China’s position in Myanmar is changing.
After the coup in 2021, China opted for a policy of strategic ambiguity towards Myanmar’s domestic politics, treating the military junta, or State Administration Council (SAC), as the de facto functional government but not the formal legitimate government of the country. This ambiguity shifted in 2023 when China moved to greenlight Operation 1027 to protect its border stability after the SAC failed to remove cyber scam centers in northern Myanmar, hence greatly boosting the strengths of the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in the region.
Now this EAO-oriented policy is coming to an end, at least for the time being. Starting with Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Myanmar in mid-August, China has increased its political support for the SAC, formally and publicly endorsed its election plan, criticized the northern EAOs and forced them to stand down. The leaking of the transcript of a meeting between a Chinese special envoy and the leader of the United Wa State Army in late August was no accident, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)’s hold on Lashio is anything but a done deal. From here on, China will support the SAC.
Several factors have contributed to China’s change of position. China’s priority is the election, which it has publicly endorsed in the hope of turning a new page in the country. But the escalation of fighting and continued chaos jeopardize its prospects. The Myanmar military will aim to take back Lashio in northern Shan State, which means more military retaliation down the road and a significant number of refugees flowing into China.
China’s traditional approach in Myanmar follows a balancing strategy between the Burmese state and the EAOs. Empowered and emboldened since Operation 1027, the northern EAOs, especially the MNDAA, have further upset the power equilibrium in the country, which had already been put in peril by the coup. After all, turf wars among EAOs are not what China is interested in. Last but not least, while Operation 1027 aimed to punish the SAC and was successful, it has also pushed the SAC to seek engagement with the US since early 2024. Backed into a corner, the SAC sought closer relations with the US to counterbalance China’s presence. As such, China intends to give the SAC, and Min Aung Hlaing, a way out.
The invitation of Min Aung Hlaing to visit China formally confirms China’s endorsement of him as the national leader of Myanmar, boosting his authority at a delicate time. The visit has many caveats, such as the occasion, which is a multilateral gathering rather than bilateral meeting, the location of his visit, which is not Beijing, and the Chinese leader he meets, which is the premier rather than President Xi Jinping. But the message will be unequivocal: that China is backing him for now.
The visit is also not condition-free. China has expectations for Min Aung Hlaing to meet, especially on a ceasefire, negotiations, political reconciliation, and the greatest possible strengthening of the election’s legality. Most importantly, China wants him to present a plan on how to move the country beyond its current chaos through the election. Beijing’s hope is to be the external power that can inject some stability into the war-torn, Balkanized country and force a reset.
Words have power. Endorsements, too. Regardless of whether the plan is naïve and simplistic, China’s explicit preferences do have sway over the psychology and positions of the players involved. Actors who no longer feel they have a hope of victory in light of China’s fateful endorsement of the military could be influenced to seek to maintain the status quo or even stand down. It also emboldens the SAC. It is no coincidence that Min Aung Hlaing recently arrested the son-in-law of former Senior General Than Shwe, a show of force aimed at demonstrating the impossibility of any former military leader replacing him.
China’s plan might work. After all, an election could move the country from the current political stalemate and military impasse , and it will have some international legitimacy, with a number of countries poised to accept its result. Those who claim that the country and the people will never accept the election because “it is no longer 2010” must realize that the alternative—a continued revolution—has met a stalemate and everyone is burned out. Those who hope for China’s intervention to tilt the balance in favor of the resistance should consider that any proposal that does not somehow accommodate the military’s power and position will not gain traction with China. The Chinese have never seen Burmese politics free from the dominance or critical role of the military, nor do they believe that it can be.
But the plan carries serious risks for China as well. It is predicated upon the assumption that Min Aung Hlaing will listen to China and seek a political solution through and after the election. But there is no guarantee that he will not seek revenge instead. China might think that Min Aung Hlaing wouldn’t dare because he has been taught a lesson by Operation 1027 and has no other option. But it is hard to recall the last time that he acted according to China’s preference. Now with China’s endorsement, he could use the opportunity to launch military retaliation, even at a later date. China won’t be able to drastically change its position for the third time within a year without losing credibility.
A more challenging question that seems to have evaded the Chinese consideration is that if Min Aung Hlaing insists on “winning” the election and becoming the next president of Myanmar, which he appears determined to do, any shred of legitimacy conferred by the election will be a joke. And the Chinese hope for the country to turn the page will be futile.
Without properly addressing this question, the bigger risk for China is that it will be seen as the military’s accomplice by virtue of its support. If the election does not improve the political or the security situation on the ground, China will become a target by association. It is hard to believe it is a coincidence that the Chinese Consulate in Mandalay was attacked days after reports emerged that Min Aung Hlaing would visit China. If the opposition forces do not believe there is hope of winning a conventional war against the military, they could shift to unconventional warfare, as well as insurgency tactics. The Chinese Communist Party’s mantra of “using people’s war” against counterrevolutionaries could find fertile ground in Myanmar. Attacks against Chinese projects, assets and nationals could become common, or even popular. That would be another nightmare for the Chinese, one they are living vividly in Pakistan.
China’s policy toward Myanmar is a continuum, undergoing constant adjustment. However, the abrupt and critical nature of the recent policy changes, first through Operation 1027, then by re-embracing the Myanmar military, are unprecedented. China may have its own logic, but it is based on many assumptions about Myanmar, the military and its people. The jury is still out. One can only say that the risk is as significant as the success China hopes to achieve.
