Myanmar’s civil war has intensified since the launch of Operation 1027 in 2023, forcing the junta into a defensive stance as it lost dozens of towns and hundreds of bases.
However, in 2024, regime forces switched to a more dynamic strategy, employing mobile defensive tactics and launching counteroffensives across the country. The following is a breakdown of battlefield situations across the country.
Kachin State
Key battles are ongoing in Bhamo and Mansi. The regime withdrew three battalions from Mansi to bolster its defense of Bhamo, a district-level town. Junta defensive operations in Bhamo are being coordinated by the 21st Military Operations Command (MOC). They are relying heavily on warplanes and drones to recapture lost bases wherever possible. This marks a strategic shift from static defense to a more mobile and proactive defensive approach.
As a result, the KIA and its allies are being forced to attack junta bases repeatedly, delaying their offensive.
Elsewhere in Kachin, small columns of junta troops are counterattacking in Mohnyin, Hopin, Hpakant, Waingmaw, Myitone and Tanai, but have failed to achieve significant gains.
Sagaing Region
Last year, the regime regained control of Kawlin but again lost control of Pinlebu Township. Resistance forces have also secured most of Inndaw town, where junta troops have retreated to an old underground hospital dug into a hillside. Despite efforts, resistance forces have yet to penetrate the position.
In Tigyaing, fighting has subsided after resistance forces paused their offensive.
However, clashes have erupted in northern Tamu, southern Kale, and Paungbyin near the Indian border, with resistance groups targeting junta bases.
Guerrilla-style assaults on junta troops, including mine attacks, have become commonplace in Sagaing. The military usually responds with single-column operations, often employing scorched-earth tactics against villages believed to support resistance forces. Despite these raids, the regime has been forced to abandon smaller outposts across the region.
Caution defines the regime’s movements due to resistance ambushes in Budalin, Depayin, Wetlet, and Chaung-U townships. Counterattacking the highly mobile resistance forces has proven increasingly challenging for the regime.
Mandalay Region
In northern Mandalay, resistance forces captured northern Madaya, Singu, Thabeikkyin, Tagaung, Mabein, Mogok, and Mongmit in 2024. However, three major military bases and a hospital remained under military control in Thabeikkyin Township. Troops from these bases recently recaptured an area close to Mogok, known as Myanmar’s “Ruby Land”, after being bolstered by airdrops of weapons and ammunition. No fighting in Mogok has been reported so far.
Fierce daily clashes are reported in western and northeastern Madaya, as regime troops seek to reclaim the areas from Mandalay PDFs.
Further south, resistance forces successfully ambushed a junta column in Myingyan Township earlier this month.
Northern Shan State
The regime reclaimed artillery battalions in Taunghkam, Nawnghkio Township from the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) late last month. Taunghkam is a two-hour drive from Pyin Oo Lwin, which is home to the regime’s elite military academies.
However, TNLA forces remain near Taunghkam, where they are launching guerilla-style attacks.
The junta’s recapture of Taunghkam means TNLA forces are now at risk of being encircled in the area.
Southern Shan State
Supported by the local Pa-O National Organization (PNO) militia, the regime is conducting a counteroffensive in Moebye on the Shan-Karenni border.
Regime troops have forced the anti-regime Pa-O National Liberation Army out of Hsihseng and are chasing them to their base in Mawkmai. From Hsihseng, the regime is transporting supplies by road to Loikaw, the capital of Karenni State. The regime’s assault in southern Shan is thus supporting its counteroffensive in Karenni.
Magwe Region
After seizing Ann town in Rakhine State, the Arakan Army and its allies are advancing into neighboring Magwe Region. Numerous junta troops fleeing from Ann, and also Natyaykan on the Bago side of the border, have been killed by local resistance ambushes.
Incapable of repulsing the AA’s advance, the junta has responded by raiding resistance bases in Pakokku, Minbu and Thayet districts to prevent potential attacks on its ordnance factories in the area. However, the raids have had minimal impact on local resistance forces, as they rely on guerilla-style operations.
Chin State
The majority of Chin State remains under resistance control. The regime maintains a foothold in Hakah, Thantlang, and Tedim. Chin resistance forces continue to attack Falam, where junta forces have been reduced to just one major battalion headquarters. In Thantlang, the regime’s counterattack has resulted in a back-and-forth battle with no decisive gains.
Rakhine State
The Arakan Army (AA) controls most of Rakhine State, except for the capital Sittwe, Kyaukphyu, and Manaung. The AA recently launched offensives in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, home to a Chinese-backed Special Economic Zone and port project, forcing the regime into a defensive posture in those towns.
The AA and its allies are also advancing over the border from Rakhine into Magwe, Bago and Ayeyarwady regions. The regime has been unable to repulse the advancing AA troops.
Karenni State
The regime recaptured most of Loikaw Township last year after Karenni resistance forces withdrew, apparently due to ammunition shortages.
Fighting has been raging for months in Pekon Township’s Moebye, on the Shan-Karenni border, with both sides suffering heavy casualties. Karenni forces have so far held their ground.
In Hpruso, Bawlake, Hpasawng, and Demoso, the regime has primarily resorted to defensive positions.
Karen State
The junta’s Operation Aung Zeya, launched in April last year, has failed to achieve its objectives. The large-scale counteroffensive, involving more than 1,000 troops from the 55th Light Infantry Division, aims to recapture the main trade route between Kawkareik and Myawaddy on the Thai border.
As the offensive nears its one-year mark, junta troops remain stuck in the Dawna Hills, suffering heavy casualties. Despite these setbacks, the regime continues to reinforce its troops and press on with the offensive.
Bago and Tanintharyi
Resistance forces continue to wage guerilla warfare in Bago and Tanintharyi regions, where regular junta military operations have failed to curb armed revolt.
This pattern extends to Sagaing, Magwe, and Mandalay regions, where the regime has been unable to conduct large-scale offensives or achieve decisive victories. Instead, their strategy relies heavily on air support and single-column ground operations. However, rather than directly attacking guerrilla forces, the regime appears to be mainly targeting civilians suspected of supporting the resistance movement.
Big picture
Since last year, the regime has employed a combination of strategies to counter resistance offensives, utilizing static defensive positions, mobile defensive maneuvers, and counteroffensives. Despite these efforts, its achievements on the national scale remain limited. To date, the military has managed to reclaim only a handful of areas, including Kawlin, Hsihseng, Twin Nge (near Mogok), and Taunghkam.
Despite heavy junta propaganda promoting these territorial gains, the reclaimed areas collectively account for less than 1% of territory, towns, and camps previously seized by resistance forces. Additionally, the reclaimed areas remain under constant threat, encircled by resistance forces, which continue to undermine the regime’s control.
However, in northern Mandalay, weak coordination between various resistance factions – including PDFs allied with the KIA, the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF), and TNLA-allied PDFs – presents a major challenge. Further caution is needed to prevent tensions between the TNLA and KIA from destabilizing broader resistance efforts in the region.
Territories reclaimed by the junta include Twin Nge and Taunghkam, which were TNLA-controlled zones. The junta’s ongoing pressure on other TNLA strongholds signals a persistent threat to resistance control.
In Loikaw, although the regime has regained control, it continues to face strong resistance from highly organized Karenni forces. Meanwhile, in southern Shan State’s Hsihseng Township, the junta appears to have gained the upper hand, leveraging support from PNO militias.
Since 2024, the regime has increasingly relied on mobile defensive strategies and counteroffensives to confront resistance forces. However, these tactics have yet to produce meaningful or decisive victories on a wider scale.
Nevertheless, resistance forces must stay vigilant against the junta’s advanced weaponry, including drones and paragliders, while adapting strategies to combat these threats in specific conflict zones. Developing robust, region-specific solutions to counter the military’s evolving tactics will be crucial for maintaining momentum against the regime.
Moe Sett Nyein Chan is a military analyst.
