There is no more strategic ambiguity.
On the morning of Nov. 5, Myanmar Airways International Flight 779 landed at Kunming International Airport in China’s Yunnan Province. The plane carried Myanmar’s regime leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who surprised everyone in July this year by declaring Chinese New Year a national holiday amid renewed fighting near the border with China.
The most unpopular Myanmar leader and commander of the armed forces in Myanmar’s modern history is to attend the summits of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Leaders and the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Co-operation Strategy (ACMECS) and join a meeting with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.
During the trip, the highest-ranking Chinese officials he will meet are senior officials from Yunnan Province. International diplomats see the junta boss’s trip as a relatively low-level one, because he was only invited as a participant in the GMS. Min Aung Hlaing may feel humiliated, but turning the trip down is not an option because being invited by China is better than not, in terms of his regime’s legitimacy.
The visit will provoke and emotion among Myanmar activists, opposition groups and ethnic armed forces along the border with China.
This first visit by the regime leader since the coup has also ended the speculation that China would roll out the red carpet—whether for the junta or the opposition allied ethnic armed groups along the border. Beijing has shown it is willing to support whichever power broker provides protection for its economic interests and access to the Indian Ocean.
It is not Min Aung Hlaing’s first visit to China. Before the coup he visited Beijing and met with Xi. He is no stranger to the country.
On the other hand, it is safe to say that China has officially declared war on the Myanmar opposition and the oppressed Myanmar citizens who want to be free of the regime. China has now extended a lifeline to the regime and Min Aung Hlaing. Indeed, China’s official invitation to attend the GMS and official recognition of Ming Aung Hlaing will no doubt upset many at home and abroad.
However, the visit begs the question: Does China trust Min Aung Hlaing, and vice versa?
Some analysts argue China is being pragmatic.
Beijing is concerned that if Min Aung Hlaing’s State Administration Council (SAC) falls, the post-SAC era will be disastrous and unfavorable to China’s projects in Myanmar. The offensive against the regime, if it continues, could bring down the junta in a disorderly way—something China doesn’t want, since it won’t be able to predict what will be next for its “back door”, especially given the West’s long support for Myanmar opposition forces in exile and along the Thai border. China is worried about the West’s connections with Myanmar opposition groups including the National Unity Government (NUG) and its armed forces, as well as the ethnic armed groups. In any case, China has always exercised its veto power at the UN Security Council to shield successive military regimes in Myanmar from international condemnation and sanctions over its human rights violations.
In Beijing, the government, businesspeople, think tanks and scholars support the regime in Myanmar. However, Chinese leaders do not believe Min Aung Hlaing is competent and doubt his leadership and ability to govern the country.
When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw on Aug. 14, he said: “China opposes chaos and conflict in Myanmar, interference in Myanmar’s internal affairs by outside forces, and any words and deeds that attempt to drive a wedge between China and Myanmar and smear China.”
Chinese special envoy for Myanmar Deng Xijun, who recently paid a visit to see powerful ethnic leaders on the border after Wang’s visit to Naypyitaw, said the military regime is “the most important political force in Myanmar’s political structure”.
Deng said the recent military victory in northern Shan State and occupation of Lashio by Kokang forces (one of the key ethnic forces on the Chinese border) had seriously worsened the overall situation in Myanmar, harming China-Myanmar relations and especially the Belt and Road Initiative, saying it was “providing an opportunity for the US and the West to interfere and create chaos.”
China’s growing concern is the nothern forces’ rapid victories in recent months, and it worries that these will open the way for Western countries to play a bigger role in Myanmar. China feels that it needs to tighten its grip over Myanmar.
As it takes sides more forcefully, China has warned the northern forces to stop fighting and imposed severe restrictions on the border. China wants them to sit down with the regime at the negotiating table.
Now China has punished the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army by cutting off supplies of fuel and medicine, as it has done to other forces including the Wa and Kachin. This also shows how China has become the most important outside power in Myanmar since the armed forces seized power in February 2021. Myanmar analysts believe that Min Aung Hlaing realized that he should visit China after seeing the fall of several territories during the first phase of Operation 1027 in 2023. Since the coup, Min Aung Hlaing has forged a friendly relationship with Russia—a miscalculation.
China’s calculation and security paranoia can be seen in its recent policy shift. Several leaders of the currently active ethnic forces see China’s bullying attitude and provocations as designed to exploit and pressure them to get favorable outcomes, but there is long-term strategic thinking at work.
However, China is not in love with the Min Aung Hlaing regime either. It is confusing and complicated… isn’t it?
The Myanmar military is not China’s ally but an adversary. Over the past decades, the military in Myanmar has fought fierce battles with China-backed forces on the border. Thanks to China’s ideological stance towards Myanmar and Southeast Asian countries—with its support of the Communist Party of Burma, Communist Party of Thailand, Malay communists and the Khmer Rouge—we have seen militarization and endless armed conflict along the Myanmar-China border.
We all know that China has substantial economic investments in Myanmar, through which it has access to the Indian Ocean, but now the country is in a civil war, with chaos in many states and regions, and the majority of the population wants to see the Min Aung Hlaing regime disappear or collapse.
In this fragile state of affairs, Myanmar is vulnerable to the substantial influence of a neighbor like China.
The visit of the regime leader is taking place amid rising tensions between the US and China, and there is strategic uncertainty following Donald Trump’s win in the US presidential election. Many Southeast Asian countries will be forced to navigate this growing power competition.
The balance and re-balance of power will intensify in the near future and unstable Myanmar is in too weak a state to negotiate this growing power competition. The Chinese and Wang may not need to lose sleep over Western interference: The US and other Western powers have been absent from and ambiguous towards Myanmar. Who will stand up for the people of Myanmar? Or is it too late?
