“Will the junta collapse this year?” It’s a big question, one that Myanmar people have asked each other at the start of every year since the coup in 2021. The people of Myanmar continue to dream of a day when they will be rid of the military dictatorship. To date, reality has fallen short of their hopes. Could things be different in 2025?
Who knows? The junta’s imminent collapse is such a seductive idea, it’s hard not to join the chorus of predictions, isn’t it? Some of the more precise forecasts of its demise have proven overly optimistic, even illusory—but that doesn’t mean it won’t happen.
But there are some other, persistent illusions about Myanmar that are more damaging: These are not merely nonsensical, they are poison for the military-bedeviled country. They could even worsen the situation. No one—from individuals to governments around the world—should deceive themselves or others about these notions. We need to get rid of such illusions; we need to know what is realistic and what is fantasy. Here, let’s examine some of these poisonous illusions plaguing Myanmar and its people.
‘Elections equal democracy’
Here’s the first illusion; it’s a big one: Elections guarantee democracy. The junta is planning an election to be joined by selected parties, and the plan has received the backing of a number of countries including China, India and Thailand.
The truth is, elections suck. (This is even the case for established democracies like the United States.) For Myanmar people, elections have sucked for more than half a century. It’s painful.
Myanmar people began experiencing this as far back as 1960 (the results of that year’s poll were nullified by a military coup two years later) and the trend continued with the latest one in 2020 (exactly 60 year later). Myanmar people take naturally to the democratic process. They like elections, want them and participate in them because they have always longed for a civilian government “of the people, by the people and for the people”. So, they are generally democratic and responsible citizens. But under one condition, which is universally accepted: elections must be free and fair.
Back in 1990, Myanmar people actively participated in free and fair elections, but the then military regime refused to honor the results after victory went to the generals’ arch enemy, the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Again, in 2020, millions of politically aware voters went to polling stations, at great personal risk as the deadly COVID-19 epidemic raged. This time the NLD’s victory was annulled by a new generation of generals led by junta chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. The thwarting of the two elections, both of which were free and fair, are painful memories for the Myanmar people. Their votes were brazenly stolen by the military, and the experience has left them with the feeling that “elections suck”.
Out of five general elections over the past 60 years—held in 1960, 1990, 2010, 2015 and 2020—only one, in 2015, delivered a credible victory that was allowed to stand. The other four elections sucked.
Notably, the only other election in which the result was honored was the 2010 vote—because victory went to the generals’ party. Before the election, the Myanmar people signaled their determination to boycott it, as the main popular political parties like the NLD and the SNLD (the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy) decided not to contest it after their leaders were detained. Obviously, the election could not be inclusive, free or fair under such circumstances.
They were right: as expected, it turned out to be an ugly election rigged by the generals. But unlike the free and fair elections in 1990 and 2020, its result was honored, with the military-backed party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), declared the winner. (The rigged result made ex-general Thein Sein president.)
This history has determined the attitude of the Myanmar people towards elections—vote or boycott, depending on whether or not it is likely to be free, fair and inclusive.
Knowing this background gives you a pretty clear idea of how Myanmar people will react to the upcoming elections planned (though no date has been confirmed) for this year by the current junta despite Min Aung Hlaing’s claims that he will transfer power back to a newly elected government. Some countries have also unwisely backed the junta’s poll as a way to restore democracy in Myanmar.
Most Myanmar people would see an election organized by junta chief Min Aung Hlaing, who openly stole their votes in 2020, as a travesty. They have no doubt that the military leader will ensure that the party he backs—once again, the USDP—is the victor, providing him with a path to become president “constitutionally”. Don’t fool yourself—if you know the mentality of the Myanmar generals, you know that the aim of Min Aung Hlaing’s election is not to end his rule but to extend it.
With that political awareness and the lessons learned from their past experiences, most Myanmar people will definitely boycott it. This time, opposition to the election may go beyond a boycott. Anti-regime groups in cities, resistance forces including People’s Defense Forces (PDF) groups, and ethnic armed organizations are likely to disrupt it. As a result, the election planned by the junta won’t be a solution to the ongoing conflict across the country, but is highly likely to escalate it. Far from leading to the return of political stability, it will achieve the opposite.
‘Dialogue is possible with the junta’
Another illusion is the possibility of genuine dialogue with the junta. This will never happen under the current regime, which has no compunction about cracking down lethally against any and all opponents, including civilians. In a civilized political environment, dialogue is essential for resolving political problems. But let’s not kid ourselves that this is possible under such a brutal and criminal regime.
This particular illusion has proven particularly powerful over the past three decades. The international community, including the United Nations, called for dialogue after the previous military regime refused to hand over power to the winning party after the 1990 elections. The mantra of “tripartite dialogue” between the then regime, the NLD (the winner of the election) and ethnic groups was repeated loudly and often throughout the previous regime’s two-decade reign in the 1990s and 2000s.
It never happened—notwithstanding the regime’s periodic release of photos of meetings between top generals and detained opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, a charade performed just often enough to create the false impression for the international community that a “dialogue” was under way. In fact, the meetings were nothing more than photo-ops to placate world opinion. No genuine political dialogue between the military and its opponents ever existed.
The record is clear: Successive generations of military leaders have displayed zero political will to engage in dialogue with their opponents. All of them have remained resolutely deaf to repeated calls for dialogue from the UN and the international community across those decades.
And that remains the mentality of the generals toward the concept of dialogue.
To Myanmar people today, it is no exaggeration to say that junta chief Min Aung Hlaing is their Hitler. He has proved it over the four years since his coup by killing thousands of people, sending his jet fighters to bomb civilian villages, hospitals and schools, and imprisoning tens of thousands who are against his coup, among other crimes. Given the atrocities committed by his regime, many Myanmar people see him as the moral equivalent of the Nazi leader. The way they see it, just as Hitler tried to wipe out the Jews, Min Aung Hlaing’s political ideology calls for the complete annihilation of all opponents. He is seen as a purely evil man instinctively opposed to peace and dialogue; and the same goes for his regime. Under his reign, the concept of dialogue is just another illusion.
Besides which, how could anyone accept the idea of dialogue with him? He is a war criminal.
But the democracies, both in the West and East, including the US, UK and South Korea, repeatedly call for, in a typical formulation, “genuine, constructive, and inclusive dialogue to find a peaceful solution to the situation in Myanmar and a return to the path of inclusive democracy.” This well-worn tone and language has been used repeatedly over many decades by the international community when addressing the situation in Myanmar. But such diplomatic appeals have never worked whenever Myanmar is ruled by generals. The idea that they might is mere illusion.
Min Aung Hlaing has always said he’s open to peace talks even as he cracks down on his opponents, including ethnic armed groups and the new PDFs. He’s never seen them even as “opponents”—they are simply enemies.
One only has to look at his actions to see he is not a man of dialogue. Nothing in his past indicates any desire for a truce with his enemies. So we shouldn’t delude ourselves by thinking there is any chance for peace or dialogue under his regime.
‘The junta will free Daw Aung San Suu Kyi eventually’
Here is another sad reality. On June 19 this year, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi will turn 80, marking her fifth birthday in detention since the 2021 coup. She must be the oldest political prisoner not only in Myanmar but across the world. Sadly, however, this now very elderly woman is unlikely to find herself walking out of her cell any time soon.
The most recent election showed the extent of her popularity among the Myanmar people. Moreover, it’s fair to say she’s been the country’s most popular leader for nearly four decades, since 1988 when she entered politics as a novice human rights defender at the age of 43. She would become a frequent political prisoner, serving terms under house arrest and sometimes in prison before she became a first-time parliamentarian in 2012 and later the country’s de facto leader as State Counselor in 2016, when her NLD party, after posting a landslide electoral victory, formed the country’s first civilian government in decades. Her unassailable popularity was one of the reasons she was detained again and again by consecutive regimes.
In the wee hours of Feb. 1, 2021, she became one of the first prisoners of the current regime as military troops started raiding the residences of top government officials, including the presidential residence, in Naypyitaw. Nobody really knows where she is currently detained, as the regime refuses to disclose her whereabouts in Naypyitaw.
She is now enduring her 19th year in detention, served periodically over the 37 years since she entered politics during the 1988 pro-democracy uprising. Nobody knows how much longer she will be a prisoner of the generals. But as long as the Min Aung Hlaing regime is in power, she is likely to remain one of the tens of thousands of political prisoners it has incarcerated.
Min Aung Hlaing’s grudge against her goes beyond politics—it is also personal. Reportedly, a few days before the coup, she rebuffed his demand to be made president. Politically she is his nemesis. According to her aide U Win Htein, she delivered a political message to the people just before her arrest that they must disobey the coup, sparking the powerful civil disobedience movement, or CDM, that spread across the country right after the military takeover. In addition, the fact that his former bosses including Thein Sein, and military-backed parties such as the National Unity Party and the USDP, were never able to defeat her in free, fair and inclusive elections, is undoubtedly a factor in Min Aung Hlaing’s decision to keep her in detention—something he will surely do even after his planned election is held.
Will the junta collapse this year?
In light of all this, then, the question “Will the junta collapse this year?” matters. Is it a realistic possibility, or a deluded hope?
Actually, I think Myanmar might have already missed at least one opportunity to uproot the junta or at least force the generals to enter a dialogue with their opponents. The last couple of years saw a rare but real opportunity, as the home-grown resistance for the first time gained some genuine momentum.
The resistance forces, comprising ethnic armed organizations and the PDF groups formed after the 2021 coup, showed that their military offensives, such as Operation 1027 launched in October 2023, could penetrate deeply into junta-controlled territories, and that they have the ability to rapidly seize large numbers of military bases, outposts, and even headquarters and towns in different states and regions.
Those military offensives—which succeeded despite receiving zero support from the international community—in contrast to Ukraine’s war of resistance against the Russian invasion—shocked Myanmar watchers. It showed such military offensives could be a game changer; that there was a real possibility of toppling the regime in Naypyitaw or at least forcing the generals to sit down with their opponents to engage in real dialogue. The second phase of Operation 1027 in 2024 brought another lightning offensive resulting in the seizure of Lashio, the capital of northern Shan State, and the military’s Northeastern Command. Meanwhile, in western Myanmar, the Arakan Army (AA) embarked on an unprecedented town-by-town capture of most of Rakhine State.
This “organic war”, self-funded by the people of Myanmar, shook the regime to its core, making it appear vulnerable even in its Naypyitaw stronghold.
Imagine what all of these resistance forces, including their political wings like the National Unity Government (NUG), could have achieved with tangible support from the international community. The Min Aung Hlaing regime would be history. We can see now, however, that this was never even an option for the West, including the US, which had long been the key supporter of the Myanmar democracy struggle. Now, with the US-centered Trump administration in power, it appears more unlikely than ever that the Myanmar resistance will receive any meaningful support from Washington.
But today, after months of interference from China, many of these military offensives, especially in northern Myanmar bordering China, have lost steam. Since last year, China has adopted a policy of explicit support for the junta, hindering anti-regime military efforts. In particular, Beijing has pressured the Brotherhood Alliance of three ethnic armies—the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and the AA—to cease fighting and enter talks with the junta, and even to withdraw their forces from the towns they have seized.
This is just one among various factors to consider when trying to answer the question above: “Will the junta collapse in 2025?” To some extent, the answer depends on whether the international community including neighboring countries act in a way that helps or harms the nationwide resistance.
But another more important factor is whether all resistance forces—the ethnic forces, the PDFs, the NUG and others—can become sufficiently united and coordinated to overwhelm the weakened junta’s military. They will need to agree among themselves a clear and concise political roadmap to reinvigorate their military offensives, and engage in all forms of resistance to weaken the junta. They will also need a plan for rebuilding the country once it is free of the military dictatorship. Of course, in addition to shared political goals and strategy, they will need improved coordination among their forces to be able to seize more military outposts and regional headquarters, as they did during the 1027 military offensive.
We all know this won’t be easy; politically, there is a lack of trust between ethnic groups, and particularly between the majority Burman and minority groups. But if they can get beyond their past grievances and truly unite, this could provide the basis for real change in Myanmar.
Which means, the answer to the question “Will the junta collapse?” ultimately depends on whether all of their strengths can be brought to bear, supported by the people of Myanmar.
Otherwise…
