A widely accepted definition of a “nation” refers to groups of people within defined borders. It can also refer to people united by shared history, culture, traditions and language, even if they lack an official political territory.
These definitions suggests that the “Kachin” are still in the process of becoming a nation. “Kachin” is an exonym, and there is no consensus among the concerned ethnic groups on a unified endonym for “Kachin” as their collective identity.
The Myanmar Spring Revolution presents a historical opportunity for the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA) to lead all Kachin ethnic groups into nationhood. This is possible because the KIO/KIA has managed to earn unprecedented degrees of public support from both Kachin and non-Kachin people by supporting the revolution from the start.
In terms of cooperation and partnership with the National Unity Government (NUG), the KIA is one of the members of the military partnership known as the K3C, along with the Karen National Union, the Karenni National Progressive Party and the Chin National Front.
The KIA is also believed to be providing military training and arms to the young people (formed as the People’s Defense Forces or PDFs) who are fighting against the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s military) in Sagaing Region bordering Kachin State. In the military operations in Sagaing Region, the KIA is even believed to be acting as the NUG’s regional commander. In short, this active support for the revolution has earned the KIO/KIA the greatest political support in its history from the public beyond Kachin.
How is the KIO/KIA utilizing or capitalizing on this newfound public political support? Before looking into this question, let us look at perhaps the key touchy issue surrounding “Kachin” as a collective identity.
Sensitive issue of identity
As a brief background, Kachin is made up of six ethnic groups: the Jinghpaw, Lacid (Lachid), Lhaovo, Lisu, Rawang and Zaiwa. Even though they share the Christian faith (with different denominations), and a large degree of their culture, traditions and customs, they each have their own written language. Among Kachin, Jinghpaw is the dominant group and its language is used as the lingua franca.
Collective identity remains a complex and sensitive issue. “Kachin” serves as their exonym, yet they lack an agreed-upon endonym. While Christian institutions (i.e., churches dominated by Jinghpaw) prefer the term “Jinghpaw Wunpawng” (even just “Jinghpaw” if possible), the official policy of the KIO/KIA is “Wunpawng” as the endonym.
At the same time, in practice, the KIO/KIA is seemingly only half-hearted at best on this particular policy. Thus, the issue of collective identity has been one of the main obstacles in unifying all Kachin into a nation.
Briefly, non-Jinghpaw ethnic groups reject Kachin nation building based on Jinghpaw identity and Jinghpaw culture; the same as non-Bamar ethnic groups reject “Myanmar” nation building based on Bamar or Myanmar identity and its culture.
Ethnic lineage-based armed organizations
Frustrated and disillusioned with the Jinghpaw-led Kachin nation building efforts with Jinghpaw identity, some leaders within non-Jinghpaw ethnic groups—more hardliners if you like—have chosen to form ethnic lineage-based armed organizations.
Meanwhile, this is not to say that all non-Jinghpaw ethnic groups have left the KIO/KIA and support their own respective ethnic lineage armed group. On the contrary, the KIO/KIA rank-and-file are comprised of all Kachin ethnic groups (even though Jinghpaw predominantly occupy the top levels).
The Lacid ethnic lineage militias include the Border Guard Force (BGF) led by Zahkung Ting Ying and local militia led by Lagwi Bawm Lang. (In practice, they are largely the same group.) The BGF was formerly known as the New Democratic Army (Kachin) or NDAK, which split from the KIA and entered a ceasefire with the military government. Following the ceasefire, it was given a designated territory, Special Region (1), which is well known for rare-earth mining and was controlled by Zakhung Ting Ying for more than 30 years.
The Rawang ethnic lineage group known as the Khaunglanhpu militia is led by Rawang ethnic leader Tang Gu Tan, and operates in the Puta-O region in northernmost Kachin State.
More recently, both the Lisu People’s Militia and Lhaovo People’s Militia were formed with the support of the State Administration Council (SAC—the junta) and they operate in Waingmaw Township. Both are widely reported to be fighting alongside junta forces against the KIA-led resistance forces in Kachin State.
Uniting Kachin groups by force
The KIO/KIA has always wanted to be the only armed organization to represent all Kachin people. However, this has been hindered by the presence of the ethnic lineage-based armed organizations stated above.
With its newfound public support derived from supporting the Spring Revolution, the KIA has achieved two strategic victories—consolidating its power as the sole Kachin military and political organization to represent all Kachin people.
In early 2024, it defeated the Lisu militia led by former leader of the Lisu National Development Party (LNDP) Shwe Min, who was killed in action. This defeat also includes the Lhaovo militia because the Lhaovo and Lisu fought together. They both still exist but given that they are new and small, the LNDP is now less active since the death of its leader, and it would be difficult for it to recover under the current circumstances.
The other key victory is over the Border Guard Force (BGF) led by Zahkung Ting Ying and the militia led by Lagwi Bawm Lang. Despite China’s pressure, the KIA captured the Border Guard Force (BGF)’s posts in Special Region (1) in early November 2024. Following its victory, the KIO/KIA declared the abolition of Special Region (1). This victory is more significant because the KIO/KIA now controls rare-earth mining and all border crossing gates with China in Kachin State.
In the coming months or year, one should not be surprised if the KIO/KIA moves toward Puta-O region either to crush the Rawang militia (if persuasion fails) as the next target. If this happens, it will mean the KIO/KIA has successfully unified (by force) all Kachin ethnic groups.
With internal Kachin unity and public support, along with cooperation from its allies such as PDFs and other ethnic revolutionary organizations (EROs), the KIO/KIA is likely to focus more on other non-Kachin militias. These include the SNA operating in parts of Kachin State and Sagaing Region, and the Min Ze Thant militia active in Shaduzup, Danai Township—both of which are under the command of the junta.
Will KIO/KIA nation building succeed?
The success or failure of Kachin nation building will largely depend on the willingness and ability of the KIO/KIA to fully implement its “Ninggawn Mungmasa” (National Policy) – which values equality, argues Mangshang Yaw Bawm, the author of a book (in Jinghpaw) “Kachin? Wunpawng? Jinghpaw Wunpawng? Jinghpaw?: Amyusha Gawgap Lam hte Anhte A Bawsang Shingteng Amying Gamung” (Kachin Nation Building and Ethnic Identity Conversation). The book stands out as perhaps the most comprehensive research work on this subject of Kachin nation building and ethnic identity. It delves into aspects that touch on some of the most politically sensitive issues within Kachin society.
In its “Ninggawn Mungmasa”, “Kachin” is the exonym and “Wunpawng” the endonym, collectively, for all Kachin ethnic groups; “Kachin State” is as the exonym and “Wunpawng Mungdan” is the endonym. According to Mangshang Yaw Bawm in his book, all non-Jinghpaw ethnic groups of the Kachin accept the KIO/KIA’s policy on this matter; however, it has not fully implemented the policy. For example, during the annual celebration of “Kachin State Day” on Jan. 10, 2020, the KIO instructed that “Jinghpaw Mungdaw Nhtoi” not be changed as the endonym, when in fact it should be “Wunpawng Mungdaw Nhtoi” according to its policy.
Other non-Jinghpaw ethnic groups reject the endonym “Jinghpaw Mungdaw” because this implies that they are landless people. They also raise serious concerns regarding the vision of the KIO/KIA. The annual Jan. 10 Kachin State Day celebration commemorates the formation of the first Kachin State government at the first meeting of the Kachin State Council Conference on Jan. 10, 1948—the year Myanmar (then Burma) got its independence.
Jan. 10 is approaching. It is unclear if people care about celebrating “Kachin State Day” amidst the ongoing civil war. If they care to celebrate, it remains to be seen whether the KIO continues to favor “Jinghpaw Mungdaw Nhtoi” over “Wunpawng Mungdaw Nhtoi” as it instructed in 2020.
Mangshang Yaw Bawm argues that the KIO needs to have a vision for a federal system (and implement it) within Kachin ethnic groups, just as the KIO advocates for federalism in Myanmar. Specifically how, where and when should the principle of ethnic equality be recognized? While “Jinghpaw” can be the official language in the state, how to recognize other languages, cultures of the non-Jinghpaw ethnic minority in the state? Successful Kachin nation building would also require a meaningful participation in the nation building process (i.e., development of political, economic, security, and social institutions) from all concerned ethnic groups.
Zung Ring is a social worker and independent political analyst based in Myanmar.
