As the military junta racks up defeat after defeat in ground operations, its only remaining advantage is its air force, which it has used freely in aerial bombings of civilian targets around the country.
Most nations around the world have imposed sanctions against the junta, restricting its ability to purchase aircraft and other military equipment, but Russia and China continue to supply arms to the regime, enabling it to continue its deadly campaign.
The military did not immediately deploy air power in the early days of the armed revolt after the 2021 coup, because junta chief Min Aung Hlaing then still believed that the army could crush the poorly equipped resistance. Even when ground units reported difficulties, they were not granted air support, and troops were pressured to keep fighting without backup.
When a military convoy was ambushed in Mindat, Chin State in the early days of the revolt, ground troops reported their distress and requested aerial support. But their request was ignored, finally forcing them to retreat in disarray.
Only after many similar incidents in other locations did Min Aung Hlaing start considering air support.
Initially, it was only approved in emergencies like defending military bases, command centers, or convoys under attack, and requests had to go through multiple levels of approval.
Once they received a request from ground forces for air support, regional military commands had to pass the request on to the office of the army chief. The request was then forwarded to the commander-in-chief of defense services, i.e. Min Aung Hlaing. Only after approval from Min Aung Hlaing could the army chief then ask the air force chief to provide air support.
Because of this bureaucratic process, air support was hard to come by even when ground forces were in crisis.
Even requests to use transport helicopters such as MI-17s required direct authorization from the junta leader, and if he was in a meeting or at a religious ceremony, urgent military requests were often delayed.
Min Aung Hlaing reportedly tended to keep quiet when he was asked permission for air support while attending religious events such as pagoda consecrations or donations to monks—it seems he did not want his kill orders to cancel out any merit he was accruing.
In one instance, junta No. 2 Soe Win personally requested air support, gripping the battle report in his fists. But Min Aung Hlaing left for a pagoda consecration without saying yes or no, and the base that had requested air support fell.
It was when Min Aung Hlaing learned that Soe Win had flown into a rage at the War Office because of this that he agreed to let him take the matter into his own hands.
And so, over time, authority for air attacks became decentralized and soon rested with regional commanders, while attack and transport helicopters were also integrated into regional command structures.
That meant air support requests were handled by an air force lieutenant colonel attached to a given regional military command. These officers then coordinated with the air force chief to facilitate operations, using planes from the nearest available base.
This also allowed Min Aung Hlaing to shift the blame to regional commanders if civilians were being targeted in air raids.
According to the Defense and Security Institute, the process for requesting air support became more flexible as the military’s battlefronts expanded. Now, lower-ranking officers like Light Infantry Division commanders and ground force commanders are authorized to request strikes directly.
But at the strategic level, major air campaigns targeting key locations are exclusively authorized by the Joint Operations Command (JOC)—a high-level body comprising the deputy commander-in-chief, air force chief, and senior coordinating officers from the army, navy, and air force.
Airstrikes are mostly carried out by light attack aircraft such as the Yak-130, K-8, and FTC-2000G, but more advanced aircraft like the JF-17, MIG-29, and F-7 are also deployed as needed for both offensive and defensive operations. They can operate in various weather conditions, and JF-17s are capable of carrying heavy bombs weighing up to 1,000 kg (2,200 lb).
Due to the shortage of attack aircraft, the junta has tried to modify Y-12 transport aircraft for combat purposes, and they are now widely used in air raids with soldiers on board manually dropping bombs. Even paramotors have been used with soldiers manually dropping bombs from the air.
Key bases for nationwide aerial operations include Magwe, Tada-U, Naypyitaw, Taungoo, and Hmawbi air bases, as well as air force training headquarters (Shan Te) in Meiktila.
Bombs are manufactured domestically. Smaller bombs are produced at Ordnance Factory (Ka Pa Sa) 3 near Sinte village in Pyay Township in Bago Region, while larger bombs are manufactured at Ka Pa Sa 21 near Paungkho village and Ngepyawgyi village approximately 48 km from Seikbyu town.
Since these locations and their supply routes remain under junta control, the air force maintains a steady supply of bombs for air operations.
Currently, the junta heavily relies on air support to defend itself against resistance offensives in such towns as Kyaukphyu in Rakhine, Bhamo in Kachin State, and Taunghkam in northern Shan.
The regime is also targeting civilians in areas controlled by the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) after talks with the ethnic armed group in Kunming failed. In northern Sagaing Region, it is also carrying out air raids to instill fear among the population after losing Indaw town on the border of Sagaing and Kachin.
These strikes are part of a broader strategic operation, authorized by the JOC led by Soe Win.
Swe Taw is a defector from the Myanmar military
