Is the Myanmar junta turning to the infamous Russian Wagner Group of state-sponsored mercenaries for help in its wars against a multitude of armed groups opposing its February 2021 seizure of power? That, at least, is what is being claimed in the 61st bulletin from a Chinese-language website called One Guide that covers the fighting in northern Myanmar. It has long been suspected that the junta would seek assistance from a group like Wagner, but the One Guide’s 61st bulletin is the first that mentions the outfit by name in a Myanmar context. The dispatch appeared online on YouTube in the second week of August, and, if correct, would explain how the junta could circumvent Section 42 (b) of the 2008 army-drafted constitution, which bans the deployment of foreign troops in Myanmar.
The Wagner mercenaries could come to Myanmar as “instructors” or “security guards”, the cover under which they operate in Asian countries such as Sudan, Mali and the Central African Republic where they protect Russian investments and also serve as advisers and military trainers to various despots. One Guide’s logo is a picture of the back of a mysterious man wearing a Western-style hat — and it always displays unique videos of the fighting in the north accompanied by amazingly detailed maps showing the exact locations of battles and the positions of Myanmar army camps and outposts in the area. The announcer speaks rapidly in what Chinese-language experts consulted by The Irrawaddy say is standard Chinese, not a local or rustic dialect. And the subtitles in English are too good to have been produced by Google Translate or any such site.
While it is impossible to determine whether or not covert mainland Chinese interests are involved with this remarkable website, its 61st bulletin nevertheless reflects what must be seen as official policy: when it comes to Myanmar, the Chinese are determined to be the only game in town. They do not want competition from any other outside power, not even Russia which is usually perceived as an ally of Beijing. Significantly, the dispatch accuses junta boss Senior General Min Aung Hlaing of “betrayal” for ignoring Chinese efforts to mediate in the conflict. The special envoy for Asian Affairs of the Chinese foreign ministry Deng Xijun, the announcer says, “went to Naypyitaw to communicate with Min Aung Hlaing” who then “exposed his true intentions” by talking only about eliminating online fraud and promising to hold elections next year.
The item claiming that the Wagner Group “is prepared” to intervene in Myanmar, comes at the end of a eulogy to Lin Mingxian, the commander of the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) in eastern Shan State, who passed away reportedly from lung cancer on August 7. Lin, a half-Shan, half-ethnic Chinese born in northern Myanmar in 1948 or 1949, joined the Red Guards in China as a teenager, and came across the border to Myanmar in 1968 with scores of other likeminded young Chinese to fight alongside the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). When the mostly hilltribe rank-and-file of the CPB’s army rose in mutiny in 1989, Lin joined them, founded his NDAA and built up a stronghold in Mong La, a town right on the Chinese border which soon gained notoriety for its abundance of casinos, brothels, transvestite shows, and stores selling exotic wildlife products. As the website explains, the CPB split up into four different, ethnically-based armies after the 1989 mutiny: the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Kokang-based Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), a smaller group in Kachin State, and then Lin’s NDAA. The group in Kachin State has turned into an officially recognized Border Guard Force while the other three remain closely allied to each other. On a personal level, Lin was married to the daughter of Peng Jiasheng, the founder of the MNDAA. He died at Mong La in February 2022.
The MNDAA is the main resistance force in northern Shan State, and it was that group which together with its Palaung ally, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), in the beginning of August overran the city of Lashio and the headquarters of the Myanmar army’s northeastern command. Notably, One Guide states that the UWSA and the NDAA remain “nominally neutral”, indicating that those two groups are not really impartial in the conflict. It should also be remembered that the UWSA serves as a conduit for Chinese weapons destined for the former CPB forces and other comrades-in-arms. That also puts to rest the rather bizarre suggestion proposed by many Western observers that the UWSA entered Lashio in order to help the Myanmar Army. On the contrary, the most likely purpose for the UWSA’s intervention was to stabilize the situation in the captured city and, whenever possible, assist its MNDAA and TNLA allies.
However, even if the junta gets help from the Wagner Group, it is far from clear what role it would, or could, play in the extremely complicated situation in northern Shan State and other conflict areas. The Wagner Group, or the Private Military Company Wagner, is ostensibly a private military company which took its name from the nom de guerre of its leader, Dmitry Utkin, a retired Russian military officer. Utkin chose that name after Richard Wagner, the favorite composer of Adolf Hitler who he also supposedly admired. But the Wagner Group’s de facto leader until his death in a mysterious air crash in August 2023 was Yevgeny Prigozhin, who was often referred to as “Putin’s chef”. Prigozhin, once a convicted criminal, owned restaurants and catering businesses which provided services to the Russian leader Vladimir Putin.
Funded by the Kremlin, Prigozhin and the Wagner Group played an important role in the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Thousands of Wagner mercenaries participated in the assault on Ukraine, but Prigozhin turned against the Russian Ministry of Defense when his men did not get the support they had expected from Moscow and, as a result, suffered heavy casualties. In June 2023, Prigozhin and his men revolted and began to march on Moscow. Putin initially denounced Wagner’s actions as “treason”, but a settlement was brokered — and, shortly afterwards, Prigozhin was killed along with nine other people when their business jet crashed outside Moscow. It was widely reported at the time that the crash had been caused by a bomb onboard the plane.
By then, the Wagner Group had become involved in Syria, several African states and as far from Russia as Venezuela. In all those countries — and Ukraine — the Wagner Group became notorious for its brutality and human rights abuses. The Economist reported on August 31, 2023 that “Wagner’s violence against civilians is not just frequent but deadly”, and they are also guilty of abduction, sexual violence and torture. Consequently, the group has been designated a terrorist group by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe as well as individual countries such as the United Kingdom, France and Estonia. The US Treasury also imposed sanctions on the Wagner Group in June 2017. When, or if, the Wagner Group gets involved in Myanmar there is no reason to believe that its mercenaries would behave differently. Like Prigozhin, many of them are former convicts.
But military top brass in Naypyitaw may be playing with fire in asking for Russian support in fighting “terrorism”, something acknowledged explicitly by Union Solidarity and Development Party chief Khin Yi in an interview with the Russian news agency Sputnik in August — and indirectly by Min Aung Hlaing when he has lamented “foreign intervention” in the war in the north. In August, junta-backed so-called “nationalists” were also allowed to stage anti-Beijing protests in downtown Yangon. It is therefore not surprising that Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi did not mince his words when he visited Naypyitaw in August and met Min Aung Hlaing. According to a press release by the Chinese embassy in Yangon, Wang said that “Beijing would not accept comments intended to harm bilateral ties or smear China. … China opposes any remarks that attempt to sow discord in China-Myanmar relations or smear and vilify China.”
It soon became clear that Wang got his message across. On August 21, Ma Jia, China’s newly appointed ambassador to Myanmar, presented her credentials to Min Aung Hlaing, who promised to do his utmost to protect Chinese projects and employees in Myanmar, and to take measures to ensure stability of the Myanmar-China border. And Min Aung Hlaing and his government would not allow “any activity that can be harmful to the safety and interests of China.”
While Myanmar’s generals are unlikely to halt efforts to lessen their dependence on China by establishing a friendly relationship with Russia, they cannot afford to antagonize China, the only foreign country that wields significant influence in Myanmar, including over all sides in the civil wars. It is impossible to verify the information provided in One Guide’s 61st bulletin, and even if it turns out to be misinformation, it nevertheless serves as a reminder of the fact that the Chinese want to remain the sole foreign actor in Myanmar’s civil wars, and that they will not tolerate any intrusion into what they consider their turf.
