With Myanmar’s military teetering on the brink after losing major battles over the past year, superpower China has thrown the junta a lifeline by threatening anti-regime groups and cutting off supplies to territories they control along the border.
China’s pressure and military situation
As fighting de-escalates in northern Shan State amid pressure and threats from China, questions arise over the Spring Revolution’s fate. There is growing speculation that anti-regime groups will lose access to weapons and ammunition due to China’s blockade, allowing the regime to finally gain the upper hand.
Operation 1027, launched on China’s border in Shan State in October last year, transformed the military situation in Myanmar. Before this, northern Shan State was largely conflict-free aside from skirmishes by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA).
Following Chinese special envoy Deng Xijun’s visit to Naypyitaw in late 2022, the regime redeployed troops from northern Shan to Karenni State and other regions.
Back then, the KIA was busy training Kachin resistance groups including the local People’s Defense Force (PDF). After the battle for Alaw Bum in 2021, there were no major military operations in Kachin.
Instead, the fighting was mainly taking place in Sagaing, Magwe, southern Mandalay, and parts of Bago and Tanintharyi regions, and Chin, Karenni and Karen states. Most Spring Revolution forces including PDF groups were still in military training and only equipped with basic weapons. Yet the regime was still unable to gain the upper hand.
Following Operation 1027, fighting has now almost halted in northern Shan State, either because of China’s pressure or because the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) have achieved their military objectives. It is also possible that they have limited their operations due to pressure from China.
However, the regime has ceded almost all of northern Shan State along with its local bases and battalions and is not in a position to retake the lost towns. There is speculation that the MNDAA will have to hand back Lashio due to pressure from China, but this is unlikely.
The MNDAA would have to withdraw troops from at least five locations south and east of Lashio if it returned the northern Shan capital to the regime. The TNLA would also be required to cede Nawnghkio, Kyaukme and Hsipaw, nearby towns it seized from the regime.
The two ethnic armies are unlikely to give up towns they fought so hard and sacrificed so many lives to capture.
Hence, the regime still needs to prepare defenses in nearby strategic locations, including Tangyan, Mongyai, Mongshu, Namlan, Taung Khan, and Pyin Oo Lwin.
The KIA and the Arakan Army (AA), however, remain undaunted by Beijing’s intervention. Despite pressure from China, which borders Kachin State, the KIA has made steady progress in realizing its military objectives since late 2023. China’s influence over the KIA appears limited, given the armed group’s financial and military strength and large political objectives.
Beijing’s pressure on the KIA, MNDAA and TNLA does not extend to the AA, as its territory does not lie on the Chinese border. The ethnic Rakhine armed group has been fighting without a pause in the westernmost state, where China cannot cut off supplies, since soon after Operation 1027 began.
The AA has seized 10 of 17 townships in Rakhine State, and the regime is now struggling to defend four other towns of Ann, Gwa, Taungup, and Maungdaw. Its Western Command headquarters in Ann town looks likely to fall soon. The fall of Ann, Taungup and Gwa towns will pave the way for resistance forces to open new fronts in Ayeyarwady, Bago and Magwe regions.
China, which wants access to the Indian Ocean for its ambitious Belt and Road initiative, may seek to improve ties with the AA.
Given India, which also has huge interests in Rakhine State, has already forged ties with the civilian National Unity Government, its PDF armed wing, and ethnic armed organizations, China may decide to favor the carrot over the stick in dealing with the AA.
Likely scenarios
Despite China’s efforts to resuscitate the military regime, likely scenarios at yearend and early 2025 are as follows:
PDF groups will seize northern Mandalay Region bordering northern Shan while the junta retreats to Madaya in Mandalay. Guns will remain silent in northern Shan State, but thousands of well-equipped local PDF troops will gain footholds in Tagaung, Thabeikkyin, Singu and Madaya townships in northern Mandalay. Guerilla attacks by anti-regime groups will increase in southern Mandalay.
Thousands of Spring Revolution troops that fought alongside the MNDAA will continue returning to central Myanmar with weapons.
In Kachin State, junta battalions will remain confined to defensive positions following the capture of border towns by the KIA and allies during major offensives in late 2023 despite Chinese pressure.
Meanwhile in Sagaing Region, KIA-led PDF groups that have seized five towns including Pinlebu in the north will continue attacking Indaw and Tigyaing towns. Ambushes and sneak attacks have been reported in southern Sagaing.
Ethnic Chin armed groups control much of Chin State with the two sides clashing heavily between Haka and Thantlang. In southern Chin, Matupi has fallen and Mindat is under attack.
In Karenni State, resistance troops have been forced to withdraw from the state capital, Loikaw, due to ammunition shortages. But the troops remain intact and control most of the rural area.
Over the past two months, the regime has used Pa-O National Organization (PNO) troops to launch offensives in Pekon and Pinlaung on the Shan-Karenni border. The PNO has suffered hundreds of casualties but so far failed to achieve its objectives.
Dramatic resistance breakthroughs in northern Myanmar have not extended to Karen State.
But the Karen National Union (KNU) and allied PDF groups have expanded their territory in Myawaddy, Kawkareik and Papun. Waw Lay is the only major junta base left standing in Myawaddy, southern Karen State. Further north in Papun District, only 10 of 70 junta positions remain undefeated. Resistance groups have gained complete control between the Salween River at the border and Sittaung River in Papun and Nyaunglebin districts.
The junta’s national-level counteroffensive, Operation Aung Zeya, has deployed thousands of troops to regain control of Myawaddy but achieved nothing over the past six months and is now grappling with counterattacks by the KNU and PDFs.
Heading into 2025
The resistance offensive will continue in Kachin State into 2025. Large-scale operations are also likely in northern Sagaing and northern Mandalay. Resistance attacks may intensify in Chin State and west of the Irrawaddy River in Magwe Region.
The fighting will intensify in Rakhine State, with resistance operations expected to spread beyond the Arakan Mountains to the Irrawaddy River in Magwe and Ayeyarwady regions.
Battles will continue in Karen, Karenni, and Pinlaung and Hsihseng in southern Shan State. Regular guerilla attacks will continue in Tanintharyi and Bago regions and guerilla attacks may also resume in Yangon Region.
With China’s interference, India is also likely to become involved in Myanmar’s civil war, though armed conflict is unlikely to deescalate.
Amid Beijing’s economic assistance and potential military support for the regime, revolutionary groups may have to struggle harder. Fighting may cease altogether in northern Shan State under pressure from China.
However, Operation 1027 saw the regime lose 86 towns and around 140 battalions and units. More towns are likely to fall in Rakhine State in the months to come.
The junta’s military is exhausted and depleted. Forced conscription has become a last resort, but reluctant recruits with only 2-3 months training will not be enough to reform defeated battalions or even replenish surviving units weakened by heavy fighting.
The regime is now terrorizing communities with indiscriminate air and arson attacks, yet there is no evidence it can gain the upper hand, stem defeats, and recapture lost territory.
It has vowed to recapture territory in northern Shan and Karenni State but is unable to launch a counteroffensive. Its counterattack in Karen State is failing, while it has made no mention of a counteroffensive in Rakhine or Kachin State.
Revolutionary groups will face intensified challenges, including escalated aerial assaults, yet they are likely to consolidate and expand military gains, making the eventual collapse of the Myanmar military increasingly inevitable.
Aye Chan Hsu is a political and military analyst.
