There has been much reporting of the armed resistance’s successes against the junta, which is boosting morale among resistance fighters and their supporters in and outside Myanmar. Mass surrenders by regime troops are also enhancing morale, while the junta’s conscription of young people into its armed forces signals it is weakening and may be in danger of collapse.
However, a more prudent attitude rules out an immediate collapse of the regime given it has some way to go before exhausting its firepower, augmented by fresh supplies from Russia and China. One could therefore ask what strategies it must adopt to remain in power. Could this conflict be a war of attrition that drags on, as seen in past conflicts with armed ethnic resistance? One way of exhausting the regime’s firepower is by destroying its arms maintenance and manufacturing facilities, but these do not seem to be a resistance target at present.
It is also assumed that Myanmar’s people wholeheartedly support the resistance. But for those who see themselves caught between combatants, is this the case? What about the displaced people suffering hardships? Of course, those IDPs who suffered from the regime destroying their homes, their livelihoods, and so on will support the resistance and may be willing to join the fight. But not everyone can be expected to take up weapons. The exception is the young generation who make up the majority of resistance fighters and who faced the regime’s wrath in peaceful anti-coup protests three years ago. Yet there are also young people in cities who have not joined the resistance and merely want to get on with their lives (a position now threatened by conscription). There will always be a stratum of people who want nothing to do with the warring protagonists and want a quiet life.
Moreover, we have the “old soldiers” of the resistance who lost their fighting spirit during the small window of dialogue with the regime and are now holding back their troops, including younger recruits, from the fight. And the China-aligned resistance armies who sit on their territories and stay out of the war or collaborate with the regime, like the United Wa State Army (UWSA) occupying Tangyan Township and the Shan State Army (SSPP) in Mongyai. They will be seen as “free riders”, benefiting from any overthrow of the regime without contributing to the fight. The question is, what will happen with these sidelined armed ethnic organizations if the regime finally collapses? Will there be a new war between them and those now fighting and resisting? There are already disputes between rival ethnic armies like the TNLA, KIA and SSPP and even internal Shan tension between the SSPP and RCSS.
Ethnic armies fighting for self-determination and territory against Bamar majority domination represented by the regime is legitimate. But young Bamars turning against the Bamar regime has altered the status quo. These young citizens are being trained and supported by some of the older ethnic armies. A new solidarity in the face of a common external enemy has emerged, but will it last after the regime falls? In this new scenario, those still pursuing dialogue with the regime become part of the resisting status quo, along with those “sitting on the fence”. There is confidence that this scenario will develop into some kind of federal structure, but what form will this take exactly?
To avert Balkanisation, will Myanmar become a collection of ethnic statelets within the territories controlled by ethnic armies under some kind of federal or co-federal structure? Is this what self-determination amounts too? How many statelets will there be? Will there be a dismantling of existing boundaries or within existing boundaries to form statelets based on ethnicity. The ethno-nationalism which existed under Bamar dominance cannot continue in the post-revolutionary era. However, nobody will want a Burma/Myanmar shattered into statelets, and none of these statelets would ever gain international recognition or a seat at the UN. Myanmar must be known as a multi-ethnic state with its ethnicities living in peace even if the individual statelets or regions contain different ethnicities. This idea of an ethnic group having its own territory – a legacy of the dominant Bamars ¬¬– must cease. The Bamars of the new Myanmar will themselves have their own state territory or state territories. The new federal structure must accommodate territories based on single ethnicities and multiple ethnicities. Myanmar should celebrate its multi-ethnic societies in a state rather than fighting over territory. Ethno-nationalism must cease with the end of the military regime.
There is also the question of the National Unity Government (NUG). Does it continue or not? Its present legitimacy rests on elected MPs who could not take up their seats because of the 2021 coup. The Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) formed the NUG as a rallying point and intermediary with the outside world, though it has no official diplomatic recognition. A new federal structure with a “bottom-up” approach would eradicate the NUG. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi would also lose her status. Federal power would derive from component states/statelets or regions and not from the previous status quo. The legitimacy of the NUG would end when a new federal structure is established, even if it had enabled it. The point of a revolution, as the resistance calls it, is to change the whole status quo.
Discussion of this vision of a future federal structure must start now among resistance groups. The first steps have already been taken, with the NUCC formed to discuss this structure in the orbit of the NUG. But others are also coming up with plans, for example, the parties to the National Ceasefire Agreement. So, what is going to happen next? A divided Myanmar? What kind of inclusive mechanism could be established to bring all parties together? What role is there for civil society? In a bottom-up approach, civil society plays an important role along with the grassroots.
The ethnic armies have trained and armed Bamar citizens, but how will they situate themselves in a new federal/co-federal state? Will these ethnic armies reform themselves? Will they accept other ethnic peoples into their ranks? Will they become part of a federal army? How will they deal with their opponents, the junta’s soldiers? Will the TNLA-SSP dispute, for example, be settled now, before entering a federal era? This applies to the two Shan armies too. Will there be dialogue with those ethnic armies who are now sitting on the fence? Will they prefer to retain independent control of their territories as statelets, as the UWSA does now?
The greatest fear is the eruption of wars between ethnic armies over territory, and how their present enemy would respond. Would the junta’s military regroup and try to recreate its dominance and hegemony? Hence the importance of discussion and negotiations among all political actors, including the ethnic armies, with tenacity, resilience, patience and courage to reach a fair and fully inclusive compromise. Myanmar cannot afford to continue warring to the detriment of the country, the state, and its citizens if its peoples are to enjoy peace and development in the 21st century. Rather than ethno-nationalism, celebrate the diversity of ethnicities, cultures and religions Create a new form Myanmar nationalism and patriotism based not on ethnicity but on loyalty and dedication to a new state.
Dr. Paul Lim is a retired university teacher and long-time human rights activist in solidarity with the Myanmar peoples.