The ceasefire brokered by China in northern Shan State collapsed on June 25 after the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) complained of repeated attacks by Myanmar regime troops.
The ethnic Brotherhood Alliance of the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and TNLA launched Operation 1027 against the regime in late October. The offensive ended when Beijing brokered a truce between the two sides in mid-January.
The TNLA said it launched fresh attacks in response to the junta’s repeated ceasefire violations with drone and artillery attacks on its positions.
The truce was signed under pressure from China as the northern Shan capital of Lashio, where the junta’s Northeastern Command is based, came under siege. China was worried that its investments would be threatened if the fighting spread to Pyin Oo Lwin, seat of regime military academies, throwing the regime into chaos.
China perhaps expected to coax the regime into dialogue with opposition forces in return for rescuing it from a military disaster.
China’s special envoy to Myanmar Deng Xijun has sought to meet jailed State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi several times only to be rebuffed. Myanmar’s stubborn and haughty ruling generals have rebuffed China’s attempts to mediate between the regime and the opposition.
In his latest visit to Naypyitaw, Deng met with foreign minister Than Swe rather than junta chief Min Aung Hlaing. He was also wearing casual clothes – a sign that it was intended as an informal meeting.
It is reasonable to assume that the TNLA’s fresh attacks could not have occurred without the nod from China. Beijing has apparently decided to teach the regime a lesson after its demand for dialogue fell on deaf ears.
China is thought to have given the green light for Operation 1027 amid the regime’s inability to curb an online scam industry near the border targeting Chinese citizens.
China may or may not have given the nod for the battle to resume. What is certain however is that Beijing will not pressure the Brotherhood Alliance to stop the fighting.
Border trade has not resumed despite five months of ceasefire.
The Brotherhood Alliance had seized most major border trade towns except Muse in previous fighting, and the junta is highly unlikely to launch attacks to regain them. China therefore need not worry about fighting on its border.
Renewed fighting
Anti-regime forces attacked northern Shan’s Kyaukme and Nawnghkio and neighboring Mandalay’s Madaya and Mogoke townships a week ago on June 25, the first day of renewed fighting. In Kyaukme, Nawnghkio and Mogoke, they not only attacked junta outposts but also positions and police stations in the towns. In Madaya, they attacked an air defense battalion east of the town. They are not yet targeting Lashio but are advancing from the north, northeast and east of Mandalay and Pyin Oo Lwin.
Resistance fighters have attacked Mandalay’s ruby town of Mogoke, cutting off Momeik (Momgmit) where a tactical command of the junta’s Northern Command is based.
The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and allies control the other road to Momeik between Mabein and Mansi. So, the junta’s tactical command and three battalions are virtually surrounded by anti-regime forces.
In the east, the anti-regime forces have also attacked Nawnghkio and Kyaukme, cutting off Lashio. With Lashio itself under threat, the regime might not risk sending reinforcements from Lashio to Nawnghkio and Kyaukme.
For now, the regime can only send reinforcements from Mandalay to either Madaya or Mogoke or Nawnghkio or Kyaukme. The regime also needs to prepare defenses in Mandalay and Pyin Oo Lwin.
How the regime will defend fresh attacks
Nawnghkio, Kyaukmen, Hsipaw, Nanglan, Lashio, Nangbao and Muse are overseen by the Lashio-based Northeastern Command. It oversees 13 battalions and troops from three military operation commands, which are spread across the area.
The 99th Light Infantry Division is based in Muse. Troops from the Central Command and a tactical command are based in Mogoke. Besides those combat units, the regime also has artillery, combat-support and medical units and training schools in those areas.
Troops from the Central Command and Thabeikkyin Military Training School No. 2 are deployed along the Madaya-Thabeikkyin road.
The regime has scant reinforcements available in Mandalay and Pyin Oo Lwin, which only host Central Command rearward troops, combat-support units and military academies.
Fifteen military trucks carrying family members of junta soldiers from Lashio arrived in Hsipaw on June 24. They were sent to the rear in response to reports of impending attacks on Lashio. The vehicles, however, are now trapped in Lashio.
Around five vehicles of reinforcements were sent to Madaya on the first day of renewed fighting but were turned back by ambushes.
One week after hostilities resumed, the regime is unable to send ground reinforcements and can only provide air support to its troops in the conflict zone.
The regime is also short of reinforcements, with only the 18th Military Operations Command (MOC) in eastern Shan State available for use.
It can’t pull out troops from Kachin and Rakhine states where fighting is raging. Junta troop shortages in Rakhine State are becoming evident as the Arakan Army makes rapid gains.
It can transfer some troops from Karenni State and Sagaing Region, though this could leave other junta positions in those areas vulnerable.
It may also consider suspending the national-level Operation Aung Zeya in Karen State and pulling out the 55th Light Infantry Division (LID) to use in the renewed fighting. The 55th LID has however been chastened by military defeats.
Overall, it appears that the regime can use troops from the 18th MOC in eastern Shan, 7th and 2nd MOCs in Karenni State, and 10th MOC under Northeastern Command. If necessary, it could also leverage the 12th MOC and 55th Light Infantry Division from Karen State.
The regime has apparently yet to forge a defensive plan as the other two Brotherhood Alliance members have not made moves in northern Shan and Mandalay.
Brotherhood Alliance
So far, only the TNLA and allied People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) from Mandalay, Mogoke and other areas have joined the operation. The ethnic Danu People’s Liberation Front (DPLF) is the new group to have joined the operation.
The TNLA is thought to have 8,000 to 10,000 troops, with 3,000 involved in the fresh fighting. The DPLF has dispatched around 500 troops.
The AA, MNDAA and its allied People’s Liberation Army and Bamar People’s Liberation Army have not yet joined the renewed fighting. The MNDAA has around 6,000 troops and the AA around 3,000 in northern Shan State. With these still on the sidelines, it is too early to say whether the renewed fighting represents a second phase of Operation 1027.
Junta positions in Mandalay and Pyin Oo Lwin may be feeling the heat now. The area is located on the border of Northern Command, Central Command and Northeastern Command. So, the chain of command is complex, which could favor anti-regime forces.
The regime is on the horns of a dilemma since it risks losing towns if it does not send reinforcements soon. But withdrawing troops from other areas for reinforcements would create gaps that anti-regime forces could exploit.
Aye Chan Hsu is a military and political analyst.
