Many regional governments and analysts cling to the view that the Myanmar military is “too big to fail”. It’s a view that China clearly endorses, as evidenced by Beijing’s latest efforts to preserve the regime.
China’s top diplomat Wang Yi visited Myanmar in mid-August for a cuddle (and a few stern words) with regime leader and war criminal Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. In addition to its main geostrategic priority in Myanmar—preserving access to the Indian Ocean—Beijing has huge economic and strategic interests in the north of the country, where civil war is currently raging and more and more Chinese projects are falling under the control of resistance forces.
Weeks before Wang’s trip, the regime leader implicitly alleged that China was behind the anti-regime offensive in northern Shan State, prompting junta loyalists to begin voicing anti-Chinese sentiments.
During the visit, Wang repeatedly asked Myanmar leaders to safeguard Chinese personnel and projects in Myanmar, maintain peace and stability along the China-Myanmar border, step up joint efforts to crack down on cross-border crime, and create a safe environment for bilateral exchanges and cooperation.
In return, Min Aung Hlaing begged China to help stop the offensive and promised to protect Chinese projects and their employees in Myanmar.
Min Aung Hlaing wanted recognition and support from Beijing and he thought he would get it. Unconfirmed reports from the Chinese side indicate that Beijing might invite Min Aung Hlaing to China before the Chinese New Year.
The embattled regime is desperate. Min Aung Hlaing wants to show Myanmar citizens and dispirited military officers and soldiers that he has China’s backing.
On the front page of the Aug. 22 issue of the junta-controlled, state-owned Global New Light of Myanmar’s English edition, a headline reads, “Myanmar, China to boost defense collaboration”, and the story is accompanied by a photo of newly appointed Chinese Ambassador Ma Jia presenting her credentials to Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw. A paragraph in the story reads, “They exchanged views on the promotion of cooperation in the defense sector and the situations for collaboration in security measures, forging peace and stability in border regions, and reopening of border trade routes.”
In the Burmese-language New Light of Myanmar’s version of the story, however, the headline makes no mention of bilateral defense collaboration, confining itself to the issue of the ambassador presenting her credentials.
There is no doubt that Myanmar’s generals are desperate to get China’s backing to stop the ongoing offensive in northern Shan State and Kachin State. It is a bitter situation for them. In their DNA, the Myanmar military are historically suspicious of China. And the Chinese are all too aware that the junta holds a grudge toward its giant neighbor. Chinese analysts and officials acknowledge that the generals resent what they see as Beijing’s decades-long support of northern insurgents.
For all of that history, however, there are ominous signs that, for the time being, China has decided to back Min Aung Hlaing. Now, Wang and his team are putting pressure on ethnic forces along the border.
And this week—less than two weeks after Wang visited Myanmar—China’s People’s Liberation Army’s Southern Theater Command said it would conduct both land and air exercises in the southwestern province of Yunnan from Tuesday to Thursday to test the “joint strike capabilities of theater troops and maintain security and stability in the border areas.” China conducted two similar drills in April.
While Western analysts have interpreted the live fire drills in various ways, Chinese sources stress that previous exercises along the border did not stop military operations inside Myanmar and that “Myanmar military and ethnic armed organizations launched their operations according to their own plans,” according to one.
At the same time, China is continuing to exert pressure on the ethnic armed forces.
According to both Chinese intelligence and ethnic armed organization sources, Chinese Special Envoy on Myanmar Deng Xijung will hold a series of meetings on the China-Myanmar border from Tuesday through Thursday with several ethnic forces. He is expected to tell them to stop the offensive and to enter a dialogue with the regime. The Chinese have also pressured Wa leaders to stop supplying arms, fuel and rice to its allies including the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army.
Likewise, China is also putting pressure on Kachin forces, who have captured a number of major military outposts and townships in Kachin State, the sources said.
When Wang met Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw on Aug. 14, he said: “China opposes chaos and conflict in Myanmar, interference in Myanmar’s internal affairs by outside forces, and any words and deeds that attempt to drive a wedge between China and Myanmar and smear China,” the Chinese Foreign Ministry said.
Wang also said China supports Myanmar’s efforts towards an early political reconciliation within the constitutional framework and is willing to work with Myanmar to deepen bilateral mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields. He did not provide details, however.
When he met former dictator Than Shwe while making a “courtesy call” during the same visit to Naypyitaw, Wang said China firmly opposes external interference and infiltration in Myanmar. He promised China’s continued support in safeguarding Myanmar’s independence, sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity, and reaffirmed China’s support for the junta’s efforts to hold a general election and restart a democratic transition, according to Chinese state-owned Xinhua.
Elated with this fresh Chinese backing, the regime is proceeding with plans to recruit men older than 35 as militia members across the country.
In February, the regime introduced mandatory military service of two years for men aged 18-35 and women aged 18-27. Except for people with certain kinds of technical expertise like doctors and engineers, men older than 35 were exempt from the national conscription law.
However, having suffered consecutive military defeats in ethnic states, the regime has decided to force older men to help defend it. The regime expects the war to expand, and so do the opposition forces.
Wang’s high-level diplomatic engagement with the pariah Myanmar military regime and endorsement of the illegitimate leadership and junta war criminals will not go down well in the two countries’ shared history.
He is of course fully aware that the current chaos and conflict in Myanmar all stem from the coup in 2021. He should be similarly aware that backing Min Aung Hlaing will not end the war and bloodshed in Myanmar—nor will it protect Chinese interests.
