In recent months, China’s fierce crackdown has upended northern Myanmar’s border towns—once hotspots for sprawling online scam syndicates. Tens of thousands have been forcibly sent back to China, many tied to massive fraud rings targeting Chinese and foreign victims.
What once seemed like fiction became reality: mass prisoner or victim exchanges at border crossings, Kokang leaders handed over to Beijing as mafia scapegoats, and dramatic raids by ethnic armed groups on scam dens. These raids laid bare the extent of the industry—abandoned offices filled with luxury goods, high-tech equipment, and evidence of billions of dollars flowing through a criminal network that once thrived under militia protection.
Over the past two years, Myanmar has transferred more than 53,000 individuals to China in connection with online scam operations along the China-Myanmar border, according to statements from China’s Ministry of Public Security and Myanmar’s State Administration Council (SAC), as the ruling military junta is known.
However, following intense pressure from Beijing and a wave of armed conflict, those scam centers are no longer active—at least not there.
Now, they’ve simply gone deeper.
Forced inward
The scam operations have not disappeared—they’ve relocated. Pushed out of northern border towns, many syndicates have now moved into eastern and southern Shan State. Their continued operations are reportedly taking place under the protection of local armed groups, spreading across at least 14 townships in the region.
According to local civil society organizations, many scam centers that once operated in the Wa and Kokang self-administered zones have now relocated to other parts of Shan State. These operations have increasingly taken root in southern Shan townships such as Kunhing, Mongpan, Mong Hsu, Mongyai, Laihka, Tangyan, Namhsan, Mongnawng and Mongping. China’s crackdown on online scam syndicates in late 2023 initially disrupted operations in border towns like Laukkai and Myawaddy. Raids led to thousands of arrests and repatriations. However, by mid-2024, that momentum faded as the scam centers moved inward, away from border areas.
“What was once mainly China’s problem has now become a bigger issue for us. It feels like we’re the ones bearing the brunt now, with no one stepping up to take responsibility or offer solutions,” Nang Hon, a member of Shan civil society, told The Irrawaddy. Nang Hon is part of a local watchdog group monitoring Chinese investments and activities, primarily in northern Shan State but which also has people working in southern Shan providing it with data. The group, which was organized by Shan politicians, works to hold external actors accountable and raise awareness of the impacts on local communities.
She added that these scam centers have spread across villages in at least nine townships in southern Shan State—for example Wanhai, Wang Pan and Wanlay villages in Laihka Township—effectively rebuilding their operations under the protection of Shan armed groups. “The villages are now swarming with young people who clearly aren’t from around here. They look like they’ve come from cities like Yangon—their clothing and behavior are very different from the locals,” she said.
According to a local resident from Naung Harn Village in Mongpan Township, the scam industry has become a source of livelihood for many villagers. “When the Chinese authorities launched crackdowns, people involved in scams fled here. Locals started renting them homes and selling them food—it’s become a way to earn a living. Their operations have been running for quite some time now, though we don’t really know exactly what they’re doing,” the resident told The Irrawaddy.
She described how waves of young people—many appearing to come from upper Myanmar and urban areas like Yangon—have flooded into the villages, allegedly seeking job opportunities. “There are also many Chinese among them. At the village entrance, armed checkpoints are easily passed—it’s as if everything is quietly being allowed,” she added.
Online scams along the China-Myanmar border take several forms. One major type is romance-based investment fraud, where victims are tricked into fake relationships and convinced to invest in bogus platforms, often involving cryptocurrency. Illegal online gambling is also common, with unregulated platforms luring users before disappearing with their money. Many people fall victim to job scams, arriving in border areas expecting high-paying work, only to be forced into scam operations under abusive conditions. Additionally, cybercriminals carry out phishing and corporate email scams, impersonating companies to steal funds or sensitive information.
In addition, eastern Shan areas—particularly Tachileik, Mong Hsat, and Mongton—have also seen the emergence or expansion of scam-related activity. Likewise, northern Shan townships such as Namkham, Namhsan and Muse have become key hotspots, where criminal networks exploit weak law enforcement and ongoing regional instability to operate freely.
“When you look at the townships where new scam centers are emerging, locals know which armed groups control which villages. If these centers continue to grow and expand, it will become a major concern for local youth,” said Nang Hon.
Spreading to the heartland
Online scams are increasingly spreading into Myanmar’s major cities. Since February, groups of Chinese nationals have reportedly traveled from southern Shan State to Yangon in large numbers by long-distance buses. Regular passengers along that route said they had observed this movement. These Chinese travelers have been arriving in Yangon almost daily by highway buses. It is believed that they are able to pass through inspection checkpoints by offering bribes to immigration and traffic officers.
In townships like Hlaing Tharyar in Yangon, Chinese nationals have been caught openly recruiting for scam operations. A lack of rule of law—and the alleged complicity of some local authorities—has allowed these networks to expand.
At the same time, there has been a noticeable rise in suspicious online messages, many apparently sent by scam networks, luring people with offers to “play games for money” or promising high-paying jobs. On Facebook groups, especially those targeting youth, there has been a surge in ads recruiting for game centers in Hlaing Tharyar. These are widely suspected to be fronts for online scam centers, commonly known as “kyar phyant”. Alarmingly, reports of missing young people have also increased, raising fears that many may be coerced or trafficked into working for these operations.
“With job opportunities so scarce for young people, it’s not surprising that some may be drawn into these activities. Many of the online job ads now seem to specifically target young women,” a resident of Yangon told The Irrawaddy via the Signal app.
“In Yangon, we’re seeing missing person posters almost every day, which raises serious concerns about a possible link between these disappearances and the surge in online scam recruitment,” he added.
After the 2021 military coup in Myanmar, the country faced a sharp economic decline, resulting in the loss of around 1.6 million jobs that year, according to the International Labor Organization (ILO). Unemployment surged, especially among women and youth—female joblessness rose fivefold by 2022. Many were pushed into informal or unstable work as formal jobs disappeared. While agriculture declined, some shifted to mining and construction. By 2023, the labor market remained fragile, with instability and weak rule of law deepening poverty and job insecurity.
Invisible wars, regional consequences
For victims, the relocation of scam operations means abuse continues unchecked under fragmented governance. For China, the crackdown may have eased domestic risks, but without tackling root causes, it merely shifted the burden—risking a resurgence.
“The crackdown created pressure, but it wasn’t surgical. It simply displaced operations from border zones to deeper areas,” said Nang Hon.
In Myanmar, power is now dictated less by politics and more by armed actors and illicit economies. These networks flourish in security vacuums, often protected by local militias and complicit officials. Beijing’s short-term containment strategy—driven by border stability and reputation—has enabled scams to spread inland.
Despite rhetoric on regional peace, China continues to back Myanmar’s junta, reinforcing military solutions. This sidelines grassroots solutions and empowers corrupt forces. Unless regional actors—including China—move beyond junta-centered diplomacy and commit to inclusive, cross-border and community-informed solutions, Myanmar risks becoming a geopolitical void: a black hole for organized crime, human trafficking, digital fraud and proxy conflicts with no clear way out.
Editor’s Note: The story was updated on June 10 to correct the number of people whom Myanmar has transferred to China in connection with online scam operations. The previous version mistakenly stated the number as 530,000.
Athena Awn Naw specializes in analyzing ethnic conflict dynamics in Myanmar, focusing on China’s expanding influence across economic sectors. Her expertise includes the socioeconomic impacts of China’s involvement, its role in Myanmar’s armed conflicts and peace processes, and its participation in regional initiatives.
