrounding the attack.
Independent analyst David Scott Mathieson feels that, “Whoever was behind the consulate bombing, it suggests that there are multiple strands of anti-Chinese anger, against the support for the regime and against the perceived support of China for the Kokang occupation of Lashio.” Speaking to VoA, Mathieson said that “China has to take this rising public anger very seriously, as it could potentially descend into violence in urban areas and against Chinese nationals and economic assets, but also Myanmar-Chinese communities as well.”
Prior to that, in May 2023, protests erupted in Letpadaung, Sagaing Region, where demonstrators burned Chinese flags and pictures of then-Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang. Similar protests occurred in Yangon, Mandalay and other regions, with banners demanding that China respect the voice of the Myanmar people.
Demonstrations like the recent one in Lashio reflect the deep-seated grievances of the Myanmar people, who feel that China’s actions prioritize its strategic interests over the well-being of the local population.
Hate speech on social media
A study conducted by the research cell of Chinese social media platform Toutiao, in collaboration with analysis company Insecurity Insight, examined hate speech targeting China and Chinese people on Myanmar’s social media platforms from July 2024 to February 2025.
The findings reveal a deep-rooted anti-China sentiment, reflected in dehumanizing language, scapegoating, and calls for violence in Myanmar’s social media discourse. Netizens linked China to economic concerns, including dependence on Chinese products, trade imbalances and infrastructure dominance. Dehumanizing language, such as comments like “Chinese thinking is inherently inferior” and “Let them sink, those dogs,” exacerbates hostility. China is also blamed for social problems, with statements such as “Don’t import anything from them; their products are all fake and full of coronavirus.” Additionally, some remarks escalate this resentment further, with alarming calls for violence and expulsion, such as “expel Chinese nationals; commit genocide if necessary,” normalizing dangerous rhetoric. Another recurring theme is moral superiority, where claims like “China is terrible to be neighbors with—their morals are so low” frame Chinese individuals as inherently immoral, deepening social divides and perpetuating negative stereotypes.
The study highlights that posts criticizing China’s border blockades—such as those at Muse and other northern Shan State checkpoints in October 2024—garnered significant attention. These blockades restricted goods like electronics and medical supplies, sparking public outrage and amplifying criticism of Chinese influence.
According to a mid-2024 survey conducted by the Institute for Strategy and Policy Myanmar (ISP-Myanmar), 54 percent of key stakeholders in Myanmar expressed a negative perception of China as a neighbor. This sentiment was even stronger among civil society organizations, with 72 percent describing the PRC as either “not good at all” or “not a good neighbor.” Similarly, 60 percent of ethnic armed organizations and 54 percent of the People’s Defense Forces—comprising the armed wing of the National Unity Government and local defense forces formed after the coup—shared this unfavorable view.
In addition to protests against Beijing’s growing influence, hate speech targeting China and Chinese people in Myanmar’s social media environment has become a significant reflection of the country’s growing geopolitical tensions.
This online hostility not only mirrors the broader discontent but also amplifies it, creating a volatile digital space that influences real-world attitudes and actions. The hostile environment increases risks for Chinese businesses, aid agencies and diplomatic missions, as they become potential targets of public anger.
Infrastructure projects at risk
The China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a flagship project under China’s Belt and Road Initiative, aims to enhance economic connectivity between the two nations. However, the growing instability threatens its implementation, as infrastructure and trade routes face interruptions. Attacks on Chinese-backed projects and infrastructure have already been reported, reflecting the precarious position of Chinese entities in the region. One notable instance occurred in May 2023, when the Natogyi Guerrilla Force (NGF) attacked an off-take station for the China-funded oil and gas pipeline in the Mandalay region. The 973-km pipeline runs from the Rakhine coast, through Magwe and Mandalay regions and Shan state, to China’s Yunnan province. The attack occurred shortly after the Chinese foreign minister’s visit to Myanmar. Following the visit, anti-Chinese protests erupted across the country, with demonstrators reportedly burning Chinese flags in some areas, as noted by one of the observers mentioned earlier. In response to the pipeline attack, security measures have been significantly tightened.
More recently, in November 2024, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) captured Kanpaiti, a vital trading town on Myanmar’s northeastern border with China and a significant hub for rare earth mining. This setback left only one border crossing town, Muse, and cut off access to valuable revenues from rare earth mines that supply China with essential materials for industries such as electric motors, wind turbines, advanced weaponry and electronics. The area is home to over 300 unregulated mines, which generated approximately US$1.4 billion worth of rare earths for China in 2024, often at severe environmental and social costs, according to a report by London-based environmental group Global Witness. In response to the KIA’s advances, China reportedly closed most border crossings, escalating tensions in the region.
In a reflection of the growing unpopularity of China among various groups, both within Myanmar and among its diaspora, last September, over 50 Burmese-Americans protested outside the Chinese Embassy in Washington, denouncing Beijing’s alleged interference in Myanmar’s internal affairs.
Since the coup, CMEC projects such as the deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu, the industrial park, and the high-speed rail link connecting Kunming in China to Mandalay have come to a halt.
Rising hostility toward China in Myanmar is not just a reflection of geopolitical tensions but also a catalyst for further instability, with significant implications for regional dynamics and the safety of Chinese interests. The growing anti-China sentiment complicates Beijing’s efforts to maintain its strategic foothold in Myanmar, as it must navigate both local resistance and international scrutiny.
Vaishali Basu Sharma is a strategic and economic affairs analyst.
