On May 9, 2025, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the leader of Myanmar’s military junta, met with Chinese President Xi Jinping for the first time since 2021 coup. This meeting took place in Moscow during a military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany. Xi reiterated China’s commitment to supporting Myanmar’s regime both regionally and internationally, including backing the military’s plans for elections.
This growing reliance on China is evident in several developments, such as Myanmar’s official recognition of the Chinese New Year as a public holiday, the implementation of the Public Security Services Law to safeguard Chinese investments, and the regime’s pledge to prioritize the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) project despite ongoing national turmoil. Additionally, the junta has publicly endorsed China’s efforts against online fraud, framing it as a national responsibility. In its quest for stronger Chinese support amid its challenges, the junta has aligned closely with Beijing, earning the moniker “Beijing’s puppet.”
However, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s engagement in Myanmar reflects a nuanced strategy; while it officially backs the military regime, it also supports various ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) opposing the junta. This dual approach allows China to navigate its economic interests, maintain regional stability, and exert strategic influence, all while securing vital border areas that are essential for its security and trade routes, serving as buffer zones against instability in its Yunnan Province.
In its official stance, China has expressed support for Myanmar’s regime, yet it has also been implicated in providing aid to various EAOs, including the Arakan Army (AA) and the United Wa State Army (UWSA), as well as the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). These groups, which wield considerable military power along the China-Myanmar border, have historically benefited from Chinese assistance in terms of weaponry among others.
This complex involvement enables Beijing to exert substantial influence over Myanmar’s internal affairs, ensuring that its regional interests are protected, irrespective of the shifting power dynamics. This strategy is particularly aimed at counterbalancing India’s influence in the Bay of Bengal and Northeast India. China’s engagement with EAOs positions it as a mediator in Myanmar’s internal strife; for example, in January 2024, it successfully facilitated a ceasefire between the Myanmar military and a coalition of ethnic armed groups, underscoring its role as a pivotal power broker in the region. The MNDAA has publicly reaffirmed its allegiance to China, emphasizing that their political stance prohibits alliances with entities opposed to Chinese interests.
This dual engagement strategy allows China to navigate the unpredictable landscape of Myanmar’s politics, maintaining ties with both the central military and various EAOs, thereby ensuring its influence remains intact regardless of which faction is in power. Additionally, this approach protects China’s infrastructure investments and economic interests, even as control over different regions of Myanmar fluctuates among rival groups.
Moreover, China’s involvement serves to dissuade EAOs from forming alliances with Western-supported opposition forces, such as the National Unity Government, as Beijing has pressured groups like the MNDAA to steer clear of partnerships that could threaten Chinese interests, thereby reinforcing its strategic goals in the region.
China’s involvement in Myanmar is influenced by a multitude of significant factors. Primarily, economic investments play a crucial role, exemplified by the CMEC, which is a vital component of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This corridor encompasses major infrastructure projects, including the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port located in Rakhine State, strategically positioned near the Sittwe Port, which has been developed under a framework agreement between India and Myanmar for the construction and operation of a Multimodal Transit Transport Facility on the Kaladan River.
Additionally, Myanmar’s wealth in rare earth minerals, gold, and its hydroelectric potential renders it an invaluable ally for China in meeting its resource demands. Furthermore, China is keen on maintaining border security to avert instability that could disrupt trade and trigger refugee crises. Moreover, China’s dual-track strategy in Myanmar reflects its broader ambition to establish dominance in Southeast Asia, utilizing its geographical leverage to undermine multilateral frameworks like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This geographical advantage not only solidifies China’s economic presence but also enhances its capacity for power projection well beyond its immediate borders. Additionally, China has adeptly navigated ASEAN’s consensus-driven decision-making process through a “divide and rule” approach, influencing certain member states, including Myanmar, to obstruct ASEAN from achieving a unified position on contentious matters such as the South China Sea disputes.
The strategic maneuvers of China in Myanmar, particularly concerning the India-Myanmar border, reveal critical insights into the geopolitical dynamics within the border region, which stretches 2,129 km from the tri-point with India in the north to the tri-point with Laos in the south. Historically, this border area has served as a buffer zone between Chinese and Burmese empires, carrying significant geopolitical ramifications.
The recent reconciliation among the ethnic Chin factions in Myanmar has significantly bolstered India’s border security, effectively mitigating infiltration threats and enhancing regional stability. The merger agreement, which was facilitated by the Indian government, was formalized in Aizawl, Mizoram, between the Chinland Council and the Interim Chin National Consultative Council. Given the Indo-Myanmar border’s porous and underdeveloped nature, it is a focal point in India’s security strategy, particularly in light of the ongoing insurgencies and tribal conflicts in the area. To address these challenges, India has been investing in infrastructure projects aimed at improving connectivity and security along the border.
Following the 2021 military coup, China emerged as one of the few nations to recognize and support Myanmar’s new military regime. In 2023 the UN special rapporteur for Myanmar Tom Andrews mentioned that between February 2021 and December 2022, Chinese state-owned and private companies supplied the Myanmar military with over US$267 million worth of defense equipment, spare parts, communications equipment, missiles, tanks and fighter jets. This support underscores China’s commitment to securing its strategic investments, notably the CMEC, which provides a vital link between Yunnan Province and the Indian Ocean, bypassing the vulnerable Strait of Malacca. This dual-track approach not only secures China’s economic and security interests but also reinforces its position as a dominant power broker in Southeast Asia. It also allows China to maintain leverage over multiple factions, ensuring its long-term interests in Myanmar remain intact.
China’s complex strategy in Myanmar, which involves backing both the military junta and various ethnic armed factions, has sparked significant apprehension regarding its dedication to the nation’s sovereignty and enduring stability. While Beijing openly supports the military regime to safeguard its strategic and economic interests, particularly through infrastructure initiatives linked to the BRI, it simultaneously nurtures clandestine relationships with ethnic militias, especially in northern Myanmar, offering them political advantages and, reportedly, material assistance. This dual approach allows China to maintain influence over all parties involved in Myanmar’s ongoing conflict, effectively positioning itself as a crucial mediator. However, such a strategy undermines authentic peace initiatives, breeds distrust among different stakeholders, and threatens to further destabilize an already precarious region. This behavior indicates that China’s involvement is more about seizing geopolitical opportunities than a sincere commitment to Myanmar’s democratic aspirations or territorial integrity, raising serious questions about the implications for Myanmar’s sovereignty and long-term stability.
The author is an analyst on geopolitical and macroeconomic issues.
