As Myanmar’s oldest ethnic armed organization, the Karen National Union (KNU) has played a pivotal role in the country’s popular armed revolt against military rule, providing a strong foundation for Spring Revolution forces.
Various ethnic armed groups – including the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in the north, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in the northeast, the Arakan Army (AA) in the west, and the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) in the south, and the KNU in Karen State – have collaborated with People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), training, arming and helping them gain combat experience.
The Karen State theater is crucial for revolutionary forces in southern Myanmar, including Bago, Yangon, Ayeyarwady, Mon, and Tanintharyi.
Some might argue that KNU has made little progress compared to military victories achieved by ethnic armed organizations in northern Shan State and Kachin State. However, the fact is that Karen people’s participation in the Spring Revolution, and their support for resistance forces, play an important part in the armed revolt, not only politically but also militarily in Myanmar’s southern theater.
The first clashes in Karen State broke out in late 2021 in Lay Kay Kaw, where young people took refuge and underwent military training after their friends were killed in the junta’s brutal crackdown on peaceful anti-coup protests. Numerous clashes took place in Karen State over three years from late 2021 to 2024, particularly in areas controlled by KNU Brigades 5 and 6.
The joint offensives by the KNU’s armed wing, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and PDF, captured strategic bases and camps, including along the Thai-Myanmar border – even threatening its main border trade hub of Myawaddy town.
Since late 2024, fighting has spilled into Tanintharyi, Kawkareik, the Sittaung River basin, and areas controlled by KNU Brigade 7, which had previously seen no combat since the 2021 coup.
Tanintharyi Front
In Tanintharyi, southern Myanmar, the KNU and allied forces made significant gains in the space of just one month.
On April 19, they seized the junta’s Htee Hta operational command base after eight days of fighting. On May 9, they captured another operation command base, Htee Khee, after one week of fighting, forcing junta soldiers to flee into Thailand and seizing the border trade camp.
They also captured a key junta position on Highway No. 8 between Ye and Dawei Township. A battle for control of border trade routes through Mawtaung, near the Thai border, has been ongoing since December.
KNU Brigade 7 Front
After three years of inactivity since the coup, KNU Brigade 7 finally joined the revolt in December last year, capturing the former KNU headquarters at Manerplaw together with Brigade 5. They have since seized several junta positions east of the Dawna Range, leaving only a few regime-held camps between the mountains and the Thai border.
The fall of these last junta redoubts would allow the KNU to secure the zone between the Dawna Range and Moei River, which separates Thailand and Myanmar, and threaten towns west of the Dawna Range including Hpa-an, Paingkyine and Hlaingbwe.
Kawkareik and Myawaddy Front
Combined KNU and PDF forces are conducting operations along the Kawkareik-Myawaddy road and southwards, securing several key junta bases. They encircled Kawkareik in December 2023.
In March last year, they defeated light infantry battalions in Thingan Nyi Naung, before overrunning Infantry Battalion 275, responsible for guarding Myawaddy town, on April 10. However, the junta-aligned Karen State Border Guard Force stepped in to prevent Myawaddy from falling into resistance hands. Soon after, the regime launched Operation Aung Zeya, a national-level counteroffensive aimed at reclaiming Myawaddy with around 1,000 troops. Resistance forces retreated to the Dawna Range, where they repulsed Operation Aung Zeya reinforcements. Around 200 junta troops reportedly remain trapped in the mountains while other units have retreated after suffering heavy casualties.
Combined KNU and PDF forces launched offensives on junta bases in Kawkareik and Kyonedoe townships in April this year, seizing positions along the road between the two main towns. Ethnic Mon revolutionary groups have reportedly joined resistance offensives near Kyonedoe town.
Sittaung River Basin Front
In the Sittaung River basin, PDF forces are leading offensives with support from KNU Brigade 3 (Nyaunglebin District). However, Brigade 3 is not operating alone – it is flanked by Brigade 5 (Papun District) to the east, Brigade 1 (Thaton District) to the south, and Brigade 2 (Taungoo District) to the north.
In Brigade 5 territory, resistance forces have seized Papun town, junta battalion bases, and several outposts near the Thai border. Junta posts have also been captured in Brigade 1 and Brigade 2 territory.
The four KNU brigades oversee an area between the Sittaung and Salween rivers in Bago Region and Karen State – a stronghold for the KNU and allied PDF, Burma People’s Liberation Army (BPLA), and People’s Defense Teams. They have also operated east and west of the Sittaung River since the coup, resulting in clashes with junta troops since 2022.
Earlier this month, resistance forces briefly captured Light Infantry Battalion 598 headquarters in Bago Region’s Shwekyin Township. PDFs have also tightened their control over the old Yangon-Mandalay road in Bago Region since December.
Possible scenarios
In Tanintharyi, resistance forces have seized two border crossings with Thailand, and capturing the third, at Mawtaung, would allow them to advance toward the coast with a secure rear base. Mineral mines along the Thai border provide funding for the KNU.
The PDF has a strong foothold along the Tanintharyi coastline from Dawei to Myeik, where it enjoys popular support. If it can form a solid alliance with the KNU, they could potentially control the coastal region by 2026. However, challenges remain, particularly in sharing territory and administration.
Recent KNU movements suggest it is targeting Hpa-an and Hlaingbwe, but the regime has bolstered its defenses here. A successful operation to seize both townships would require neutralizing at least 20 junta bases.
However, Hpa-an will come under direct threat if the KNU and its allies seize Kawkareik and Kyonedoe towns. Resistance forces have long controlled the Ye-Thanbyuzayat road, potentially threatening Mawlamyine, the capital of Mon State.
Meanwhile, the Sittaung River front is becoming increasingly critical for the PDF’s aim to expand operations into Bago, Yangon, and Ayeyarwady regions.
Since early 2025, the Karen theater has seen significant changes, with KNU forces aligning their offensives under a unified strategic goal. This increased coordination has led to consistent victories, strengthening their position.
Another key development has been the KNU’s tight information control, ensuring operational secrecy before, during, and after battles. It is also working to persuade regional countries to oppose the junta’s plans to build a nuclear power plant with Russian assistance.
The other major shift concerns the increasing reluctance of junta-aligned Karen factions – such as the Karen State Border Guard Force and Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) – to actively engage in the conflict.
The DKBA, a Buddhist-led Karen armed group, broke away from the KNU, which is dominated by Christian Karen, in 1994. The BGF later splintered from the DKBA. Both groups’ military cooperation with the regime has declined drastically over the past few months.
Karen groups have been working for reunification for years, and though there has been little progress, they have adopted a policy of mutual non-violence that is apparently working.
Next year is expected to bring significant shifts in the Karen State theater. If Karen splinter groups reunite, the conflict could undergo rapid transformation, potentially reshaping the broader resistance landscape in southeastern Myanmar.
Aye Chan Hsu is a political and military analyst.
