The junta has launched three major military operations in the past six months to retake territory lost to Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and allied resistance groups in Karen, northern Shan, and Karenni states and Mandalay Region.
But the operations have made little if any progress, according to analysts.
The junta has lost large swathes of territory to EAOs and their allies. In January 2023, junta chief Min Aung Hlaing admitted his regime controlled only 198 of Myanmar’s 330 townships.
Then on October 27, the Brotherhood Alliance of three ethnic armies launched Operation 1027, a major offensive that turned the tide of the revolution. The regime has since lost dozens of towns in ethnic states, particularly in northern Shan State and Rakhine. In July, it also began to lose ground in Mandalay Region.
In a bid to retake the lost territory, the junta scrambled to launch three operations. However, all of these counteroffensives have struggled to make ground.
The junta has also lost one of its 14 regional commands, Northeastern Command in Lashio, leaving only 13 to direct military operations. Captain Zin Yaw, who defected from the army and joined the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) after the coup, said that each command has its own operation name.
All military activities within these commands are meticulously managed and recorded under their specific operation names, he explained.
Operation Aung Zeya
Launched on April 11, the first junta counteroffensive, Operation Aung Zeya, differs from the other two in being a national-level operation, overseen by deputy junta chief Soe Win. (here in this paragraph: What I like to say is that Aung Zeya differs from other two operation is – 1. Aung Zeya was named as a national-level operation 2. And the junta regime owned propaganda channels and state-owned newspapers publicly stated about that operation / the junta hasn’t never public stated about the other two operations, instead, it plans and commands them secretly. These are the different points from two others).
However, Zin Yaw and two other analysts consider Operation Aung Zeya to be confined to Southeastern Command, which covers Mon and Karen States.
Aung Zeya aims to retake Myawaddy, on the border with Thailand, from the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU).
Aung Zeya is another name for King Alaungpaya, who founded the Konbaung dynasty in the 18th century. The Aung Zeya counteroffensive comprises around 1,000 troops equipped with armored vehicles, tanks, and artillery to reinforce troops that remained in Myawaddy after Karen forces overran Infantry Battalion 275.
However, the reinforcements were pinned down in the Dawna Mountain Range for months on their way to Myawaddy after being attacked by ethnic Karen and other resistance troops. They eventually retreated and dispersed into Mon State and Tanintharyi Region respectively.
Operation Sin Phyu Shin
Four months after launching Operation Aung Zeya, the junta launched its second major counteroffensive. Operation Sin Phyu Shin – “Lord of the White Elephant” – aimed to retake areas of northern Shan State captured by the Brotherhood Alliance and its allies during Operation 1027.
According to the sources close to the junta’s military headquarters in Naypyitaw, Sin Phyu Shin is also the new operation name given to all military activities and operations under Northeastern Command.
But when the operation was launched in the middle of August by a committee led by Vice-Senior General Soe Win again, the junta had already lost its Northeastern Command in Lashio, the capital of northern Shan State.
A source close to the military said that the operation has become the name for their new Northeastern Command HQ, which has been relocated to Mongyai, about 65 kilometers southeast of Lashio.
Sources said the goal of Operation Lord of the White Elephant is not only to retake towns lost in northern Shan State, but also in Mandalay Region. However, they were skeptical that the depleted military had the strength to launch the massive counteroffensive required to retrieve towns and bases it had either lost or surrendered.
Operation Sin Phyu Shin has so far made no progress, instead suffering a major setback. Recent battles in Taung Hkam and nearby villages in Nawnghkio Township saw the Brotherhood Alliance’s Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and its allies, including the People’s Defense Force (PDF) of the civilian National Unity Government, reportedly inflict dozens of casualties on army troops while dozens more deserted.
Operation Yan Naing Min
In the latest counteroffensive, called Operation Yan Naing Min, Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing aims to reclaim territories in Karenni State while bolstering defensive positions in Pinlaung and Naungtayar Townships in southern Shan State, near the Karenni border, according to an analyst and sources close to the military.
In the first week of this month, Min Aung Hlaing visited southern Shan and Karenni state and met with key administrative and military chiefs in both regions.
On September 5, he visited the Regional Operation Command (ROC) headquarters in Loikaw, the Karenni capital, for talks with the highest remaining officials in the state, including Loikaw ROC commander Colonel Aung Kyaw Khaing.
Min Aung Hlaing issued orders to enhance security around Loikaw and expedite the recapture of all of Kayah State, according to the junta military’s propaganda channel, MWD.
He assigned the name “Yan Naing Min (King Conquer the Enemy) to the operation under Southern Command, which includes Loikaw ROC.
Accordimg to the assessment of a conflict analyst, Operation Yan Naing Min lacks the required strength and manpower for this mission, an observation supported by the fact that it has yet to make any progress.
Khu Reedu, secretary of the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF) said they had seen no significant junta offensive in their area since the departure of Min Aung Hlaing.
“However, junta has conducted continuous airstrikes targeting civilian areas. At this moment, the military has deployed forces inside and outside of Loikaw and also has patrol units stationed around the capital,” he said.
The regime currently maintains control over Loikaw and certain surrounding areas, as well as Bawlakhe Township — where several battalion headquarters are located.
These two townships represent the last strongholds where the junta can exert authority. The rest of the state is either entirely or partially under the control of resistance forces, who have been fighting the military since a few months after the 2021 coup.
“While I won’t outright dismiss the possibility, regaining full control of the entire state would prove extremely challenging for the junta’s military,” said Banyar Khun Aung, secretary of Karenni State Interim Executive Council (Karenni IEC), the governing body of resistance in Karenni State.
The junta is seeking to consolidate control in Pinlaung and Naungtayar townships on the Karenni border by collaborating with Pa-Oh militia groups, the conflict analyst said.
These areas hold strategic significance for Naypyitaw, given they lie just 140 km east of the junta’s control centre and administrative capital.
Weakening military
Analysts assess that the junta’s military is weakening and lacks the manpower to conduct offensives that will retake lost territory.
“The junta does not have military strength required to launch such major offensives nationwide [given the number of troops kiĺled, surrendering or captured by resistance forces]. So, Min Aung Hlaing is making public visits to conflict areas in a bid to rally his troops,” said a conflict analyst.
He remarked that the junta’s military has now switched to a defensive strategy by gathering together its remaining scattered forces, while new recruits are proving ineffective.
He added that the junta chief was conducting psychological warfare, seeking to terrorize civilians and resistance forces with intimidating-sounding operation names.
“He has now resorted to bombing areas controlled by EAOs and other resistance groups, instilling fear among the local population,” the analyst said.
With combat troops depleted, the junta is being forced to use troops from transportation, supply and signal units, along with disabled and hospitalized soldiers and new conscripts.
“But this doesn’t mean they can all be used as combatants, you can’t send all of them to the frontlines immediately,” he remarked.
Uncertainty in the skies
On September 3, during a meeting with administrative officials in the Shan capital, Taunggyi, the junta chief issued a warning. He emphasized that authorities and civilians must prevent ‘insurgent groups’ from taking control of towns and villages or seeking refuge within administrative and civilian buildings.
He accused armed resistance groups of commandeering civilian buildings to protect themselves from counterattacks.
Following the warning, the military launched deadly airstrikes on civilian areas controlled by EAOs and allied resistance forces.
A series of junta airstrikes on civilian targets in Chin, Shan and Karenni states and Magwe, Sagaing and Mandalay regions have killed dozens of civilians, including women and children since Sunday.
“Min Aung Hlaing had publicly declared his intention to reclaim lost territories during his visits to Taunggyi and Loikaw. However, shortly after making this statement, he ruthlessly escalated airstrikes,” said Captain Zin Yaw.
He said that these airstrikes aim to disrupt the administrative structures that EAOs and resistance groups have established in the areas under their control. Additionally, they serve to terrorize civilians and convey a message about the military’s response when it loses control.
However, he emphasized that true victory in a war lies in conquering and holding ground. Merely launching airstrikes does not constitute a winning strategy until troops can secure their intended objectives.
