Beijing’s long-standing policy of “non-interference” in other countries’ internal affairs appears increasingly hollow when it comes to Myanmar. By forcing the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) out of Lashio two months ago, it has not only blatantly interfered in Myanmar’s internal affairs, but openly propped up a brutal regime committing widespread war crimes against its own civilians.
China arrested the MNDAA leader and closed its border crossings with territories controlled by the ethnic armed organization, while helping the regime to reclaim Lashio, the capital of northern Shan State, which the MNDAA liberated last year as part of anti-regime Operation 1027. The MNDAA launched the operation with the Arakan Army and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, its two partners in the Brotherhood Alliance.
The TNLA confirmed at a recent press briefing that China’s Special Envoy to Myanmar Deng Xijun has been pressuring it to return control of five towns to the regime. Although the TNLA rebuffed the demands at the time, more talks are expected in August, raising questions about what additional pressure Beijing might bring to bear.
Separately, Deng also met with leaders of the AA and the Kachin Independence Army in late May, urging them to refrain from offensives on Rakhine State’s Kyaukphyu—home to a number of China’s Belt and Road Initiative projects—and Kachin State’s Bhamo. China reportedly promised economic incentives in exchange for ceasing attacks. The AA has captured 14 of 17 townships in western Myanmar’s Rakhine, and the KIA has seized several towns in Kachin as well as rare-earth mines near the Chinese border.
China’s deep involvement in Myanmar stems from one overriding concern: the potential collapse of the military junta, which would likely create a geopolitical vacuum and threaten Chinese interests. Beijing’s continued backing of the regime is not due to a lack of awareness of the junta’s brutal oppression, or the widespread public resistance to it.
China accounts for the largest number of foreign spies in Myanmar. It maintains a vast intelligence network in the country, including trained operatives fluent in Burmese with advanced surveillance capabilities. In short, China is well aware of the junta’s brutality and the suffering of the Myanmar people.
As a rising global power, China views Myanmar not through the lens of humanitarian concern, but through its own geopolitical, economic and military interests. Myanmar’s military regime, shunned by the West and entirely dependent on Beijing, makes for a cheap and obedient client. China sees it as the best available proxy to protect its own strategic and economic interests in the region, regardless of the cost to the people of Myanmar.
While China’s involvement was more discreet in the early stages, it became overt after Operation 1027 seriously challenged the junta’s grip on power. In August 2024, following the junta’s loss of Lashio and its Northeastern Command, China sent its Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Naypyitaw to publicly express its support, before providing financial aid and hosting the diplomatically shunned junta boss at the Greater Mekong Subregion Summit in Kunming.
The military coup triggered several years of economic crisis marked by high inflation, but the junta has regained a semblance of economic stability since August 2024—thanks entirely to Beijing.
On the military front, China has helped the regime by taking the MNDAA leader captive, closing border crossings and restricting the flow of essential goods into rebel-held territories. These measures finally forced the MNDAA to return Lashio to the regime, and halt its offensives in northern Shan State.
China’s influence also extends to the Thai border in Karen State’s Myawaddy, an area under the de facto control of the regime-aligned Karen State Border Guard Force (BGF). Previously, China vowed to eliminate cyber scam operations there, which were backed by BGF leader Saw Chit Thu and targeted Chinese citizens. However, fearing that targeting Saw Chit Thu could provoke a rebellion against the regime in Karen State, China has softened its stance, opting instead not to punish him.
Envoy Deng has also explicitly warned ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) along the Chinese border against forming alliances with the shadow National Unity Government and its People’s Defense Force.
Under the banner of promoting ceasefires and stability, China has been pressuring EAOs on the border to halt offensives against the regime. However, it has remained conspicuously silent on the junta’s brutal campaign of violence—massacring civilians, bombing schools and hospitals, and targeting non-military sites with artillery and airstrikes. Not once has the Chinese government or its special envoy publicly condemned these atrocities, let alone intervened to stop them.
China’s unwavering support for the junta is not only shielding it from accountability, but also emboldening it to continue its campaign of terror. Beijing’s assistance has, in many ways, been a lifeline for the regime.
Economically, while the junta has failed to revive the economy, Chinese financial support has helped ease Myanmar’s post-coup inflation, alleviating one of its most pressing crises. Militarily, the regime has regained ground in northern Shan and slowed the conflict intensity in Rakhine State. Chinese drones and surveillance technology have also reportedly bolstered junta operations.
Politically, Beijing’s interference has weakened the opposition’s momentum. The reoccupation of Lashio, facilitated through Chinese pressure on the MNDAA, has raised concerns that more towns may be handed back to junta control, further complicating resistance coordination.
Meanwhile, the junta has bolstered its ranks thanks to its Conscription Law adopted in February last year. By early June 2025, it had trained and deployed 55,000 new soldiers, and it no longer needs to reinforce its positions in northern Shan State.
Some in China’s political circles seem to believe that with the backing of a powerful nation like China, the junta will ultimately prevail. But this view misjudges Myanmar’s political realities. Propping up a widely hated regime does not create stability—it deepens resistance.
China’s current strategy appears to be a two-step plan: first, pacify the EAOs with ceasefires and minor concessions; then, isolate and eliminate the NUG and PDFs. But this approach ignores a fundamental truth: Myanmar’s EAOs do not trust the military. Decades of broken promises and betrayal have left EAOs deeply skeptical of any deal brokered with or by the junta.
Further complicating any ceasefire deal is the issue of territorial control. EAOs now control not only remote border regions, as in the 1989-90 period, but also major towns and key strategic areas. They are unlikely to surrender hard-won territory back to the regime, especially after sacrificing so many lives and limbs.
Equally critical is the interdependence between the EAOs and the Spring Revolution forces. Despite China’s attempt to divide them, EAOs understand that their own victories are intertwined with those of the NUG and PDFs. Without the Spring forces, they cannot secure or sustain their gains. As AA Commander-in-Chief Major General Tun Myat Naing stated in an interview with The Irrawaddy on August 31, 2024:
“In Myanmar, most organizations operate from an ethnic standpoint. But if we only focus on our own group, we’ll never get anywhere. Seventy years of civil war have shown that ethnic-based thinking alone doesn’t work.”
If Myanmar’s ongoing political crisis were a game, every serious player—both domestic and international—would recognize one simple truth: the Spring Revolution forces are the key players. Should these forces be weakened or excluded, the junta will certainly shift its focus to EAOs—a shift that could unravel an already fragile balance of power.
The regime plans to hold elections and install a façade of civilian government to initiate “peace talks”. China appears prepared to back this roadmap, pressuring northern EAOs to participate in talks. However, as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has urged the junta to prioritize bringing an end to the fighting before holding an election, this could be a diplomatic bind for China, which has expressed its support for the regional bloc’s five-point consensus regarding the Myanmar issue.
Myanmar’s military, which has been in power almost uninterrupted since 1962, has reduced the once promising country to one of the poorest nations in the world. Today, the junta is not only brutally killing civilians, but also militarily incoherent, incapable of defeating either the well-established EAOs or the decentralized Spring Revolution forces.
The junta failed to suppress the Spring forces even while they were poorly armed and inexperienced, and even before the Brotherhood Alliance launched Operation 1027. Any notion that the junta is on the cusp of victory now is little more than fantasy.
History is replete with warnings for those who back unpopular regimes in foreign conflicts. Previous examples included the US in Vietnam and Russia in Syria. Both ended in failures. China’s current trajectory in Myanmar risks repeating these mistakes. Its support may not stabilize the country but instead entrench the conflict and exacerbate the suffering of Myanmar people.
China is propping up the regime only because it underestimates the resolve of the Myanmar people and overestimates its superpower status. Its support for the regime is nothing more than flogging a dead horse, and China will soon realize that its action will backfire.
Thet Htar Maung is a Myanmar political analyst.
