The word “fragmentation” is now appearing regularly in reports, opinion and analysis on Myanmar as ethnic armed revolutionary organizations (EROs) and anti-coup resistance forces make gains on battlefields across the country.
The April 20 edition of The New York Times reports: “If they [EROs] manage to push into the nation’s heartland … The result may be not so much a shifting of power as a shattering of a nation, its vast periphery breaking permanently away from central control.”
A day later, the same newspaper continues: “An escalating civil war threatens to break apart a country of roughly 55 million people that sits between China and India”.
The most recent report by the International Crisis Group (May 30) uses phrases such as “Myanmar’s state is fragmenting” and “Myanmar’s growing fragmentation”. The narrative of fragmentation is also being pushed by Burmese media (see RFA Burmese, May 30).
However, the effect of this narrative – whether intentionally or not – aids the cause of the military regime and its supporters.
In short, phrases like “As Myanmar disintegrates…” amplify the narrative of Bamar elites who support the junta or share its disdain for granting autonomy to non-Bamar ethnic minorities.
Perpetuating military dominance
Terms such as “fragmentation,” “disintegration,” “Balkanization,” “separatist,” “secession,” and “next Yugoslavia” continue to have significant sensitivity in the politics of Myanmar. This is because the stated purpose of the country’s first military coup led by General Ne Win in 1962 was to save Myanmar (then Burma) from the danger of disintegration under the U Nu government. Ever since, the military has justified its expansion and leading role in politics with this narrative that a strong army is necessary to prevent the country from falling apart.
“Only the army is mother. The army is father,” were slogans on billboards in the 1990s.
The current military regime has retained this narrative. The military’s pretext for staging the latest coup was that fraud in the 2020 general election went unresolved by the election commission appointed by the NLD-led government, which threatened “disintegration of national solidarity.” In his speech marking the 77th Anniversary of Union Day on February 12 this year, Min Aung Hlaing reaffirmed that the military would steadfastly protect its so-called Three Main National Causes: non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national solidarity, and perpetuation of sovereignty. The military views these as inviolable pillars of the nation.
The majority ethnic Bamar people have traditionally endorsed this narrative, and those who support the military still do. Among them are venerated and influential monks such as Sitagu Sayadaw Ashin Nyanissara and Dhammaduta Ashin Chekinda, with hundreds of thousands of followers at home and abroad. The ultra-nationalist Association for the Protection of Race and Religion, known as Ma Ba Tha, has also maintained support for the junta. Additionally, in February 2015, the Myanmar Film Association donated hundreds of thousands of kyats to military personnel injured during fighting with ethnic armed resistance groups in northern Shan State. In January 2021, President U Win Myint handed several officers including one private soldier the title of “Thura”, the highest Burmese award for valor, for fighting the Arakan Army in Rakhine State. The recipients said they received the honor for their efforts in preserving the Three Main National Causes. Conferring soldiers with honorary titles for fighting the Arakan Army or any other ethnic revolutionary organizations (their fellow citizens) seeks to legitimize the military’s actions.
Even well-known Burmese historian Thant Myint-U has used the same disparaging words as the Tatmadaw when referring to ethnic minorities’ armed struggle for autonomy and federalism. In a January 2016 interview with Frontier Myanmar, he was asked: “The dominance of the Burmans under U Nu and U Ne Win increased the pace of the civil war. How do you consider this historical background and the current peace situation?
He replied that peace and ending discrimination were important for Myanmar’s democratic transition. He added that in the absence of recent civil war, the task at hand was to consolidate and resolve “fragmentation issues”. The words he used for autonomy and federalism were “Thaung Kyan Thu” and “Thaung Kyan Mhu.”
The Burmese dictionary published by the Department of Burmese Literature in 2008 offers these definitions for “Thaung Kyan”: “Soe Thwan Dhi” (wicked), “Haw Yan Dhi” (rampage), and “Tawlan Pone Kan Dhi” (armed opposition against the government and disrupting domestic law and order, and peace). Equating “Thaung Kyan” with lawlessness suggests it occurs without reason or purpose. Hence, using such terms intentionally or unintentionally discredits the legitimate struggle of ethnic minorities and legitimizes the narrative of the military.
The military was able to draft the 2008 Constitution with tacit support from a large portion of the Bamar majority, who were largely indifferent to the army’s offensives against ethnic minorities before 2021. This Constitution enshrines the military’s power in both the executive and legislative branches of government. It allows the military to participate in political leadership of the state (Article 6f) and to nominate one of the three presidential candidates, and reserves three ministries (Defence, Home Affairs, and Border Affairs) for the military. It also mandates 25% military representation on the Leading Bodies of the Self-Administered Division or Self-Administered Zone. In Parliament, the military reserves 25 percent (110 seats) in the Pyithu Hluttaw (lower house), 25 percent (56 seats) in the Amyotha Hluttaw (upper house). The military quota is even higher in region or state level parliaments, at 33 percent.
These are only some of the provisions cementing military influence in politics, in a constitution still backed by the junta and its supporters.
Is strong ethnic armed resistance really a threat?
Let’s start with the origins of Myanmar Army. The ethnic composition of the army at independence in 1948 was reflected in its battalions: Burma Rifles, Karen Rifles, Kachin Rifles, Chin Rifles, and Burma Regiment (Gurkhas). These were later grouped into two wings – a first wing composed mainly of ethnic Burmese led by General Ne Win, and a second composed of ethnic minorities (ie, Chin, Kachin, Karen), according to political scientist Zaw Thein. Gradually, General Ne Win purged the ethnic minority leaders when he “restructured” the army. By the time of the 1962 coup, ethnic minorities had gone underground – making way for ethnic Bamar to take over the entire military institution.
Had General Ne Win “restructured” the army without purging ethnic minorities, would Burma have become a more peaceful federal country, or would it have disintegrated? This, of course, remains a separate matter of debate and speculation.
Anyway, one could argue that the emergence of various strong ethnic armed groups (Arakan, Bamar PDFs, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Kokang, Mon, Shan, Ta-ang, Wa) resembled the Myanmar Army (though with ethnic minorities) of post-independence democratic Burma (1948-1962).
It is vital to recognize that today, no ethnic armed revolutionary organization – including the most powerful United Wa State Army – is demanding complete secession. Equating the military’s loss of territory to ethnic minorities with the disintegration of the country is not only unhelpful but also dangerous to the ongoing Spring Revolution against the junta. Such speculation reinforces the military’s narrative and propaganda while undermining the people’s struggle.
Many observers, including this author, are convinced that no one would attempt to leave the union if there were a functioning federal political system that guarantees ethnic equality, autonomy, self-determination, good health and education for all its citizens.
Reclaiming lost autonomy
The misrepresentation of the ongoing armed conflict by many media outlets is unhelpful for the advancement of the Spring Revolution. In Myanmar, where the revolution involves a multitude of stakeholders, the role of the media and the need for precise, accurate reporting is imperative.
Hence, the military’s recent loss of territory to various ethnic minorities and resistance forces should be viewed as the ethnic minorities regaining their lost autonomy. In other words, terms such as “fragmentation” and “disintegration” should be viewed in the context of steps toward decentralization and regional autonomy.
Meanwhile, the de facto autonomy exercised by EROs over newly gained territory must be accompanied by de jure recognition for their long-term stability, legitimacy, and support.
Progress toward long-term peace would be greatly aided if the international community, including researchers, journalists, academics, and organizations, support efforts to achieve a comprehensive and progressive federal constitution that provides de jure recognition to existing de facto ethnic autonomy, and is acceptable to most (if not all) stakeholders.
Zung Ring is a social worker and independent political analyst based in Myanmar.
