From June 25-27, the junta staged a carefully choreographed event in Naypyitaw, deceptively titled the “Peace Forum.”
This event had nothing to do with peace. It was a cynical performance, a deceitful façade masking an intensified and atrocious war waged against the people of Myanmar.
The junta invited domestic “extras” and selected international diplomats to join the show, delivering speeches about peace and dialogue from a decorated grand stage, while simultaneously continuing its campaign of terror, including the bombing of cities and villages, and the destruction of schools, hospitals and religious sites.
On stage, Min Aung Hlaing and his subordinates spoke of “open doors for peace talks,” “inclusive dialogue,” “the political process,” “federalism,” “free, fair, comprehensive, and conclusive elections,” and the military’s supposed willingness to “hand over authority to a government that wins the elections.”
But it was all a lie—a calculated effort to mask their true intentions.
Just days after the forum, Min Aung Hlaing flew to Belarus to secure more weapons, expand drone warfare training for Myanmar officers, and strengthen ties with Russia’s economic bloc. He also appeared eager to learn from Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko how to rig and tightly control elections.
When fake narratives overshadow reality
The junta’s current strategy is clear: escalate the war while speaking the language of peace, dialogue, federalism and elections.
On the ground, the reality remains unchanged: massacres, war crimes, scorched villages, indiscriminate airstrikes, stolen and blocked humanitarian aid, and military offensives to recapture cities—using civilians who are forcibly conscripted, drugged and sent into battle untrained as human waves.
Yet in regional media, diplomatic circles and policy discussions, the narratives will focus on prospects for a ceasefire, inclusive dialogue, the need for a political process to replace conflict, “soft landing” elections, and a need for humanitarian aid and stability.
These discussions are dangerously disconnected from the ground truth. No matter how severe junta atrocities are—and will continue to be—massacres and war crimes are ignored or sidelined by a dominant narrative shaped by diplomatic wishful thinking. This narrative continues to crowd out reality, distorting regional and international engagement with Myanmar in ways that benefit the military.
A war pursued by other means
The military coup in February 2021 saw elected leaders imprisoned and democratic institutions dismantled. The junta believed that within months, with some repression, killings, mass arrests, and torture of peaceful protesters, it would gain control and international acceptance.
But the people of Myanmar rose up. At first, the movement was peaceful and civic. When the military responded with killings, mass arrests, and torture, the resistance transformed into a determined and widespread liberation struggle—one of the most heroic of our time.
With help from Russia, China, Belarus and other regional countries the junta has waged an all-out war against its own people. Still, despite the vast military imbalance, it has lost control of over 60 percent of the country.
Yet its goals have never changed: crush the resistance, regain total control, force the population once again to accept a military-imposed constitution, dominate the state, and win international recognition. At the fake “Peace Forum,” Min Aung Hlaing simply rebranded those goals using the language of peace, dialogue, and elections.
Both the junta and Myanmar’s neighbors—who benefit from the military’s grip on power—understand that the junta cannot win on the battlefield right now. That’s why the regime has revived Thein Sein-era spin doctors from the defunct Myanmar Peace Center and other zombies of the failed peace process, aiming to achieve militarist goals through political manipulation.
Carrot-and-stick strategy
The junta’s current approach involves two parallel tracks: relentless violence and manipulative political narratives.
On one side, military forces will continue burning villages, bombing cities and targeting civilians. Russian and Chinese aircraft, along with new drones from China, Russia and Belarus, will be used to destroy camps for internally displaced people, schools and hospitals in liberated territories. This is the “stick” of war, wielded with brutality and vengeance.
At the same time, well-spoken junta intellectual servants will craft the “carrot”: soothing narratives of peace, dialogue, federalism, constitutional reform and elections.
Both the violence of war and the deception of false narratives serve the same purpose: to gain regional and international acceptance. By dividing and weakening the revolutionary forces, manufacturing fake opposition parties, and banning the real ones, the junta will stage sham elections in limited areas—no more than one-third of the territory—and claim a fabricated victory, in the style of a “Myanmar democracy” that supposedly does not copy foreign models.
All of this would allow Min Aung Hlaing to shed his military uniform and reappear in a pseudo-civilian role, cloaked in the appearance of legitimacy.
At a time when the junta cannot achieve military victory, its goal is a political one: to secure regional recognition first, and international recognition second, as the central government of Myanmar. With such recognition, the junta would gain easier access to weapons, loans, investment, and development aid—resources it would use to wage further war and deepen its kleptocratic rule.
What revolutionary forces must do now
The junta will move forward with its sham elections—and it will receive backing from neighboring governments. Time is running out for Myanmar’s revolutionary forces to present a credible and unified alternative.
Relying on the 2020 election results is no longer viable. Since the revolution began, and with big parts of country being liberated and being under governing rule of liberation forces—most of them from ethnic revolutionary organizations—Myanmar’s political geography has fundamentally changed. The legitimacy of that past election has already been exhausted.
What’s urgently needed is a bold new strategy—one that reestablishes democratic legitimacy for the revolutionary movement. This must come through a process that forces regional and international actors to make a choice: will they recognize the junta’s blatantly fraudulent election, or will they acknowledge the clearly legitimate revolutionary bodies that indisputably enjoy the support and consent of the people?
A year ago, I proposed organizing a plebiscite across liberated territories, among the diaspora, and online in junta-controlled areas—offering legitimacy backed by millions of real votes as a direct contrast to the junta’s manufactured results and low turnout. At the time, the idea failed to gain traction. Today, it’s too late for such an ambitious effort—but it is not too late to act politically, not just militarily.
Revolutionary forces must urgently build a new foundation of legitimacy—one that is credible, inclusive, and visible to the world. Pioneering work has already been done by Karenni revolutionary forces and others, who formed broadly inclusive consultative councils and derived interim executive bodies from them.
What needs to happen without any further delay is the formation of a temporary Joint Coordination Revolutionary Body—but one composed of those who are inside the country, in liberated territories, and who are actively leading the resistance to the junta. Not those long settled in Chiang Mai or scattered across the world. This Joint Coordination Revolutionary Body should provide effective leadership in political, military, and international affairs—on a daily basis and with a sense of urgency—not just during occasional gatherings facilitated by external actors. This body would serve only until a new Interim Federal National Authority is formed through the process described below, which means no longer than the next six to eight months.
There are still six months remaining to disrupt and delay the junta’s electoral farce through coordinated military offensives. This will not be easy—the junta has also learned, and it has acquired new weapons, technologies, and resources for war. But success is possible—if operations are coordinated and staged on multiple fronts.
Most importantly, these six months must be used—decisively, responsibly, and with purpose—to accelerate the formation of state- and region-level consultative councils and interim executive bodies.
These should become the foundation for a new Interim Federal National Authority, equipped with a strong mandate and clear democratic legitimacy—the kind of legitimacy the junta’s fabricated election results will never be able to match.
The time to act is now.
Igor Blazevic is a senior adviser at the Prague Civil Society Centre. Between 2011 and 2016 he worked in Myanmar as the head lecturer of the Educational Initiatives Program.
