China invited two high-profile figures from Myanmar to visit recently, with former President Thein Sein flying to Beijing on June 27 and General Soe Win, deputy chief of the current junta, following him a week later, visiting Qingdao.
Since Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi received Thein Sein, speculation has been rife and rumors have swirled about the purpose and larger significance of the visits.
The week of Thein Sein’s visit saw a renewal of fighting between ethnic armies and junta forces in northern Shan State after a Chinese-brokered truce collapsed, while in Rakhine State, where China has built a deep seaport and a terminal for its oil-and-gas pipeline project, the Arakan Army continues to gain territory and push the Myanmar military back.
The official reason for Thein Sein’s visit was to attend an event in Beijing commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Declaration of Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence—a set of principles laid out by China in the early days of communist rule governing the country’s foreign relations. It was his first foreign trip since the military seized power over three years ago, plunging the country into turmoil.
Even before Thein Sein arrived back to Naypyitaw the rumors were flying thick and fast, and they have yet to stop. One has it that China seeks to nudge the junta into forming a transitional government including some ministers from the 2011-16 quasi-civilian government led by Thein Sein. According to another, China asked Thein Sein to persuade coup leader Min Aung Hlaing to step down.
Here is my take.
First, China believes Min Aung Hlaing is incompetent and incapable of holding the country together, and has lost patience with him. But Min Aung Hlaing will not leave his post voluntarily and cannot be persuaded to do so.
Second, China is working on Thein Sein, possibly sounding out his opinions and the possibility of his re-entering politics at some point in the future. But is this realistic? Thein Sein is infirm and frail. He would need political backing to fix things in Myanmar. Could he persuade Min Aung Hlaing to step down? No.
Some have floated a scenario in which Thein Sein would guide a transition to civilian rule after an election in 2025—assuming one can be held. One question that arises from this approach is whether—assuming Aung San Suu Kyi is released—Thein Sein would be able to work with her as a “political guiding force” to restore calm to the nation. Or is that sheer fantasy?
Third, analysts say that China doesn’t want to see the junta extend its emergency rule yet another time. And China is not alone in this. Myanmar’s other neighbors also want to see an end to this process of repeated extensions of junta rule.
One thing that must be understood is that Min Aung Hlaing will not leave national politics unless he is forced to do so.
At the meeting between Wang Yi and Thein Sein, China no doubt repeated its commitment to the two countries’ “paukphaw”, or sibling, ties (seemingly its favorite phrase when discussing ties with Myanmar) and expressed a desire to see stability restored in its southern neighbor. For his part, it seems a safe bet that Myanmar’s former president delivered a plea from the regime that China intervene with the ethnic armies to halt the war in the north—underscoring China’s influence and the outsize role it plays in the Myanmar conflict.
Over the last two weeks unverified reports have emerged that China has asked the junta to hold talks with several key players including detained State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi and powerful ethnic armed leaders.
The regime leader reportedly rejected the proposal, insisting that Suu Kyi is a criminal and thus he can’t talk to her. Regarding the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), Min Aung Hlaing reportedly said that they have been officially invited to join talks under the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement guidelines.
Upon hearing this reply, not only China but also Myanmar’s neighbors were not pleased.
Soe Win’s surprise trip
China’s invitation to Gen. Soe Win surprised many. While the hardliner second-in-command’s alleged orders to bomb innocent civilians make him responsible for the deaths of many innocent people since the coup, he has no political ambitions.
Min Aung Hlaing (Defense Services Academy Intake 19) and Soe Win (DSA Intake 22) are known to be at loggerheads, but Soe Win does not dare challenge his boss’s leadership.
Some analysts have even speculated that China wants to see Min Aung Hlaing removed. Does it follow that it wants to see Soe Win replace him? For the time being, Min Aung Hlaing isn’t going anywhere. Min Aung Hlaing and Soe Win are both war criminals. Whichever of them leads the nation, they are doomed to failure.
On his first official visit to China since the 2021 coup, Soe Win did not go to Beijing, rather he traveled to Qingdao to attend the Green Development Forum organized by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
There, he discussed border stability, security for Chinese investments in Myanmar, elimination of online scam operations, promotion of trade and the proposed election, junta media said.
Soe Win met Shen Yueyue, vice chairwoman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and president of the SCO’s Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation Commission.
Needless to say there was no mention of China’s pending massive arms shipment to the junta during the meeting with Shen.
Wa: Wild card in the war in the north
Only a few days after Soe Win came back from China, the powerful United Wa State Army (UWSA) deployed troops to Tangyan town in northern Shan State—a strong indication of the Wa’s goal of expanding its territory.
Wa spokesman Nyi Rang said the UWSA negotiated with the regime to allow it to deploy troops in Tangyan after residents called for protection from fighting between the junta and the Brotherhood Alliance of three ethnic armies. Negotiated with Myanmar’s regime? This is interesting.
Nyi Rang said: “It is a preventive measure to stop the conflict in northern Shan State from spreading to Tangyan. We maintain our neutrality and reject conflict. We want peace and stability in Tangyan and believe our deployment will be constructive in every aspect.”
So the regime gave the greenlight to the Wa to enter Tangyan?
This move coincided with Soe Win’s visit to China. It is likely that Chinese officials and Soe Win discussed the situation in northern Shan State, including the position of the Wa. Chinese officials have reportedly asked the Myanmar military to elevate the political status of the Wa in order to ease the armed conflict in the north.
Indeed, the Wa, backed by China, are kingmakers in the conflict in the north and suspected of backing (as well as providing arms to) the Brotherhood Alliance, which comprises the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Arakan Army (AA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). The alliance is now seriously threatening Lashio, where the regime’s Northeastern Command is based.
Granting a new political status to the Wa could be a way for the regime to ease the ethnic offensive in the north, where its troops continue to suffer losses.
Expansion of territory
In January 2024, a few days after the ceasefire agreement brokered by China was reached between the three northern ethnic armies and the regime, the junta agreed to the Wa’s demand for administrative control of Hopang and Panlong towns in northern Shan State.
The transfer of the two towns to Myanmar’s most powerful ethnic army expands the Wa Self-Administered Region east of the Salween River.
The United Wa State Army (UWSA) and United Wa State Party were established after ethnic Wa soldiers split from the Communist Party of Burma on April 17, 1989 and signed a ceasefire with the then military regime.
What the Wa call “northern Wa State” is officially classified in the 2008 military-drafted constitution as the Wa Self-Administered Region, also known as Special Region 2. This region’s capital is Panghsan, also known as Pangkham, and it is made up of Mongmao, Monglin and Mongpauk districts and Pangkham Special Township, an area covering around 1,500 square kilometers.
Today the UWSA is the most powerful EAO in Myanmar. It has maintained a ceasefire with successive governments, but refused to sign the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement.
Wa leaders have also said that Wa State will not secede from the Union, but the UWSA will manage its state independently except for national defense and diplomatic relations.
With the previous military regime’s approval, the UWSA also expanded its territory to include Monghsat District on the border with Thailand in southern Shan State, and around 80,000 to 100,000 ethnic Wa resettled there. Now the district is referred to as “southern Wa State”, also known to the UWSA as Military Region 171, and some 9,000 UWSA fighters are stationed there. Clearly, the Wa want their territory in southern Shan State to be combined with the northern areas and recognized officially as Wa State.
And the winner is …?
Last week, Min Aung Hlaing surprised everyone, declaring Chinese New Year a national holiday amid the renewed fighting near the border with China.
This is the first time in Myanmar’s history that a foreign festival has been officially recognized as a public holiday. Until now, apart from internationally recognized days like New Year’s Day, only national anniversaries, religious holidays such as Christmas and Eid, and some commemorations associated with the major national ethnicities such as traditional Karen New Year’s Day, have been observed.
The junta’s official explanation was that Chinese New Year is a public holiday in Myanmar’s neighbors in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and in many other countries around the world. In truth, there is no ASEAN-wide tradition of observing Chinese New Year. While Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia do officially mark it, Thailand, Cambodia, the Philippines, Laos and Brunei do not, and Vietnam has its own Tet Lunar New Year holiday.
At any rate, the primary reason—as spelled out in a regime statement—for the move is that “Myanmar wants to deepen the Pauk-Phaw relations with China,” according to the regime statement.
It has been reported that China’s outgoing ambassador, Chen Hai, proposed the official recognition of the day to junta boss Min Aung Hlaing during the embassy’s Lunar New Year celebrations in February.
Observers commented that the move reflects a level of dependence on Beijing unprecedented in the 76 years since Myanmar gained independence. The decision is certainly controversial and has caused unease among Myanmar citizens including military personnel.
No wonder Myanmar people often now jokingly refer to their country as the “Chinese Republic of the Union of Myanmar”!
China’s “provinces” or “protectorates” in northern Myanmar will no doubt be celebrating Chinese New Year. For instance, the MNDAA on Sunday officially announced that it would stop fighting for four days (from July 14 to 12 a.m. on July 18), saying in a statement that “at the time of the Third Plenary Session of the Communist Party of China, all combat troops were required to stop active offensive” operations.
Now, with the northern ethnic forces closely connected to China gaining more territory and overtaking military outposts and pushing through to the interior of the country, the regime’s dependence on China will only deepen.
China’s geostrategic and economic interest are enormous in Myanmar, including oil-and-gas pipelines, railroads, deep-water seaports on the Bay of Bengal, border trade and access to the Indian Ocean.
In Myanmar’s quagmire there are many losers, but it’s obvious who the winner is—and it’s unquestionably not the Myanmar people.
Is it too early to wish my countrymen a Happy Chinese New Year?
