After openly interfering with a large-scale resistance offensive against the military regime in northern Shan State in January, China is attempting to do the same in Rakhine State in western Myanmar, where it has considerable interests.
A series of talks in Kunming brokered by China saw the regime and the Brotherhood Alliance of three ethnic armies – the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Arakan Army (AA) – agree to a ceasefire in mid-January, though the truce was confined to northern Shan State bordering China.
The Brotherhood Alliance had quickly come under pressure from China to stop fighting after launching its anti-regime Operation 1027 offensive in northern Shan State in late October last year.
China has huge investments in Myanmar, including copper and nickel mines, hydropower projects, and border trade worth more than US$ 5 billion a year. Moreover, it has oil and gas pipelines running from the Chinese border city of Ruili through northern Shan State, Mandalay and Magwe regions to Rakhine State on the Bay of Bengal.
Any disruption of this supply could seriously impact businesses in China, particularly in landlocked Yunnan province.
Acting on its national interests, Beijing openly interfered in the offensive launched by the Brotherhood Alliance, over whom it has influence.
Ceasefire in northern Shan State
The Chinese-brokered ceasefire reached in January saw the two sides agree that their troops would not make further advances. The alliance also agreed not to seize any more regime camps or towns in northern Shan, while the junta agreed to halt airstrikes and shelling in the area.
The two sides agreed to resume border trade through Chin Shwe Haw – a town seized by the alliance – at the latest round of talks in March, with customs tariff income reportedly to be shared between the regime and the MNDAA on a 30-70 basis.
The regime conceded on trade because it wants to foster the ceasefire in northern Shan State and secure a guarantee from China. The agreement allows it to keep its troops and administrative organs in the key border trade town of Muse and run the customs and border trade department in Chin Shwe Haw.
The regime was forced to agree to a truce in the face of an impending attack on Northeastern Command headquarters in Lashio. It needed time to regather and replenish troops decimated by the fighting.
China reportedly threatened the Brotherhood Alliance that it would lose access to food, consumer goods, medicines and fuel imported via the border if it refused to stop fighting. The alliance was already deprived of supplies from lower Myanmar due to a junta blockade and was aware that a similar blockade by Beijing could spell disaster. It was left with no option but to listen to China.
The MNDAA and TNLA, which had vowed to root out military dictatorship in Myanmar, had to tone down their threats. However, both groups had managed to secure territory they intend to establish as self-administered states.
Junta’s stance
While supporters of the military view the territories seized by the Brotherhood Alliance and the sharing of custom tariffs as an insult to Myanmar’s sovereignty, the regime is apparently determined to toe China’s line.
The junta recently dispatched staff from border trade and customs departments to Chin Shwe Haw and allowed cargo trucks to travel on the Hsipaw-Lashio road.
It has withdrawn its troops from Muse as well as Lashio, Tanyang, Hsipaw and Kyaukme townships. Some were redeployed to the front line in Karenni (Kayah) State, Pinlaung – a town on the border of Shan and Karenni states – and Sagaing and Rakhine.
The small junta force left in Lashio comprises the Northeastern Command and 1st and 16th Military Operations Command, but these would not be able to resist a renewed assault by the Brotherhood Alliance. The fact that the regime has boldly withdrawn its troops from northern Shan State suggests that it has compromised to secure a guarantee from Beijing that the Brotherhood Alliance will not resume its northern Shan offensive.
Operation 1027, Rakhine front, and China
Fighting has been raging in Rakhine since the AA launched an offensive in November last year. The AA has seized several townships in the western state, including Ramree which neighbours Kyaukphyu Township, the starting point of Chinese gas and oil pipelines. China is implementing a special economic zone and a deep-sea port in Kyaukphyu as part of its global Belt and Road Initiative.
The AA has even attacked Danyawaddy naval base near Maday (Made) Island where oil tankers are docked.
The ceasefire reached in January is limited to northern Shan and does not cover the AA’s ongoing offensive in Rakhine. China is not in a position to impose tough pressure on the AA as it does not share a border with Rakhine. India and Bangladesh do share a border with the state but both countries attach importance to their ties with the AA.
Border sources report that China is employing persuasion rather than coercion in attempts to convince AA leaders to halt their offensive, which threatens its interests in Kyaukphyu.
AA leaders were invited to China on March 17 soon after the group seized Rathedaung town, according to the border sources.
The junta wants to stop fighting not only in Rakhine but in all ethnic states so that it can focus on quelling the armed revolt in central Myanmar. A ceasefire in Rakhine would give the regime more troops to repulse attacks in Kachin and Karen states.
The regime is bombing and shelling the nine townships seized by the AA to prevent it from installing its own administrations like the MNDAA and TNLA have done in northern Shan State.
Unable to use coercion, China might consider incentives – for example, handing over a portion of the profits from its oil and gas pipelines – to persuade the AA to halt fighting. The regime would have no reason to object to this having already handed the MNDA 70 percent of custom tariffs from border trade. And the regime is desperate for breathing space.
Ceasefire in Rakhine?
AA leaders recently arrived back from talks in China. The question was whether Beijing had succeeded in convincing them to stop fighting in Rakhine, where the AA has gained unprecedented military victories since fighting first broke out in late 2018.
The war cries, however, resurfaced on March 25 in Rakhine with the AA reiterating that it must be the only army in Rakhine. Clashes continue in the townships of Maungdaw, Buthidaung, Ann and Sittwe, site of the state capital.
Beijing’s attempt to prop up the junta and its military looks increasingly forlorn given that fighting has spread across much of the country – in Kachin, south Shan, Chin, Karenni and Karen states, and Sagaing, Magwe, Bago, Tanintharyi and Yangon regions – while the regime faces economic collapse and a popular nationwide revolt.
Instead, Beijing’s attempt to secure ceasefires in Rakhine and northern Shan to protect its investments will only intensify anti-China sentiments in Myanmar. Driven solely by its own national interests, China has ignored the objective situation in Myanmar and will apparently not give up easily on working toward its ends.
However, without dialogue and solid political agreements, securing ceasefires with ethnic armies is merely building castles in the air.
Thet Htar Maung is an analyst of Myanmar affairs.
