As the Myanmar junta’s brutal war against its own people rages on—and as the country reels from the devastating earthquake that has deepened its humanitarian crisis—recent moves by regional actors, particularly the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Myanmar’s neighbors, have made one thing disturbingly clear: the people of Myanmar are once again being abandoned in favor of a failed strategy of appeasement.
This week, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim of Malaysia—the current ASEAN chair—is set to meet junta chief Min Aung Hlaing in Bangkok. Officially, the meeting is to discuss humanitarian aid and the safety of Malaysian aid workers following the earthquake, as well as a so-called “ceasefire” that has never existed—merely a manipulative fabrication by the junta leader. But this is not a humanitarian-driven move. It is the latest sign of a deeper, more troubling pivot.
A dangerous consensus: propping up the junta
Long before the earthquake, Myanmar’s key neighbors—China, Thailand and India—and ASEAN, chaired this year by Malaysia, had already begun shifting toward gradual but active engagement with the junta. Anwar brought former Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and Cambodian strongman Hun Sen onboard as advisors, both known for their friendly ties with the junta leadership. These choices reflect a calculated attempt not to resolve Myanmar’s crisis, but to manage it—by preserving military dominance through backroom deals and regional diplomacy.
These efforts are not isolated. A new tacit consensus has emerged among Myanmar’s neighbors and regional actors: to prop up the collapsing State Administration Council (SAC), as the junta is known. Their approach is threefold—diplomatic engagement to bring Min Aung Hlaing “out of the cold”, limited economic assistance to prevent regime collapse, and pressure on revolutionary forces to stall offensives and accept a non-existent “ceasefire”. At the center of this is a push for sham elections: a hollow PR exercise that would take place on limited territory with minimal participation, designed to create a façade of legitimacy and pressure the revolutionary movement into a soft surrender that allows continued military control over Myanmar’s state and economy.
The motivations are clear. These regional powers prefer the “devil they know”—a centralized authoritarian regime—over a democratic uprising they cannot predict or influence. Deeply entrenched interests are also at play: decades of military collusion, economic deals and elite networks binding these governments to Myanmar’s generals and oligarchs.
This is not diplomacy—it is complicity.
Humanitarian excuses, strategic cover
The alliance of democratic and federalist forces, who enjoy overwhelming and enduring support from the people, and who have made slow but steady gains despite immense challenges, are being undermined. The earthquake has given regional actors a convenient excuse—a new “humanitarian narrative”—to re-engage with a regime responsible for widespread atrocities. For Min Aung Hlaing, this is a lifeline. Suddenly, he is treated as internationally acceptable. Resources begin flowing again, and the junta manipulates them to its advantage.
At the same time, the junta desperately needs a pause in the revolution’s momentum. It needs time to regroup, resupply, and forcibly recruit new soldiers. So, Min Aung Hlaing is playing along with the new regional narrative of a “humanitarian imperative”. He feigns openness, speaks of de-escalation, and presents every meeting as a diplomatic win. Meanwhile, he continues to obstruct aid, terrorize civilians and wage an unwinnable war. Every handshake, every photo-op and every summit reinforces his delusion that he is a legitimate leader on the world stage.
No one is coming—but the people will prevail
Anwar may believe that engagement will moderate the junta. But he will be just another in a long line of leaders who believed appeasement could tame Myanmar’s military cartel. He will fail—not because of his intentions, but because the junta has no interest in peace or the people. Min Aung Hlaing and his gang in uniform are concerned only with their own survival and continued dominance. When Min Aung Hlaing staged the failed coup, he envisioned himself as Myanmar’s future president-king. That ambition remains. As he once said before the coup: “There is nothing I would not dare to do.”
Let’s be clear: Myanmar’s neighbors and ASEAN are not interested in supporting the people’s democratic and federalist uprising. Nor are they moved by the suffering of Myanmar’s civilians. Their strategy is to restore “order” through elite-driven negotiations that leave the military intact. The so-called “negotiated settlement” they promote is, in reality, a soft surrender—a demand that revolutionaries accept permanent military control over the state, economy and political life.
But the people of Myanmar will not surrender. They have resisted too long, fought too bravely, and sacrificed too much to return to military rule. ASEAN’s pivot—from passive observation to quiet collaboration—makes the revolution harder, but not hopeless. The resistance will continue, and it will prevail—because it is rooted in legitimacy, not fear and force.
In truth, regional actors are not helping the junta to win—they are simply helping it to not lose. In the early days of the coup, they watched silently, hoping the military would swiftly suppress the Spring Revolution. Now, as the junta falters, they intervene—ineffectively, inconsistently and without principle.
The lesson for Myanmar’s revolutionaries is simple: expect no meaningful support from the region or the wider international community. Some humanitarian aid may trickle in, but much of it will be diverted or misused by the junta. Liberation must come from within. The revolution will not be backed from the outside.
However, when it becomes clear that the revolution is going to win, the region will adjust—not out of solidarity, but out of self-interest. They will recognize a new transitional authority because they must—not because they care.
Until then, the people of Myanmar largely stand alone.
But they stand, nonetheless.
Igor Blazevic is a senior adviser at the Prague Civil Society Centre. Between 2011 and 2016, he worked in Myanmar as the head lecturer of the Educational Initiatives Program.
