The warning issued by the Ruili City Security Committee has triggered an online and offline backlash against China, awakening latent anti-Chinese sentiment across Myanmar. The Myanmar people viewed the warning as a threat to Myanmar’s state sovereignty by China, as well as outright interference in Myanmar’s conflict by pressuring the popular resistance against the brutal regime. The Chinese Embassy’s response to the warning made it worse, as it appeared to confirm it and made people more suspicious of Beijing’s support of such actions.
China’s move to pressure the resistance is readily interpreted as neglecting the violence and atrocities committed by the junta and is also seen as an effort by Beijing to rescue the Min Aung Hlaing regime. Such action also undermines China’s ongoing efforts to maintain neutrality in the Myanmar conflict and its non-interference policy, a core principle in China’s foreign policy.
Regardless of whether such a threat from Ruili City was supported by Beijing or not, the junta took full advantage of the situation and was emboldened to escalate its ongoing campaign of terror against civilians and resistance forces. Earlier this month, the junta declared the members of the Brotherhood Alliance—the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Arakan Army—as terrorist groups. A few days later, it launched deadly airstrikes on civilian targets including towns, a school, a bazaar, and a camp for internally displaced persons.
The Telegram channels of the junta’s supporters claimed that China gave the exact locations of TNLA bases to the junta’s forces, further aggravating the anti-Chinese sentiment among the Myanmar public.
While the moral implications of the conflict may be China’s least concern, the junta’s manipulation of China’s involvement in the Myanmar conflict has been further complicating already complex bilateral relations. It has also undermined China’s attempt to restore stability and maintain its position that its “friendship policy towards Myanmar is for all people in Myanmar.”
Understanding China’s approach
China’s approach to the Myanmar conflict has been closely watched by many observers and the resistance forces alike. When popular calls for China to stop engaging with the brutal junta were not answered, the resistance side decided to focus on its attempt to end military rule on its own and hoped that China would come to understand the gravity of the Myanmar crisis as the events unfolded over time.
When Chinese efforts to deal with transborder online scams facilitated the launch of Operation 1027, the resistance and the Myanmar people were somewhat relieved to see that China may not be entirely pro-junta, as many observers had contended. However, the resistance side has remained ambivalent about China’s cautious approach. The ongoing burning question has been what China really wants in Myanmar.
To understand China’s approach to the Myanmar conflict, it is necessary to understand its strategic interests in its southern neighbor. China’s strategic interests in Myanmar have not changed for a long time—they can be described as: 1) stability; 2) border security and development; 3) stability and security around its investment projects and personnel; and 4) protection from external interference, especially from the West.
However, the events of the past three-and-a-half years show that China tends to adjust its position when there are changes in dynamics such as:
- the junta’s de facto control and its ability to stabilize the country;
- the power dynamics between the revolutionary forces, especially the three northern groups, and the National Unity Government (NUG) and the junta;
- the level of threats to China’s national security, border stability, and economic interests and personnel; and
- the level of anti-Chinese sentiment.
De-escalation efforts counterproductive?
The recent efforts by China to pressure the resistance side, particularly the TNLA and MNDAA, by closing borders and blocking the supply of food, fuel, and medicines, may have been counterproductive. The unilateral nature of this pressure has only further roused latent anti-Chinese sentiment among the Myanmar populace, and even emboldened the junta forces to bomb civilian targets in resistance-controlled areas.
Public resentment was also fueled by the fact that China did not try to stop the forces of the junta, known as the State Administration Council (SAC), from indiscriminately killing unarmed civilians, yet came to its rescue when it faced losses.
In its own way, China may have been pressuring the junta all along via diplomatic means, but the blockage of supplies to the resistance forces can be seen as a far harsher action, given the two sides’ inequitable share of resources. It also provides little incentive for the junta to restrain its ongoing escalation of the conflict.
From its efforts to broker a ceasefire between the junta and the Brotherhood Alliance earlier this year, China has already seen that the generals have no willingness to make any meaningful concessions, militarily or otherwise. Myanmar ethnic armed organizations have learned this lesson the hard way over the course of the country’s 70-year-long civil war, with its vicious cycle of recurring ceasefires, armed struggles, and broken promises by the Myanmar military with one group or the other.
China’s efforts to mediate between the Myanmar military and the Brotherhood Alliance proved to be ineffective and will remain so as the junta forces continue to escalate the conflict and threaten stability in the northern region and across Myanmar.
Junta remains a threat to stability, peace
It is not difficult to see China’s lack of confidence in the Min Aung Hlaing-led junta, and in its ability to stabilize the country. However, it is not clear how China sees the junta’s manipulation of US-China geopolitical competition.
The junta’s private meetings with the US in the region would not have pleased China. While little is known about the content and nature of the meetings, a well-known pro-junta Telegram channel discussed the merits of taking advantage of the US’s China containment policy.
The Chinese side should also be wary of the junta’s manipulation of Chinese concerns over US interference in Myanmar—for instance, the SAC’s branding of the NUG as pro-US and claiming that the resistance is receiving assistance from Washington.
It appears that when Min Aung Hlaing did not receive the kind of support he sought from China—namely to quell the ongoing offensives by the Brotherhood Alliance, he desperately sought support from Russia. Earlier last month, the SAC’s defense minister visited Russia to strengthen military cooperation.
On Sept. 2, the junta’s No. 3, a military general, met a senior Indian military officer in Naypyitaw to discuss cooperation between the two sides.
While it is not certain how much support the Min Aung Hlaing junta has been able to garner from the US, Russia or India, it is clear it has no intention of halting its hostilities, and thus remains a threat to stability and peace in Myanmar and in the region.
China-Myanmar relations at risk
While many commentators argue that China prefers authoritarian regimes over democratic ones, the China-Myanmar relationship was strong and effective during the civilian and democratically elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government. Myanmar’s successive military regimes have manipulated China’s diplomatic support and investments to benefit themselves, further deepening anti-Chinese sentiment among the Myanmar populace. In contrast, the civilian NLD government was effectively cooperative in economic and diplomatic relations with China, and ensured that the benefits of Chinese investments were distributed among the wider Myanmar population, and that people were properly compensated for any negative impacts. The Letpadaung copper mine in Sagaing Region is a case in point. Thus, anti-Chinese sentiment diminished during the period of civilian rule in 2016-21.
In 1950, under the civilian government of U Nu, Myanmar (then Burma) was one of the first countries to recognize the People’s Republic of China. The longstanding bilateral “pauk-phaw” (fraternal) friendship was strengthened during those times. In 1954, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visited Rangoon (now Yangon) to meet U Nu, and issued a joint communique reaffirming Beijing’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the right of people “to choose their own state system”. In 1955, at the Bandung Conference between Asian and African countries, the Myanmar delegation helped lead the adoption of principles of “peaceful coexistence” among post-colonial countries.
Three-and-a-half years under the junta have reversed the pauk-phaw relationship that had been restored under the civilian NLD government, and reawakened anti-Chinese sentiment. The junta’s supporters are also ready to exploit such sentiment by creating the false impression that they receive Chinese support to quell the resistance.
Competing interests
China is aware of the threat that the junta poses, but it remains anxious about the uncertainty and potential chaos that would follow the collapse of a 70-year-old institution such as the Myanmar military. China’s current efforts to halt Phase II of the resistance’s Operation 1027 may stem from these grave concerns about the potential collapse of the junta and its aftermath.
But the most pressing question for China is not whether the collapse of the junta poses the more serious threat to China’s interests. The question is whether the status quo—the junta remaining in power—guarantees to protect or damage China’s interests.
At this point, competing interests among China, the Myanmar resistance and the junta are at play.
China wants to see the end of the conflict, and stability and peace restored in any way with as few adverse effects on China’s interests as possible.
The resistance and the Myanmar people also want to end the conflict and restore peace. The difference, however, is that they do not believe this is possible as long as the junta remains in power. History and past experience have shown them that the Myanmar military has never made any meaningful concessions. The political reconciliation of the 2010s gave the Myanmar military a political exit and allowed the generals and the institution to walk away with impunity. However, the 2021 coup reversed all the positive progress, politically and economically, and caused the current political, economic, and humanitarian crisis.
Min Aung Hlaing and the Myanmar military seek to remain in power indefinitely, at any cost. Whether the conflict ends or not presents little concern for them, as long as they remain in power and there are enough people and resources to sacrifice to protect them.
If China seeks to de-escalate the conflict and restore stability and peace in Myanmar sooner rather than later, it may need to adjust its current approach. As a first step, it may need to explore much more effective tools to rein in the Myanmar military’s aggression and atrocities.
At the moment, having to deal with both the junta’s aggression and the intense negative public sentiment at the same time must be very frustrating for China. Beijing may be cognizant of the fact that anti-Chinese sentiment has been largely manipulated by successive military leaders as a go-to strategy to earn diplomatic and political advantage. Beijing may want to test such a theory by applying just a small amount of pressure on the junta to rein it in. For instance, if China attempted to halt the SAC’s aerial bombing campaign in northern Shan state, it would see an instant positive public reaction.
Given the gravity of the conflict that continues to threaten the lives and security of millions of Myanmar people, China will need to continue striking a delicate balance between protecting its interests while navigating the intricacies of public sentiment and avoiding inadvertently prolonging the conflict and further instability in Myanmar and beyond.
Khin Oo is a public policy analyst and researcher on the political economy of Myanmar.
