The International Criminal Court (ICC) may issue an arrest warrant for Myanmar junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in the near future, but the war criminal will never find himself in the dock. Nonetheless, when the news was announced that the ICC was mulling an arrest warrant over his role in the violent 2017 military operations against Rohingya Muslims, many Myanmar people were excited. Anything that’s bad for Min Aung Hlaing is good news to them. It’s one of the few pleasures they have left.
They no doubt want to see him doing time in a dog cage—or hanged.
In the old days, during previous regimes, when Myanmar people heard via shortwave radio that the US or the UN had condemned the generals for heinous crimes or demanded the release of political prisoners, they welcomed such news. But they were not naive or stupid. They knew condemnation wouldn’t bring justice or real change on the ground, but they were happy anyway. The message was clear: “We know you are criminals!”
So who is not happy about the latest development?
China, Myanmar’s big brother, is not happy, and warned that the ICC has no right to arrest Min Aung Hlaing.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning saved the day for Min Aung Hlaing!
In Beijing, she told AFP during a press conference last week that the Rohingya issue is “complex” and the ICC should “uphold an objective and impartial stance, strictly follow the principles of complementarity and cooperation, [and] exercise its functions and powers prudently in accordance with the law.”
“Under the [Rome] Statute, the court has no jurisdiction over acts committed by nationals of non-state parties on the territory of a non-state party unless referred to it by the UN Security Council,” she added. Myanmar is not a signatory to the statute.
The junta rebuffed the ICC prosecutor’s call for an arrest warrant, saying Myanmar had “never recognized” the court.
“As Myanmar is not a member state of the ICC, the statements of the ICC have never been recognized,” the junta’s information team said.
Well, noted.
Barely three weeks after Min Aung Hlaing’s first visit to China as junta leader, the ICC reminded the world that he could face a possible ICC arrest warrant, as he is a war criminal.
But China doesn’t seem to care about that—it’s more interested in the resumption and safety of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)-related projects, including the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), in its southern neighbor.
The CMEC comprises economic zones and highways, railways and pipelines connecting China’s Kunming in Yunnan province to the deep-sea Kyaukphyu Port in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, a key project for Beijing.
In 2023 China and the regime signed a supplementary agreement for the port, as both sides sought to get the stalled BRI project off the ground. As the military conflict has widened in Rakhine, China has grown seriously concerned for the project, which it insists is for “commercial purposes”. The US, India and Japan have in the past quietly expressed concern over this particular project.
Since the pro-democracy opposition declared a “people’s defensive war” in 2021 after the coup, Chinese projects in Myanmar have come under increasing threat as Beijing has failed to condemn the takeover and expressed solidarity with the regime on the world stage.
Beijing knows that the regime is weak and unable to protect Chinese projects in Myanmar, in spite of promises that Min Aung Hlaing made “to safeguard Chinese investments and implement Belt and Road-related projects” during his meeting with Chinese Premier Li Qiang in China in November.
That’s why, ahead of Min Aung Hlaing’s visit, Beijing proposed the formation of a joint security company to protect Chinese investments and personnel in Myanmar.
On Oct. 22, 2024, the junta formed a working committee to draft a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for the initiative, reflecting China’s growing concerns over the security of its projects, particularly those under the CMEC. The corridor is vital to Beijing, providing direct access to the Indian Ocean, but currently many CMEC projects pass through some of Myanmar’s most volatile conflict zones.
Indeed, the announcement of a joint security company has sparked controversy in Myanmar, with critics saying it would violate the country’s sovereignty and even the military-friendly 2008 constitution, which prohibits the deployment of foreign troops on Myanmar soil.
Can the regime allow foreign forces to operate in Myanmar? It has decided, in a move designed to show it is respecting the constitution, that it can allow Chinese “private security companies” to operate in the country.
Beijing is pushing Pakistan, in the wake of the rising number of terror attacks on Chinese nationals there, to allow its own security staff to provide protection to thousands of Chinese citizens working in the South Asian nation. However, no major attacks on Chinese projects in Myanmar have taken place so far.
In the past, North Korean technicians have been stationed in Myanmar to build an extensive tunnel network as an emergency shelter and to transfer missile technology.
In recent years, Russian military advisors and flight instructors have been stationed around Naypyitaw and Mandalay. China and Russia are the top arms suppliers to Myanmar. Therefore, having foreign military advisors and technicians is not anything strange for Myanmar.
As China steps up and becomes more assertive over Myanmar, it is a critical moment for the West, which must become more active in shaping conditions and countering China.
Analysts and observers familiar with the pro-democracy movement argue that the US and other Western countries should do more to engage and proactively support the Myanmar opposition; activate the US’ Burma Act (signed into law by President Biden in 2023 but of which there has been no implementation so far); and appoint a senior US government official to coordinate policy and lead initiatives on Myanmar.
Such a US official could engage with neighbors of Myanmar including Thailand, Bangladesh and India. They must look beyond the Min Aung Hlaing-led regime and to a future Myanmar in which its citizens’ welfare and prosperity are the top priorities. The key point is that China can’t be given a free hand to operate alone in Myanmar, imposing its will amid the country’s turmoil and civil war, and with its own version of Russia’s notorious Wagner Group operating in the country.
