China’s recent actions in Myanmar have led many observers to conclude that China has sided with the military junta. We argue this is a simplistic view, stemming from sinophobia and a Western-centric lens, with an inherent, concerning risk of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy and consequently harmful to the revolution in Myanmar. This is significant—Myanmar’s revolution has fought against the military dictatorship for almost four years without any external help and has emerged with significant victories during this period. This is exactly the reason it has attracted the powerful neighbor’s attention, which should be understood properly. Now is a critical and testing period for Myanmar’s revolutionary actors—one in which sober judgement with calm and measured wisdom, and strategic engagement with China are most required.
There is no doubt that China is an influential and powerful neighbor that could have a huge impact on Myanmar politics. However, it is helpful to remember that post-coup China analysis, which has shaped the Burmese public perception and discourse on China, has often been exaggerated with contradictory claims. In May 2023, when then-Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang went to Naypyitaw and met with regime leader Min Aung Hlaing, many analysts concluded that China had everything managed, and had secured its interests in Myanmar. According to commentaries back then, Beijing had successfully leveraged its influence over ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) to stabilize the situation, make a peace deal with the junta, and contain the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). However, the events that followed within just five months—Operation 1027, the highly successful anti-regime military offensive launched jointly by the PDFs and Brotherhood Alliance of EAOs—proved these assessments wrong.
Rather than reassessing China’s will and capacity to act, the analysts’ discourse swung from the extreme of “China has everything under control” to another extreme: “China is behind Operation 1027”. This was not only contradictory to their previous claims, but totally discounted the revolutionary situation that has led to unprecedented military defeats for the Myanmar generals. This time, the analysts insisted that the offensive was about “capturing Laukkai” and “regaining Kokang territory” because that’s what the EAOs wanted and China greenlighted. Contrary to their predictions, the resistance forces led by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)—a member of the alliance—captured the junta military’s Northeast Command in Lashio, northern Shan State in August 2024.
Unsurprisingly, analysts were quick to attribute the fall of Lashio to China once again, this time citing a meeting between representatives of the State Administration Council (the junta) and the US in Hanoi as a factor influencing China’s alleged shift in position, allowing Lashio to be captured. At this point, that seems more like discounting the agency of the resistance actors in Myanmar at any cost, and exaggerating the role of China, even if it stretches simple logic.
A straightforward explanation is that China’s perception of Myanmar’s conflict has evolved over time, particularly as border trade and key infrastructure projects have fallen under the control of resistance groups including both EAOs and PDFs. Expecting China, with its strategic interests in Myanmar and growing superpower rivalry in the region, to do nothing in this situation is unrealistic. Clearly, China is anxious about the potential for state collapse in Myanmar and the ensuing chaos in its backyard. (Not that we haven’t seen this kind of assessment and anxiety in the case of Western nations.) Naturally, it has prompted Beijing to recalibrate its approach, including pressuring the MNDAA and engaging with the junta leader, and inviting the chairman of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) to Beijing. The prevailing discourse is once again rife with anti-China rhetoric and sinophobia. We have not known the major stakeholders in the Burmese resistance so united and unanimous in their discourse on any issue—except in their sinophobia and hostility against China.
Rather than uncritically following these perspectives, which vilify China at every turn, it is time the resistance invest all they have in engaging China constructively. When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met Min Aung Hlaing in August, his visit was widely misinterpreted as an endorsement of the junta. In reality, both the visit and the subsequent invitation of the junta leader to the regional forum (not a state visit) may have been a calculated attempt to pressure the military into prioritizing stability and exploring pathways to elections, blending carrots and sticks to steer the junta toward a resolution.
Needless to say, it is unwise to speak with certainty about China’s intentions in Myanmar. It is essential to remain cautious of the actions of any superpowers. However, the portrayal of China as being fully committed to supporting the junta is overblown and dangerous. Such misperceptions fuel unnecessary hostility toward China and unintentionally risk pushing Beijing closer to the junta, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy that undermines revolutionary goals.
Recently, members of the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) announced that they will lobby to engage with the incoming Trump administration. Why can’t the same thing be done with China, a big actor that actually matters? The resistance actors should hire professional lobbyists if they don’t know how to engage with China. After the KIO chairman returned from Beijing, the border gates were reopened—showing China responds well when engaged constructively. The junta, for its part, did not shy away from getting professional lobbies to advocate against US sanctions.
Instead of resentment, the resistance should focus on advocacy and diplomacy to China. This means addressing China’s concerns—territorial integrity of Myanmar, state collapse, and economic stability—while articulating how the victory of democratic forces aligns with Beijing’s long-term interests. The resistance needs to demonstrate that it has significant preparedness to safeguard China’s interests post-revolution, a message crucial to gaining China’s confidence. China, for its part, should listen to the aspirations of Myanmar peoples rather than investing in a brutal regime despised by the entire country.
The financial success of recent fundraising campaigns like ICO2, which raised US$13.2 million within a few weeks, and the unwavering public support for the NUG, PDFs and EAOs illustrate that this revolution is far from losing steam. The challenge now is to translate this internal momentum into external legitimacy.
Now is a true test of leadership, one that will shape not only Myanmar’s future but also its place in a region where China has a constant formidable presence.
Htet Min Lwin is a scholar of religion, social movements and revolution, currently writing a PhD at the York Centre for Asian Research at York University, Toronto.
Thiha Wint Aung is a fellow at Myanmar Policy and Community Knowledge (MyPACK) Hub at the University of Toronto’s Asian Institute.
